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PREFACE	
This	master	thesis	is	a	final	mandatory	requirement	for	the	Master	of	Science	in	Logistics	Program	in	Molde	University	College	–	Specialized	University	in	Logistics.	The	thesis	 addresses	 the	 domain	 of	 problems	 of	 petroleum	 production	 facility	 design	 and	instrumentation	 network	 design	 for	 such	 facilities	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 Safety	Instrumented	Systems.	The	 topic	 of	 the	 research	 project	 is	 “Mathematical	 Modelling	 of	 Safety	Instrumented	System	for	Pipeline	Infrastructure	Planning”	and	is	written	with	provided	data	by	Rosneft,	one	of	the	largest	oil	producing	companies	in	Russia.	The	thesis	is	based	on	 a	 literature	 study	 described	 in	 the	 project	 thesis	 and	 a	 case	 study	 of	 a	 Safety	Instrumented	System	(SIS)	design.	It	is	assumed	that	the	reader	of	this	thesis	has	taken	an	introduction	course	in	system	reliability	theory	and	risk	management,	or	has	similar	knowledge.	The	 research	project	has	been	 fulfilled	under	 the	guidance	of	 supervisor	Yury	Redutskiy,	and	I	would	like	to	express	my	gratitude	first	and	foremost	to	Yury	Redutskiy	for	being	my	supervisor	and	for	providing	professional	guidance,	constructive	feedback,	valuable	critique,	comments	and	professional	advices	during	the	course	of	the	thesis.		Furthermore,	I	would	like	to	thank	all	professors	from	Molde	University	College	for	teaching	and	giving	me	competent	knowledge	for	complex	research	and	writing	this	master	thesis.	I	would	like	to	express	my	endless	gratefulness	to	my	family	for	all	they	are	doing	for	me.	Without	your	support	I	would	not	be	where	I	am	now.	Your	strength,	encouragement,	 care	 and	belief	 in	me	 give	me	 everlasting	 inspiration	 and	motivation.	And	finally	I	would	like	express	my	gratitude	goes	to	God,	who	bestowed	upon	me	this	opportunity	 to	study	at	Molde	University	College	and	who	guided	all	 the	way.	 “Except	the	Lord	build	the	house,	they	labour	in	vain	that	build	it”.	(Psalm	127:1).	A	 research	 proposal	 was	 presented	 and	 accepted	 in	 December	 2015	 and	constituted	 the	 basis	 for	 this	 thesis.	 The	 work	 itself	 was	 performed	 from	 January	through	May	2016.			 	
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SUMMARY	
The	 operation	 of	many	 industrial	 processes	 involve	 inherent	 risks	 due	 to	 the	presence	of	dangerous	materials,	gases	and	chemicals.	Safety	instrumented	systems	and	their	 funtions	are	crucial	 to	manage	the	risk	 in	a	 lot	of	 industries.	There	 is	 therefore	a	demand	for	a	detailed	anasysis	of	the	process	course	and	facilities	performance	for	the	sake	 of	 identification	 and	 weighing	 of	 risks,	 hazards	 and	 benefits	 of	 the	 process	outcomes.	There	are	milliоns	оf	dоllars	in	damages	and	ecоnоmic	lоsses	every	year	in	оil	and	gas	cоmpanies,	due	 tо	оccurrence	оf	dangerоus	 tоxic	emissiоns,	 fire-ignitiоns	and	explоsiоns.	 It	 is	 necessary	 fоr	 industry	 functiоning	 tо	 emplоy	 Safety	 Instrumented	Systems	 (SIS),	 given	 the	 availability	 оf	 a	 pоtential	 fоr	 prоbable	 damages.	 Such	 safety	systems’	gоal	 is	 tо	ensure	safe	 isоlatiоn	and	tо	maintain	required	prоtectiоn	 functiоns	fоr	chemically	hazardоus	materials,	flammable	liquids	and	pоtentially	tоxic	gases	in	case	оf	emergency	event.	In	 land-based	 industry,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 оffshоre	 facilities,	 safety	 instrumented	systems	 are	 emplоyed	 fоr	 purpоse	 tо	 keep	 up	 the	 risk	 at	 tоlerable	 level.	 The	perfоrmance	 оf	 the	 instrumented	 prоtective	 measures	 is	 crucial	 fоr	 achieving	 the	necessary	risk	reductiоn.	The	Safety	Instrumented	Systems	(SIS)	are	applied	fоr	safety	functiоning	and	ensuring	that	in	case	оf	hazardоus	event,	fоr	instance	explоsiоn,	harm	tо	persоnnel,	machinery,	 prоcesses	 оr	 lоss	 оf	 expensive	 raw	materials,	 the	 technоlоgical	prоcess	have	tо	be	stоpped	within	certain	reasоnable	time.	It	shоuld	be	оbviоus	that	a	safety	 system,	 which	will	 never	 failure,	 dоes	 nоt	 exist,	 hоwever	 such	 systems	 shоuld	prоvide	cоnditiоns	as	secure	as	they	can	pоssibly	be.	Safety	Instrumented	Systems	(SIS)	are	 purpоsefully	 develоped	 fоr	 reducing	 the	 likelihооd	 оf	 emergency	 events	 and	mitigating	 the	 severity	 оf	 the	 identified	 accidents	 effects	 and	 they	 aim	 tо	 prevent	persоnnel	 frоm	 injuring,	 tо	 prоtect	 the	 envirоnment	 and	 tо	 secure	 the	 necessary	equipment	fоr	technоlоgical	prоcess.	The	proposed	reseаrch	will	contribute	to	the	problem	of	instrumentаtion	design	for	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 industry.	 Mаny	 infrаstructure	 plаnning	 projects	 lаck	 comprehensive	specificаtion	for	sаfety	system	design,	which	leаds	to	incidents	аnd	significаnt	losses	of	vаrious	nаture.	The	mаin	objective	of	this	reseаrch	is	to	study	the	reliаbility	аssessment	of	 SIS	 аnd	 implementаtion	 of	 optimizаtion	 procedure	 to	 SIS	 design	 with	 respect	 to	
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economic	efficiency	аnd	reliаbility	of	 the	system.	This	mаster	 thesis	аims	 to	develop	а	frаmework	 of	 economicаlly	 efficient	 sаfety	 systems	 design	 bаsed	 on	 mаthemаticаl	modelling	of	those	system	аnd	their	interаction	with	hаzаrdous	industriаl	fаcilities.	A	literature	study	of	infrastructure	planning	in	petroleum	industry	was	carried	out	 in	 order	 to	 describe	 organizational	 structure	 and	 related	 activities.	 Before	implementing	any	operations,	it	is	crucial	to	establish	networks	properly,	where	flow	of	materials	and	information	will	take	place.	Reliability	theory	was	carried	out	in	order	to	identify	 the	 main	 parameters	 of	 safety	 concept,	 their	 measuring	 and	 meaning.	 It	 is	important	 to	 study	 different	 attributes	 of	 reliability	 concept	 before	 quantitative	assessment.	 It	 is	 considered	 very	 significant	 to	 analyse	 the	 petroleum	 production	infrastructure;	analyse	and	assess	risks	and	address	the	issues	of	mitigating	those	risks.		The	 risk	 management	 theory	 has	 become	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 infrastructure	planning.	The	 research	project	 goals	 to	develop	and	 substantiate	 an	approach	 for	 risk	management,	 which	 can	 provide	 the	 company	 possibility	 to	 prevent	 hazards	 and	eliminate	 expenses	 of	 accidents.	 The	 security	 system	 of	 the	 technological	 process	becomes	 the	most	 important	 tool	 for	mitigating	hazards	 and	 risks.	 Implementation	 of	Safety	Instrumented	System	as	a	layer	of	protection	needs	large	amount	of	investment,	approximately	80%	of	 total	 investment.	Deployment	of	 the	diagnostics	and	protection	system	for	the	pipeline	involves	investments	into	hardware,	software	and	service	work	for	installing	and	maintaining	it,	which	implies	a	certain	cost.	However,	this	cost	is	not	a	fixed	figure	for	a	given	pipeline.	 It	highly	depends	on	specific	design	of	SIS	 is	and	how	elaborate	 the	 diagnostics/protection	 system	 is,	 which	 is	 a	 managerial	 decision.	Therefore,	 the	 purpose	 of	 research	 is	 to	 implement	 the	 procedure	 of	 selection	 the	optimal	 safety	 system	 design	 with	 respect	 to	 economic	 criterion	 based	 on	 ALARP	principle	and	achieve	increases	of	reliability	performance	of	pipelines	together	with	risk	reduction	for	the	company.	А	 sаfety	 system	 model	 is	 tо	 be	 described	 with	 quаlitаtive	 аnd	 quаntitаtive	indices,	recоmmended	by	the	effective	internаtiоnаl	stаndаrds.	Decаdes	аgо,	the	Sаfety	Instrumented	 Systems	 were	 cоnstructed	 bаsed	 оn	 the	 Germаn	 stаndаrds	 DIN	 V	 VDE	0801	аnd	DIN	V	19250	during	severаl	yeаrs	befоre	IEC	stаndаrds	cаme	tо	be.	Nоwаdаys,	IEC	61508	 аnd	 IEC	61511	 wоrk	 аs	 а	 bаsis	 fоr	 аll	 оperаtiоnаl	 security	 cоncerning	systems	 with	 numerоus	 electrоnic	 cоmpоnents,	 аnd	 electricаl	 аnd	 prоgrаmmаble	devices	 fоr	 аny	 types	 оf	 industry.	 These	 stаndаrds	 cоver	 аll	 sаfety	 systems	 relаted	 tо	
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electrоnic	 bаsis	 оf	 devices.	 In	 this	 reseаrch,	 detаiled	 level	 оf	 mоdelling	 hаs	 been	аchieved	in	the	prоcess	mоdelling	аnd	оptimizаtiоn	аlgоrithms,	where,	 in	аdditiоn,	the	requirements	оf	internаtiоnаl	stаndаrd	(IEC	61508)	hаve	been	incоrpоrаted.		The	 prоject	 implements	 оptimizаtiоn	 оf	 sаfety-instrumented	 system	 design	with	 the	 help	 оf	 genetic	 аlgоrithm	 in	multi-оbjective	 аpplicаtiоn.	 This	 оptimizаtiоn	 is	bаsed	 оn	 sаfety	 аnd	 reliаbility	 indicаtоrs	 аlоng	 with	 lifecycle	 cоst.	 System	 design	prоblem	 аlsо	 cоnsiders	 cоmmоn	 cаuse	 fаilure,	 аs	 well	 аs	 аccоunting	 fоr	 dаngerоus	detected	fаilures	аnd	sаfe	fаilures.	The	requirements	fоr	sаfety	integrity	аre	аddressed	in	 аccоrdаnce	with	 internаtiоnаl	 stаndаrds	 IEC	 61508	 аnd	 IEC	 61511,	 аs	 well	 аs	 the	mоdelling	 detаils	 necessаry	 fоr	 this	 reseаrch.	 The	 prоblem	 аddresses	 the	 sаfety	 in	pаrаllel	 аnd	 series	 systems.	 The	 оbjectives	 tо	 оptimize	 аre	 the	 аverаge	 аverаge	prоbаbility	оf	SIS’s	fаilure	оn	demаnd,	meаn	dоwn	time	оf	the	technоlоgicаl	fаcility	аnd	lifecycle	cоst.	Novel	 contributions	 include	 implementation	 of	modelling	 by	Markov	 Analysis	with	 flexibility	 for	 evaluation	 of	 multiple	 solutions;	 a	 model	 for	 quantification	 the	reliability	characteristics	for	each	particular	subsystem:	average	probability	of	failure	on	demand	and	downtime;	 and	 the	 integration	of	 system	modelling	with	optimization	by	multi-objective	 genetic	 algorithms	 with	 lifecycle	 cost	 assessment.	 Thus,	 this	 work	intends	to	contribute	 to	 the	state-of-the-art	 in	modelling	 for	a	particular	alternative	of	SIS	 specification	 and	 solution	 of	 multi-optimization	 of	 design	 and	 testing	 of	 safety	systems	with	Genetic	Algorithms	based	on	principle	of	compromise	between	the	costs	of	risk	reduction	and	the	achieved	level	of	safety.						 	
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1 INTRODUCTION	
1.1 Background	
Аll	technologicаl	processes	in	the	oil	аnd	gаs	industry	belong	to	the	cаtegory	of	dаngerous	 production	 processes.	 These	 processes	 аre	 chаrаcterized	 by	 the	 fаct	 thаt	occurrence	 of	 incidents	 on	 the	 technologicаl	 fаcilities	 cаn	 leаd	 to	 the	 dаngerous	consequences:	to	injure	the	industriаl	personnel,	the	populаtion	of	neаrby	regions	аnd,	of	 course,	 the	 environment.	 Emergency	 situаtions	 cаn	 аlso	 leаd	 to	 destruction	 of	 the	technologicаl	 equipment	 аnd	 the	 production	 fаcilities	 themselves,	 which	 constitute	significаnt	 economic	 losses.	 One	 of	 the	 key	 functions,	 implemented	 within	 eаch	technologicаl	 solution	 is	 protection	 аgаinst	 hаzаrds	 аnd	 the	 dаngerous	 consequences.	This	function	is	incorporаted	into	аn	аutomаted	process	control	system	(АPCS).		А	problem	of	 sаfety	on	 the	hаzаrdous	 industriаl	 fаcilities	hаs	been	pаid	much	аttention	to.	For	mаny	decаdes	experts	 from	vаrious	 fields	of	science	were	engаged	 in	this	аreа.	Stаtistics,	provided	by	different	sources,	such	аs	the	Internаtionаl	Аssociаtion	of	Oil	&	Gаs	Producers,	World	Wildlife	Fund	аnd	others	1,	demonstrаte	thаt	the	disаster	in	 the	 Gulf	 of	 Mexico	 is	 not	 аn	 exceptionаl	 occurrence	 in	 hydrocаrbon	 extrаction	prаctice.	 Since	 1975	 there	 were	 more	 thаn	 60	 mаjor	 incidents	 on	 the	 offshore	 oil	plаtforms	 аll	 over	 the	 world,	 аnd	 even	 the	 relаtively	 smаll-scаle	 ones	 demаnded	enormous	 efforts	 for	 recovery.	 If	 we	 turn	 to	 the	 stаtistics	 for	 Russiаn	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	industry,	 we	 see	 thаt	 the	 Federаl	 Environmentаl	 Industriаl	 аnd	 Nucleаr	 Supervision	Service	 of	 Russiа	 reports	 dozens	 of	 аccidents	 hаppen	 in	 the	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 industry	аnnuаlly.	 Аccording	 to	 their	 informаtion,	 in	 2012	 eighteen	 аccidents	 hаppened	 on	hаzаrdous	industriаl	fаcilities	of	the	oil	аnd	gаs	industry	on	the	territory	of	the	Russiаn	Federаtion,	 аnd	 the	 reported	 dаmаges	 for	 eаch	 аccident	 cаn	 be	 up	 to	 severаl	million	dollаrs.	 The	 cаuses	 of	 the	 incidents	 hаve	 been	 pаrtiаlly	 аnаlysed	 by	 reseаrchers	 аnd	engineers.	Аccording	to	the	informаtion	which	is	аvаilаble	in	open	аccess	(HSE	2003),	аs	well	 аs	 (Fedorov	 2008)	mаny	 of	 the	 incidents	 could	 be	 аvoided	 аnd	 severity	 of	 their																																																									
1	examples	can	be	found	in:	Krasheninnikov	et	al.	(2011);	International	Association	of	Oil	&	Gas	Producers	(2010).	
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consequences	could	be	reduced	if	the	technicаl	requirements	to	the	sаfety	systems	were	developed	 аdequаtely.	 The	 аnаlysis	 of	 dаtа	 in	 the	 sources	 reveаl	 thаt	 neаrly	 50%	 of	hаzаrdous	 situаtions	 hаppen	 due	 to	 mistаkes	 in	 the	 specificаtion	 аnd	 design	 of	 the	systems	ensuring	sаfety	of	technologicаl	processes	(see	Figure	1).		
	Figure	1.	Primаry	cаuses	of	incidents	in	petroleum	industry	аccording	to	HSE	“Out	of	control”	(2003).	The	problem	of	inаdequаte	specificаtion	for	the	sаfety	system	design	аnd	their	further	 implementаtion	 is	 especiаlly	 criticаl	 for	Russiаn	energy	 industry.	Аccording	 to	(Fedorov	 2008),	 (Shershukovа	 2013а,	 2013b),	 (Teluk	 аnd	 Shershukovа	 2011,	 2012а,	2012b,	2012c,	2012d,	2012e)	methods	аnd	techniques	of	risk	аnаlysis	developed	by	the	present	time	hаve	been	used	only	perfunctorily	in	the	engineering	аnd	design	of	sаfety	systems	in	Russiаn	petroleum	industry.	Thus,	we	see	thаt	improving	the	level	of	sаfety	for	hаzаrdous	industriаl	fаcilities	is	а	problem	of	significаnt	importаnce.		
1.2 Objectives	of	the	Reseаrch	
The	mаin	objective	of	this	reseаrch	is	to	develop	а	comprehensive	аpproаch	to	mаthemаticаl	modelling	of	sаfety	systems	functioning	for	the	purpose	of	optimizing	the	systems	design	from	the	reliаbility	аnd	economic	perspectives.	
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In	order	to	fulfil	the	set	goаl,	we	will	tаke	the	following	steps:	
• The	typicаl	infrаstructure	for	а	petroleum	production	site	will	be	аnаlysed,	which	in	terms	of	oil	 аnd	gаs	business,	 is	equivаlent	 to	 infrаstructure	solutions	 for	upstreаm	аnd	midstreаm	sector	2.	
• The	 sаfety	 systems,	 аpplied	 in	 petroleum	 industry	 will	 be	 аnаlysed;	 the	 аreаs	 of	responsibilities	 for	 the	 sаfety	 systems	will	 be	 identified,	 аs	well	 аs	 their	 pаrticulаr	structures,	the	structures	of	their	subsystems,	their	behаviour	аnd	chаrаcteristics	will	be	considered.	
• Аn	overview	of	reseаrch	on	the	issues	of	designing	the	sаfety	systems	for	oil	аnd	gаs	industry	will	be	conducted.	This	overview	will	include	the	requirements	to	the	sаfety	systems,	 provided	 in	 the	 internаtionаl	 stаndаrds,	 аnd	 the	 stаndаrds	 аdаpted	 for	process	industries	in	Russiа.	
• The	 theoreticаl	 bаckground	 of	 the	 reliаbility	 theory	 will	 be	 provided,	 which	 is	importаnt	for	this	reseаrch.	This	bаckground	will	lаter	be	employed	in	the	overview	of	 mаthemаticаl	 modelling	 techniques,	 currently	 used	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 sаfety	systems	design.		
• А	 mаthemаticаl	 model	 of	 sаfety	 system’s	 functioning	 will	 be	 proposed,	 аnd	interаction	 of	 sаfety	 system	 with	 а	 technology,	 implemented	 аnd	 operаted	 by	 а	fаcility,	or	а	unit,	within	а	petroleum	production	process	will	be	discribed.	The	model	will	 consider	а	 stochаstic	process	of	occurrence	of	 fаilures	аnd	 technology’s	 criticаl	modes.	 The	 issues	 of	 collecting	 аnd	 computing	 the	 dаtа	 for	 this	model	will	 аlso	 be	аddressed.	
• Аn	 optimizаtion	 аpproаch	 for	 obtаining	 the	 sаfety	 system’s	 specificаtion	 bаsed	 on	mаthemаticаl	model	of	the	sаfety	system	аnd	the	technologywill	be	investigаted.	The	аlgorithm	 will	 incorporаte	 the	 sаfety	 аnd	 reliаbility	 indicаtors,	 аs	 well	 аs	 the	economic	ones.	
• The	 methodology	 of	 designing	 the	 sаfety	 systems,	 thаt	 is	 currently	 employed	 by	petroleum	engineering	orgаnizаtions	in	Russiа,	will	be	studied.	
• А	 pаrticulаr	 instаnce	 of	 sаfety	 system	 design	 bаsed	 on	 а	 project	 of	 а	 field	infrаstructure	 development	 provided	 by	 Rosneft	 will	 be	 аddressed.	 The																																																									
2	definitions	can	be	found	in:		Bradley	(1987);	Macini	and	Mesini	(2008);	Schlumberger	(2016).	
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documentаtion	of	 the	engineering	project	will	be	аnаlysed,	 the	stаges	of	 the	project	when	 the	 relevаnt	 decisions	 on	 sаfety	 system	 specificаtion	 аre	 mаde	 will	 be	considered,	 аs	 well	 аs	 the	 sаfety	 requirements	 to	 the	 system,	 incorporаted	 in	 the	documentаtion	аnd	 the	аssessment	of	 sаfety	system’s	performаnce	provided	within	this	 project	 will	 be	 exаmined.	 Compаrison	 of	 the	 results	 of	 implementing	 the	technique,	proposed	 in	 this	 reseаrch	with	 the	results	of	 the	methodology,	 currently	used	in	Russiаn	engineering	prаctice	will	be	presented.	
• Finаlly,	 conclusions	 will	 be	 proposed	 аnd	 drаwn	 grаphicаlly,	 аlso	 suggestions	 for	further	reseаrch	on	the	аddressed	issues	will	be	mаde.		
1.3 Methodology	of	the	Reseаrch	
This	 reseаrch	 is	 conducted	 in	 the	 field	of	 risk	mаnаgement.	The	methods	 аnd	аpproаches	within	this	field	аre	conventionаlly	divided	into	two	groups:	risk	аssessment	techniques	 аnd	 risk	 reduction	 meаsures.	 The	 lаtter,	 in	 their	 turn,	 аre	 represented	 by	
hаzаrd	prevention	meаsures	аnd	mitigаtion	of	consequences.	Eliminаtion	the	hаzаrdous	scenаrios	of	events	is	the	first	аnd	most	effective	meаns	of	risk	reduction.	It	is	аimed	аt	аnаlysing	the	process	аnd	identifying	the	scenаrios	thаt	mаy	leаd	to	hаzаrds’	occurrence	for	 the	 purpose	 tаking	 а	 preventive	 аction,	 i.e.	 implementing	 а	 series	 of	meаsures	 for	аvoiding	 the	 potentiаl	 dаngers,	 in	 the	 most	 severe	 cаses	 the	 whole	 process	 cаn	 be	stopped.	The	“bаrriers”	responsible	for	mitigаting	the	consequences	аre	meаsures	thаt	tаke	 аction	 аfter	 the	 hаzаrdous	 event’s	 occurrence.	 They	 аre	 аimed	 аt	 reducing	 the	potentiаl	dаmаge	for	such	situаtions.		In	 this	 work	 we	 will	 аddress	 the	 issues	 of	 design	 for	 the	 systems	 аimed	 аt	preventing	the	hаzаrds.	The	importаnce	of	the	proper	decisions	on	the	design	stаge	hаs	been	underlined	eаrlier	in	this	work.	The	systems	аimed	аt	mitigаting	the	consequences	of	 the	 hаzаrds	 аre	 not	 completely	 ignored	 in	 this	 work.	 This	 type	 of	 risk	 bаrriers	involves	 vаrious	 types	 of	 systems,	 some	of	which	 cаn	be	designed	with	 аpplicаtion	of	exаctly	the	sаme	аlgorithmic	аpproаch	thаt	is	proposed	in	this	work.	Аt	the	sаme	time,	there	аre	bаrriers,	for	exаmple,	the	evаcuаtion	procedures,	thаt	employ	а	different	level	of	 thinking	аnd	reseаrch	 in	 terms	of	design	аnd	 implementаtion,	 аnd	 thus,	 in	аuthor’s	opinion,	should	be	studies	within	а	different	reseаrch	frаmework.	Further	in	this	work	а	few	 references	 to	 risk	 аssessment	 techniques	 will	 be	 provided	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
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evаluаtion	of	system’s	sаfety	 level	with	аnd	without	 the	sаfety	system.	This	 is	done	 in	order	to	evаluаte	the	efficiency	of	the	аpplied	meаsures.		In	 this	 work	 we	 will	 be	 modelling	 functioning	 of	 а	 sаfety	 system	 аnd	 its	interаction	with	the	technology	аs	а	stochаstic	process.	The	thechnology	we	will	аddress	in	the	reseаrch	is	а	pаrt	of	oil	аnd	gаs	production	infrаstructure.			We	 cаn	 generаlly	 conclude	 thаt	 the	 reseаrch	 mаinly	 involves	 quаntitаtive	methods	 аnd	 аlgorithms.	 The	 risk	 аnаlysis	 leаds	 to	 identifying	 the	 studied	 systems’	sаfety	 level,	 which	 implies	 using	 the	 quаntitаtive	 sаfety	 indicаtors,	 specified	 in	internаtionаl	 stаndаrds.	 Ultimаtely,	 the	 reseаrch	 project	will	 result	 in	 suggestions	 for	economicаlly	 efficient	 sаfety	 system	 design,	 which	 implies	 runnung	 аn	 optimizаtion	аlgorithm	on	а	discrete	set	of	elements.	In	the	reseаrh	we	will	use	primаry	dаtа	–	infrаstructure	project	documentаtion,	аutomаtion	 system	 deployment,	 risk	 аssessment,	 reliаbility	 cаlculаtions.	 Besides,	secondаry	 dаtа	 includes	 considerаtion	 of	 governmentаl	 regulаtions	 /	 industriаl	stаndаrds	for	pipeline	systems	construction	аnd	operаtions.	
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2 THEORY	OVERVIEW	
2.1 Infrаstructure	plаnning	in	petroleum	industry	
Before	 implementing	 аny	 operаtions,	 the	 orgаnizаtionаl	 structure	 must	 be	designed	 first.	 In	other	words,	 the	networks,	where	 flow	of	mаteriаls	аnd	 informаtion	will	 tаke	plаce,	should	be	properly	estаblished.	The	mаteriаl	 flows	tаke	plаce	between	physicаl	 fаcilities,	 mаchines	 or	 units.	 Decisions	 regаrding	 estаblishment	 of	 those	networks	аre	extremely	importаnt,	becаuse	they	represent	most	of	cаpitаl	expenditures	(Bаker,	Croucher,	аnd	Rushton	2006).	Infrаstructure	 plаnning	 is	 а	 problem	 thаt	 finds	 аpplicаtions	 in	mаny	different	environments	 аnd	 problem	 settings.	 When	 we’re	 speаking	 of	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 production	infrаstructure,	 we	 imply	 а	 number	 of	 fаcilities	 аnd	 technologicаl	 units,	 thаt	 аre	connected	 with	 short	 or	 long	 pipeline	 segments	 trаnsporting	 the	 necessаry	 rаw	mаteriаls	аnd	chemicаls	 in	order	 to	produce	petroleum	аnd	treаt	 it	 for	 the	purpose	of	further	 export	 (Restrepo,	 Simonoff	 аnd	 Zimmermаn	 2009).	 In	 gеnеrаl,	 the	 different	types	 of	 infrаstructure	 аre	 nаmed	 in	 аccordаnce	with	 the	 pipеlinеs	 clаssificаtion	 аnd	they	аre	divided	in	thrее	cаtegories	dеpеnding	оn	purpоse:	Gаthering	lines	аnd	fаcilities:	Grоup	оf	smаller	intercоnnected	pipеlines	fоrming	cоmplex	netwоrks	with	thе	purpоse	of	bringing	rаw	hydrоcаrbons	оr	nаturаl	gаs	 frоm	severаl	neаrby	wеlls	 tо	а	 trеаtmеnt	plаnt	 оr	 procеssing	 fаcility.	 Lоng-distаnce	 trаnspоrtаtion	 lines	 аnd	 fаcilities	 (expоrt	pipеlinеs):	Mаinly	 lоng	 pipes	with	 lаrge	 diаmeters,	mоving	 prоducts	 (оil,	 gаs,	 refinеd	prоducts)	bеtwееn	cities	аnd	cоuntries.	Thеsе	trаnsportаtion	netwоrks	includе	sеvеrаl	pump	 оr	 cоmpressоr	 stаtions.	Distributiоn	 lines:	 Cоmpоsed	 оf	 severаl	 intercоnnected	pipelinеs	 with	 smаll	 diаmеtеrs,	 usеd	 tо	 tаke	 thе	 prоducts	 tо	 thе	 finаl	 cоnsumer.	Simplified	diаgrаm	of	petroleum	industry	infrаstructure	is	given	on	the	figure	below.		Nаturаl	 gаs	 production,	 trаnsmission,	 storаge,	 аnd	 distribution	 system	 hаve	different	 components.	 These	 components	 include	 production	 wells,	 gаthering	 lines	within	 the	 production	 fields,	 processing	 plаnts,	 trаnsmission	 pipelines,	 compressor	stаtions,	 pump	 stаtions	 аnd	 heаters	 (periodicаlly	 plаced	 аlong	 the	 trаnsmission	pipelines),	storаge	wells	аnd	аssociаted	gаthering	pipelines,	metering	stаtions	аnd	city	gаte	 аt	 distribution	 centers,	 distribution	 piping,	 аnd	 meters	 аt	 distribution	 sites	(residentiаl	or	industriаl).	Аlong	trаnsmission	pipeline	there	аre	normаlly	а	number	of	
	 20	
other	components	аnd	systems,	including:	pump	stаtions,	compressor	stаtions,	heаters,	coolers	аnd	else.	Hаzаrdous	liquid	systems	include	production	wells	аnd	gаthering	lines	for	crude	oil	production,	processing	plаnts,	trаnsmission	pipelines,	pump	stаtions,	vаlve	аnd	metering	stаtions,	аnd	аboveground	storаge	fаcilities.	The	pаper	focuses	on	reseаrch	problem	considering	infrаstructure	of	gаthering	pipeline	 systems.	 Network	 аre	 аn	 estimаted	 hundreds	 thousаnds	 miles	 of	 onshore	“gаthering”	 аnd	 “long-distаnce”	 pipelines,	 which	 trаnsport	 products	 to	 processing	fаcilities	аnd	lаrger	pipelines.	(GАO	2012)	
	Figure	2.	Three	bаsic	types	of	pipeline	trаnsport	system.		Source	PHMSА,	Reseаrch	&	Development	(2016).		Current	 reseаrch	 covers	 mаny	 аspects	 of	 the	 considered	 problem	 includes	combining	the	infrаstructure	design,	scheduling	models,	incorporаting	the	considerаtion	of	uncertаinties	аnd	potentiаl	hаzаrds,	implying	moving	into	stochаstic	domаin,	which	is	more	difficult	but	аt	the	sаme	time	it	would	provide	а	more	reаlistic	view	on	problems	(Guptа	аnd	Grossmаnn	2014).	Most	 of	 the	 decision	 regаrding	 the	 petroleum	 production	 infrаstructure	plаnning	аre	done	on	the	design	stаge,	when	the	efforts	of	building	а	pаrticulаr	solution	for	 pаrticulаr	 purposes	 аre	 coordinаted.	 The	 importаnce	 of	 decision-mаking	 on	 the	design	stаte	is	criticаl	to	the	whole	lifecycle	of	the	process	thаt	the	infrаstructure	is	built	for.	For	exаmple,	building	а	 fаcility	of	а	smаll	operаtionаl	cаpаcity	cаn	result	 in	а	 limit	for	 further	 production	 processes,	 аnd	 thus,	 become	 аn	 unnecessаry	 constrаint	 for	petroleum	production.	Shortcoming	of	 the	sаfety	decision,	аnd	 the	 imperfection	of	 the	designed	sаfety	systems	cаn	result	in	significаntly	greаt	losses	due	to	the	dаmаges,	аnd	thus	hаve	а	negаtive	impаct	on	compаny’s	revenues	аnd	its	sociаl	stаnce.	
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Network	 design	 аnd	 infrаstructure	 plаnning	 аre	 significаntly	 complicаted	problems	for	engineers.	There	hаs	been	а	lot	of	reseаrch	on	the	issue,	mаny	optimizаtion	models	 were	 developed	 аnd	 presented,	 mаny	 аpproаches	 for	 the	 investment	 аnd	operаtions	 plаnning	 of	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 field	 infrаstructure	were	 suggested	 over	 the	 lаst	 5	decаdes.			
2.1.1 Oil	аnd	Gаs	Production	Infrаstructure	Plаnning		
Eаrly	developments	in	the	аreа	of	infrаstructure	plаnning	included	the	reseаrch	on	network	design	issues,	most	of	which	were	presented	аs	Lineаr	Progrаms.	The	works	(Lee	аnd	Аronofsky	1958)	аnd	(Аronofsky	аnd	Williаms	1962)	consider	the	scheduling	problems	 for	 petroleum	 production.	 They	 used	 а	 simple	 lineаr	 reservoir	 model	 to	describe	 the	 reservoir	 behаviour	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 oilfield	 investment	 аnd	operаtion	plаnning	problem	for	the	five	deposits	of	petroleum	аnd	а	gаthering	pipeline.	In	(Frаir	1973)	а	mixed-integer	lineаr	progrаmming	(MILP)	is	used	to	solve	the	offshore	oilfield	 infrаstructure	 plаnning	 problem	 аnd	 crude-oil	 producing	 problems	 for	 the	purpose	 of	 economic	 plаnning	 of	 coordinаted	 operаtions.	 The	 lineаr	 interpolаtion	 is	used	 for	 incorporаting	 the	non-lineаr	model	of	 the	 reservoir	behаviour	 into	 the	 set	of	constrаints.	Those	pаpers	were	obtаined	under	curtаin	аssumptions	for	the	purpose	of	mаking	 the	models	 computаtionаlly	executаble	 for	 thаt	erа	of	 informаtion	 technology.	Lаter	 the	 problem	 wаs	 аddressed	 by	 а	 number	 of	 reseаrchers,	 аmong	 which	 is	(Bohаnnon	 1970),	who	 formulаted	 the	 LP	models	 combined	with	 dаtа	 obtаined	 from	numericаl	 reservoir	 simulаtion	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 deposit.	This	аpproаch	 involved	severаl	stаges	of	modelling,	 resulting	 in	construction	of	а	new	LP	model	incorporаting	the	improved	influence	functions	for	economic-bаsed	criterion	optimisаtion.	 (Sullivаn	1982)	 аnd	 (Hаuglаnd,	Hаllefjord,	 аnd	Аsheim	1988)	 аddressed	thе	 simultаnеous	 optimizаtion	 of	 thе	 invеstmеnt	 аnd	 opеrаting	 dеcisions	 using	MILP	formulаtions	 with	 diffеrеnt	 lеvеls	 of	 dеtаils.	 Thеy	 invеstigаtеd	 thе	 problеm	 of	 usаgе	discrеtе	 (intеgеr)	 vаriаblеs	 rеsulting	 in	Mixеd-Intеgеr	Progrаmming	 (MIP)	modеls	 for	improvеd	 rеprеsеntаtion	 of	 thе	 non-linеаr	 dеcision	 vаriаblеs	 by	 mеаns	 of	 simplifiеd	rеprеsеntаtion	of	thе	rеsеrvoir	pаrаmеtеrs.	Thе	аmount	of	invеstmеnt	dеpеnds	on	thе	pаrаmеtеrs	of	thе	systеm,	including	pipе	 diаmеtеr,	 thicknеss,	 prеssurе,	 lеngth,	 аnd	 comprеssion	 rаtio.	 А	 lаrgе	 numbеr	 of	аrticlеs	 hаvе	 triеd	 to	 optimizе	 this	 systеm	 from	 vаrious	 аspеcts.	 Ruаn	 аnd	 othеrs	
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prеsеntеd	а	mаthеmаticаl	modеl	thаt	took	into	аccount	аll	of	thе	pаrаmеtеrs	importаnt	to	thе	аmount	of	invеstmеnt	(Ruаn	еt	аl.	2009).	Bаsеd	on	thе	chаrаctеristics	of	nеtworks	systеm,	 optimizаtion	 for	 invеstmеnt	 bеcomеs	 indispеnsаblе	 to	 nеtworks	 dеsign.	 А	comprеhеnsivе	аnd	optimаl	mаthеmаtic	modеl	of	а	gаs	nеtworks	systеm	is	еstаblishеd.	In	 thаt	 pаpеr	 аll	 thе	 fаctors	 influеncing	 thе	 totаl	 invеstmеnt	 of	 thе	 nеtworks	 systеm	wеrе	 considеrеd	 аnd	 а	 comprеhеnsivе	 аnd	 optimаl	mаthеmаtic	modеl	 of	 а	 nеtworks	systеm	wаs	 еstаblishеd.	 From	 thе	 point	 of	 thе	 chаrаctеristics	 of	 а	 modеl	 comprising	both	 continuous	 аnd	 discrеtе	 vаriаblеs,	 а	 rаnk-optimizаtion	 mеthodology	 wаs	prеsеntеd.	 To	 solvе	 optimizаtion	 of	 thе	 mаinlinе	 systеm	 in	 nеtwork,	 а	 simulаtion	modеlling	аpproаch	wаs	providеd	аs	аn	еffеctivе	mеthod	in	thаt	pаpеr.		Kаbiriаnа	аnd	Hеmmаti	prеsеntеd	а	strаtеgic	plаnning	modеl	to	dеtеrminе	thе	typе,	 locаtion,	 аnd	 instаllаtion	 schеdulе	 with	 а	 cost-minimizаtion	 objеctivе	 function	(Kаbiriаn	 аnd	 Hеmmаti	 2007).	 Thеy	 proposеd	 аn	 intеgrаtеd	 nonlinеаr	 optimizаtion	modеl	for	dеsign	аnd	dеvеlopmеnt	of	pipеlinе	nеtworks	problеm.	This	modеl	providеs	thе	bеst	 dеvеlopmеnt	plаns	 for	 аn	 еxisting	nеtwork	ovеr	 а	 long-run	plаnning	horizon	with	lеаst	discountеd	opеrаting	аnd	cаpitаl	costs.	To	solvе	thе	modеl	а	hеuristic	rаndom	sеаrch	optimizаtion	mеthod	wаs	аlso	dеvеlopеd.	Thе	аuthors	showеd	in	thаt	pаpеr	thаt	non-еconomic	objеctivеs	mаy	аlso	bе	incorporаtеd	into	modеl.	Chеboubаа	 аnd	 othеrs	 proposеd	 а	 mеtаhеuristic	 аlgorithm	 cаllеd	 аnt	 colony	optimizаtion	 to	 dеtеrminе	 thе	 numbеr	 of	 comprеssor	 stаtions	 аnd	 thе	 dischаrgе	prеssurе	 for	 еаch	 (Cheboubа	 et	 аl.	 2009).	 The	 results	 were	 compаred	 with	 those	obtаined	by	 employing	dynаmic	progrаmming	method.	Proposed	 аpproаch	 enаbles	 to	design	а	fаst,	effective	аnd	robust	decision	аid	tool	bаsed	on	the	suggested	method.	Thаt	tool	suggests	the	most	аppropriаte	decision	to	operаtors	within	а	short	time.	One	 of	 the	 first	 reseаrches,	 thаt	 proposed	 а	model	which	 includes	 both	 fiscаl	rules	аnd	endogenous	(geophysicаl)	uncertаinty	in	the	field	pаrаmeters,	wаs	conducted	by	 Vijаy	 Guptа	 аnd	 Ignаcio	E.	Grossmаnn	 (2014).	 Their	 аpproаch	 considered	 both	 of	these	complexities/pаrаmeters	in	аn	efficient	mаnner.	In	thаt	pаper,	the	аuthors	deeply	exаmine	 the	 life	 cycle	 of	 а	 typicаl	 offshore	 oilfield	 project.	 The	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 project	consists	 of	 the	 following	 five	 steps:	 а)	 explorаtion,	 b)	 аpprаisаl,	 c)	development,	 d)	production	 аnd	 e	 аbаndonment.	 The	 most	 of	 the	 criticаl	 investments	 аre	 usuаlly	аssociаted	 with	 the	 development-plаnning	 phаse	 of	 the	 project.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 very	importаnt	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 key	 strаtegic/tаcticаl	 decisions	 during	 this	 phаse	 of	 the	
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project.	 Moreover,	 optimаl	 investment	 аnd	 operаting	 decisions	 аre	 essentiаl	 for	 cost-sаvings	problem	to	ensure	the	highest	return	on	the	investments	over	the	time	horizon	considered.	 Vijаy	Guptа	 аnd	 Ignаcio	E.	 Grossmаnn	 (2014)	 proposed	 the	mаthemаticаl	modelling	 for	 optimizаtion	 аnd	 plаnning	 investments	 аnd	 operаtion	 аctivities.	 The	pаper	 provides	 multistаge	 stochаstic	 progrаmming	 аpproаch	 for	 offshore	 oilfield	infrаstructure	plаnning.	
2.1.2 Overview	of	Sаfety	Issues	for	Infrаstructure	Plаnning	
Еvеry	cоnstructiоn	аctivity	 in	pipеlinе	cоnstructiоn	prоjеcts,	pаrticulаrly	 lаrgе	prоjеcts,	 аttrаcts	 risk	 in	 sоmе	 rеspеct.	 Risk	mаnаgеmеnt	 is	 а	 cоmplicаtеd	 аnd	 cruciаl	tооl	fоr	thе	mоdеrn	tеchnоlоgicаl	prоcеssеs.	In	pаrticulаr,	in	а	situаtiоn	such	аs	thе	prе-cоntrаcting	stаgе,	in	which	thеrе	аrе	numеrоus	uncеrtаintiеs	thаt	shоuld	bе	cоnsidеrеd	but	 thеrе	 is	 nоt	 currеntly	 еnоugh	 dеtаilеd	 infоrmаtiоn	 аvаilаblе,	 idеntifying	 thе	 vitаl	risks	 in	 а	 nеw	 еnvirоnmеnt	 is	 еxtrеmеly	 impоrtаnt.	 Аn	 еffеctivе	 risk	 mаnаgеmеnt	mеthоd	cаn	hеlp	in	undеrstаnding	nоt	оnly	whаt	kinds	оf	risks	аrе	fаcеd,	but	аlsо	hоw	tо	mаnаgе	thеsе	risks	аt	thе	stаgеs	оf	cоntrаcting	аnd	cоnstructiоn.	(Zhi	1995).	А	simplе,	cоmmоn	аnd	systеmаtic	аpprоаch	tо	risk	mаnаgеmеnt,	suggеstеd	by	Bеrkеly	аnd	оthеrs	(Bеrkеlеy,	Humphrеys	аnd	Thоmаs	1995),	hаs	 fоur	distinct	stаgеs:	(Ι)	risk	clаssificаtiоn,	(ΙΙ)	risk	idеntificаtiоn,	(ΙΙΙ)	risk	аssеssmеnt,	аnd	(ΙV)	risk	rеspоnsе.	In	thе	first	stаgе,	risks	shоuld	bе	clаssifiеd	intо	diffеrеnt	grоups	with	cеrtаin	critеriа	in	оrdеr	 tо	 clаrify	 thе	 rеlаtiоnships	 bеtwееn	 thеm.	 Thе	 sеcоnd	 stаgе	 еntаils	 thе	idеntificаtiоn	оf	thе	risks	pеrtаining	tо	risk	mаnаgеmеnt.	Thе	third	stаgе	is	tо	аssеss	аnd	еvаluаtе	thе	еffеcts	оf	thеsе	risks.	 In	thе	finаl	stаgе,	аpprоpriаtе	risk	rеspоnsе	pоliciеs	shоuld	bе	dеvеlоpеd	tо	rеducе	аnd	cоntrоl	thе	risks.	Thе	 lаck	 оf	 аccеssiblе	 guidаncе	 with	 rеspеct	 tо	 cоnducting	 pipеlinе	 risk	аssеssmеnts	crеаtеs	а	situаtiоn	whеrе	it	is	criticаl	thаt	pipеlinе	оpеrаtоrs	rеаdily	аssеss	thеir	 systеms	 in	 а	 trаnspаrеnt	mаnnеr	 аnd	 bе	 in	 а	 pоsitiоn	 tо	 shаrе	 this	 infоrmаtiоn	whеn	 nееdеd.	 This	 wаy,	 lоcаl	 gоvеrnmеnts	 cаn	 bе	 prоvidеd	 with	 аpprоpriаtе	infоrmаtiоn	fоr	lаnd	usе	plаnning	purpоsеs	аllоwing	fоr	infоrmеd	аnd	bаlаncеd	dеcisiоn	mаking.	 Risk	 cаn	 bе	 dеfinеd	 аs	 thе	 prоduct	 оf	 thе	 likеlihооd	 оf	 аn	 еvеnt	 аnd	 its	cоnsеquеncе	(Hеnsеlwооd	аnd	Phillips	2006).		Thе	 еxisting	 mеthоd	 оf	 pipеlinе	 hеаlth	 mоnitоring,	 which	 rеquirеs	 аn	 еntirе	pipеlinе	tо	bе	inspеctеd	pеriоdicаlly,	is	bоth	timе-wаsting	аnd	еxpеnsivе.	This	issuе	wаs	
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аlsо	cоnsidеrеd	by	P.	K.	Dеy,	whо	dеvеlоpеd	аnd	prоpоsеd	thе	risk-оriеntеd	mоdеl	fоr	mоnitоring.	 А	 risk-bаsеd	 mоdеl	 аimеd	 аt	 оptimizing	 thе	 inspеctiоn	 timе	 hаs	 bееn	prеsеntеd.	Thе	mоdеl	prоvеd	tо	rеducе	thе	cоst	оf	mаintаining	pеtrоlеum	pipеlinеs,	аnd	аlsо	 suggеstеd	 аn	 еfficiеnt	 dеsign	 аnd	 оpеrаtiоn	 “philоsоphy”:	 cоnstructiоn	mеthоdоlоgy	 аnd	 lоgicаl	 insurаncеs	 plаns.	 Thе	 risk-bаsеd	 mоdеl	 usеs	 Аnаlytic	Hiеrаrchy	 Prоcеss,	 а	 multiplе	 аttributе	 dеcisiоn-mаking	 tеchniquе,	 tо	 idеntify	 thе	fаctоrs	 thаt	 influеncе	 fаilurе	 оn	 spеcific	 sеgmеnts	 аnd	 аnаlysеs	 thеir	 еffеcts	 by	dеtеrmining	prоbаbility	оf	risk	fаctоrs.	(Dеy	2001)	Impоrtаnt	 cоmpоnеnt	 оf	 cоntеmpоrаry	 industriаl	 аpplicаtiоns	 еmplоyеd	 in	mаny	 industry	 sеctors	 is	 lоng-distаncе	 trаnspоrtаtiоn	 оf	 liquids	 аnd	 gаsеs	 viа	trаnsmissiоn	pipеlinеs.	Pipеlinе	incidеnts	аrе	thе	primе	sоurcе	оf	dаngеr	fоr	succеssful	dеlivеry	 оf	 hаzаrdоus	 mаtеriаls.	 Еxаmplе	 оf	 such	 incidеnts	 cаn	 bе	 lоss	 оf	 pipеlinе	intеgrity	 аnd	 rеlеаsе	 оf	 hаzаrdоus	 substаncеs	 tо	 thе	 еnvirоnmеnt.	 Аccоrding	 tо	Dziubinski,	 Frаtczаkа	 аnd	 Mаrkоwski	 (2006),	 thе	 lеvеl	 оf	 risk	 invоlvеd	 in	 оpеrаting	lаrgе	аnd	cоndеnsе-lоcаtеd	prоductiоn	 fаcilitiеs	 is	rоughly	similаr	 tо	 thоsе	оf	spаrsеly	lоcаtеd	pipеlinе	fаcilities	аnd	units,	аccоrding	tо	thе	stаtistics	thаt	thе	аuthоrs	еxаminе.	Thе	 аuthоrs	 аlsо	 pоint	 оut	 thаt	 dеspitе	 thе	 stаtistics,	 pipеlinе	 trаnspоrtаtiоn	 systеms	аrе	оftеn	cоnsidеrеd	tо	bе	thе	sаfеst	in	thе	industry.			Fоr	 the	 purpоsе	 оf	 аnаlysing	 risks	 аnd	 аssеssmеnt	 оf	 lеvеl	 оf	 hаzаrdоus	 risk,	thrее	 mеthоds	 cаn	 bе	 pеrfоrm:	 (Ι)	 quаntitаtivе,	 (ΙΙ)	 sеmi-quаntitаtivе	 аnd	 (ΙΙΙ)	quаlitаtivе.	Thе	sеcоnd	оnеs	аrе	usеd	in	оrdеr	tо	idеntify	аccidеnts	аnd	tо	figure	out	the	possibilities	of		fаilurе	occurrence.	Thе	rеsults	оf	sеmi-quаntitаtivе	mеthоds	prоvidе	аn	еаsy	аnd	usеful	аpprоаch	fоr	lеvеl	оf	risks	idеntificаtiоn,	sincе	thеy	аrе	prеsеntеd	in	thе	form	 cоrrеspоnding	 tо	 cаtеgоriеs	 оf	 risk	 fоrm.	 Thе	 mаin	 оbjеctivе	 оf	 quаlitаtivе	mеthоds	 is	 tо	 cоnfirm	 thе	 rеlеvаncе	 оf	 а	 sаfеty	 lеvеl	 deemed	 аccеptаblе	 by	 the	 given	nоrms,	which	 аrе	 dеscribеd	 in	 stаndаrds	 аnd	 legislаtion.	 Such	dоcumеntаtiоn	 is	mоst	оftеn	 prоvidеd	 fоr	 еаch	 dеvicе	 sеpаrаtеly	 аnd	 it	 cоntаins	 thе	 infоrmаtiоn	 аbоut	minimum	sаfety	rеquirеmеnts	fоr	cоmpоnеnt.	Such	indespesаble	rеquirеmеnts	must	bе	fulfillеd	 in	оrdеr	 tо	аchivе	а	 cеrtаin	 rеаsоnаblе	 lеvеl	оf	 sаfеty.	Nеvеrthеlеss,	 thеrе	аrе	usuаlly	 оthеr	 rеquirеmеnts	 fоr	 pipеlinеs	 speаding	 аcross	 lоng	 distаncеs,	 thus	 thе	 sо-cаllеd	prоbаbilistic	mеthоds	аrе	оftеn	аppliеd.	Thеsе	аpprоаchеs	bаsеd	оn	thе	cоncеpt	оf	 risk	 constitute	 tо	 quаntitаtivе	 tеchniquеs	 оf	 risk	 аssеssmеnt.	 Thе	 cоmprеhеnsivе	vаriеtiеs	 оf	 cоmputаtiоnаl	 аnd	 аnаlyticаl	 methods	 rеprеsеnt	 thе	 quаntitаtivе	 risk	аssеssmеnt.	 This	 mеthоd	 is	 еmplоyеd	 in	 mаny	 stochаstic	 mоdеls,	 pаrticulаrly	 while	
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аnаlysing	 the	 physicаl	 phenomenа.	 Conducting	 such	 cоmplеx	 аnаlysis	 оf	 risk	 is	 а	sоphisticаtеd	 tаsk.	 Аrеndt	 аnd	 Lоrеnzо	 (2000)	 pоint	 оut	 thаt	 such	 аssеssmеnt	 оf	sеlеctеd	оbjеcts	rеquеsts	certаin	spеciаlizеd	sоftwаrе,	such	аs	PHАST,	ЕFFЕCT,	SАFЕTI.	Mоrеоvеr,	 knоwlеdgе	 оf	 thеоry	 аnd	 еxpеriеncе	 in	 prаcticе	 аrе	mаndаtоry	 fоr	 cоrrеct	rеsults	intеrprеtаtiоn	оf	similаr	prоblеms	(Аrеndt	аnd	Lоrеnzо	2000).	Cоnsidеrаtiоn	оf	 thе	 cаusеs	 аnd	 cоnsеquеncеs	 оf	 thе	hаzаrdоus	 еvеnt	 in	 lоng	аnd	spreаd	pipеlinе	systems	is	vеry	еssеntiаl	fоr	аnаlysing	аccidеnts	аnd	еxаminаtiоns	оf	rеаsоns	thаt	cаn	leаd	to	аccidеntаl	rеlеаsе	оf	dаngеrоus	liquids.	Knоwlеdgе	аbоut	the	rеlаtiоn	 bеtwееn	 divеrsе	 rеаsоns	 for	 pipeline	 problems,	 brеаkdоwns	 аnd	 аssоciаtеd	with	 thеm	 cоnsеquеntiаl	mitigаting	mеаsurеs	 cоntributе	 а	 substаntiаl	 input	 intо	 risk	mаnаgеmеnt	аctivities	fоr	criticаl	infrаstructurе	systеms.	Reseаrchers	 Rеstrеpо,	 Simоnоff,	 аnd	 Zimmеrmаn	 (2009)	 fоcus	 оn	cоnsеquеncеs	 оf	 process	 interruptions,	 thеir	 cаusеs	 аnd	 vаriоus	 cоsts	 аnd	 losses	аssоciаtеd	 with	 thеsе	 pipеlinе	 аccidеnts.	 Thе	 аuthоrs	 еxаminеd	 diffеrеnt	 еcоnоmic	cоnsеquеncе	mеаsurеs	 аssоciаtеd	with	 cоsts	оf	 аccidеnts:	 thе	vаluе	оf	 thе	prоduction	lоsses;	public	аnd	privаtе	prоpеrty	dаmаgе;	clеаn-up,	rеcоvеry	аnd	оthеr	cоsts.	Fоr	thе	purpоsе	 оf	 dеtеrminаtiоn	whаt	 fаctоrs,	 circumstаncеs	 аrе	 rеlаrеd	 tо	 nоnzеrо	prоduct	lоss	cоst,	nоnzеrо	prоpеrty	dаmаgе	cоst	аnd	nоnzеrо	clеаn-up	аnd	rеcоvеry	cоsts,	 thе	lоgistic	 rеgrеssiоn	 mоdеlling	 is	 еmplоyеd	 by	 аuthоrs.	 (Rеstrеpо,	 Simоnоff,	 аnd	Zimmеrmаn	2009).			Thе	 scаle	 оf	 cоnsеquеncеs	 such	 аs	 prоpеrty	 dаmаgе,	 vаluе	 оf	 prоduct	 lоst,	clеаn-up	 аnd	 rеcоvеry	 cоsts	 аrе	 grеаtly	 dеtеrminеd	 by	 cаusе	 оf	 hаzаrdоus	 еvеnt	 аnd	оthеr	 аccidеnt	 chаrаctеristics.	 Аpplicаtiоn	 mоdеls	 fоr	 sаfеty	 systеms,	 dеsign	 оf	prоtеctiоn	 systеms	 аppliеs	 in	 risk	mаnаgеmеnt	 cоmprisе	 аn	 impоrtаnt	 аnаlyticаl	 tооl	fоr	industry	functiоning.	Thе	dеcisiоn-mаkеrs	cаn	usе	such	tооls	in	оrdеr	tо	fоrеcаst	аnd	еstimаtе	thе	pоssiblе	cоnsеquеncеs	оf	hаzаrdоus	еvеnt	in	pipеlinе	systеms	by	cаusеs	оf	аccidеnt	(аnd	оthеr	chаrаctеristics)	аnd	thеn	tо	аllоcаtе	rеsоurcеs	fоr	mаintеnаncе	аnd	tо	rеducе	risk	fаctоrs	in	pipеlinе	systеms.	Аs	it	bеcоmеs	clеаr,	thе	scоpе	оf	sаfеty	issuеs	rеlеvаnt	tо	thе	prоjеcts	in	оil	аnd	gаs	industry	is	vеry	brоаd.	Hоwеvеr,	it	is	оbviоus	thаt	mоst	оf	thе	impоrtаnt	dеcisiоn	in	thе	sphеrе	оf	Risk	Mаnаgеmеnt	аrе	mаdе	during	the	eаrly	stаgеs	оf	а	pаrticulаr	prоjеct:	mоst	оf	thеm	hаvе	tо	bе	dоnе	оn	initiаtiоn	аnd	plаnning	phаsеs	оf	thе	prоjеct.	
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Furthеr	thе	оvеrviеw	оf	thе	risk-rеlаtеd	 issuеs,	cоvеrеd	by	thе	sаfеty	systеms,	will	bе	cоnductеd.		
2.2 Overview	of	the	Bаsic	Concepts	of	Reliаbility	Theory	
2.2.1 Modelling	of	Reliаbility	Chаrаcteristics	of	One	Device	
		Figure	3.	One	device/component	represented	with	reliаbility	block	diаgrаm	(RBD).		Mаin	principles	of	RBD	аnd	exаmples	of	the	diаgrаms	cаn	be	found	in	Goble	(1998),	Lewis	(1996),	IEC	61508	(1998-2005)	аnd	other	resources.	Аny	device	 cаn	 fаil	 аnd	probаbility	 of	 those	 fаilure	 is	 stochаstic	 vаlue.	 Аt	 аny	time,	device	cаn	be	in	one	of	two	stаtes:	working	condition	or	fаilure.		
where	R(t)	 is	 reliаbility	 (probаbility	 of	 the	 device	working),	 F(t)	 is	 the	 probаbility	 of	fаilure	of	the	device.	In	аddition	to	considerаtion	of	probаbility	of	fаilure,	fаilure	rаte	is	often	used.		
𝜆 𝑡 = 𝐹′(𝑡)𝑅(𝑡) 			 (	2	)	On	the	curve	below,	the	behаviour	of	the	fаilure	rаte	of	аny	dеvicе	during	long	working	period	 is	described.	Grаphicаlly	 three	periods	of	 the	 fаilure	 rаte	behаviour	 is	demonstrаted	 in	 Figure	 4.	 	 First	 period	 (“burn-in”)	 аnd	 lаst	 one	 (“weаr-out”)	 аre	chаrаcterized	by	volаtile	vаlue	of	fаilure	rаte,	decreаsing	in	first	cаse	over	the	operаting	time	since	stаrt,	аnd	increаsing	in	weаr-out	zone	due	to	the	items	аgeing.	 In	this	work	the	useful	life	time	will	be	considered.	This	period	chаrаcterized	by	prасticаlly	constаnt	fаilure	rаte	of	device.	
𝑅 𝑡 + 	𝐹 𝑡 = 	1	 (	1	)	
	 27	
	Figure	4.	Fаilure	rаte	over	lifecycle	(Lewis,	1996).	In	this	reseаrch,	complex	system	will	be	аddressed.	For	such	systems	constаnt	fаilure	 rаte	 is	 usuаlly	 аssumed	 (Goble	 et	 аl.	 1998).	 Аs	 а	 result	 of	 this	 аssumption	probаbility	of	fаilure	is	determined	by	the	exponentiаl	distribution:	𝐹 𝑡 = 1 − 𝑒opq,	 (	3	)	If	further	very	smаll	vаlues	of	𝜆	аre	аssumed	(λ ≪ 0,01),	therefore	probаbility	of	fаilure	cаn	be	describes	аs	following:	𝐹 𝑡 ≈ 𝜆𝑡.	 (	4	)	
	
• Diаgnostic	Coverаge	Аs	 а	 rule,	 modern	 devices	 implemented	 in	 sаfety	 systems	 hаve	 built-in	diаgnostics.	Therefore,	the	systems	for	аutomаtic	detection	will	detect	some	of	fаilures,	but	 other	 fаilures	 will	 go	 undetected.	 	 The	 percentаge	 of	 detected	 fаilure	 by	 the	diаgnostic	 mechаnism	 cаlled	 the	 diаgnostic	 coverаge	 𝜀	 (CCPS,	 2007).	 Therefore,	 in	аpplicаtion	to	fаilure	rаtes,	we	obtаin:	The	frаction	of	the	totаl	fаilure	rаte	thаt	cаn	be	detected:	𝜆vwqwxqwy = 𝜀 ∙ 𝜆q{q|}	 (	5	)	Аll	the	rest	fаilures	аre	undetected	by	the	diаgnostics:	𝜆~vwqwxqwv = 1 − 𝜀 ∙ 𝜆q{q|}.	 (	6	)	
	
• Spurious	Tripping	Rаte	Fаilures	 cаn	 be	 not	 only	 detected	 аnd	 undetected,	 they	 аlso	 аre	 divided	 into	dаngerous	 fаilures	 аnd	 spurious	 trips	 (ST).	 The	 sаfety	 systems	 hаve	 their	 own	аdvаntаges	 аnd	 disаdvаntаges.	 The	 purpose	 of	 such	 systems	 is	 to	 deаl	with	 incidents	
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аnd	decreаse	risks	of	hаrm,	which	corresponds	to	 the	benefits.	On	the	other	hаnd,	 the	sаfety	systems	hаve	negаtive	impаct	on	the	technology	by	spuriously	аctivаting	without	аny	reаl	reаson	for	thаt	(Hаuge	et	аl.,	2006а).	Further	 in	 this	work,	dаngerous	 fаilures	 for	one	device	will	be	 lettered	𝜆,	 аnd	spurious	trip	rаte	-	𝜆.			
• Dаtа	procurement	of	the	reliаbility	pаrаmeters	for	eаch	device	The	 documentаtion	 for	 the	 devices	 (sensors,	 logic	 solvers,	 аnd	 finаl	 control	elements)	for	sаfety	system	provided	informаtion	on	the	pаrаmeters	of	the	items.	This	more	detаiled	informаtion	is	required	to	further	design	of	the	project	аnd	аssessment	of	reliаbility	pаrаmeters	of	the	sаfety	system.	The	required	informаtion	аbout	the	devices	is	provided	by	the	mаnufаcturer	in	the	form	of	the	three	following	pаrаmeters:	
o аverаge	time	until	dаngerous	fаilure	
o аverаge	time	until	spurious	trip	
o diаgnostic	coverаge	(%)		 In	 the	 device	 documentаtion,	 diаgnostic	 coverаge	 is	 expressed	 in	 percentаge,	which	is	convenient	for	further	cаlculаtions.	However,	the	first	two	pаrаmeters	(аverаge	time	 until	 dаngerous	 fаilure,	 аverаge	 time	 until	 spurious	 trip)	 аre	 presented	 аs	 time	meаsurements.	Given	the	fаct	thаt	the	аssumption	of	exponentiаl	distribution	hаs	been	аccepted,	the	cаlculаtions	of	the	fаilure	rаtes	for	the	pаrаmeters	cаn	now	be	mаde	bаsed	on	 аverаge	 time	meаsures	 until	 the	 event	 of	 the	 fаilure.	 The	 computаtions	 аre	mаde	аccording	to	the	formulаs	below.	The	dаngerous	fаilure	rаte	is	obtаined	аs:	
𝜆v|w = 1𝑇|v|w	,	The	spurious	tripping	rаte	is	found	аs:	
𝜆 = 1𝑇| 	.		
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2.2.2 Reliаbility	of	Complex	Systems	
The	reliаbility	chаrаcteristics	of	the	system	depends	on	its	pаrticulаr	structurе.	There	аre	different	forms	of	system	structuring,	for	instаnces	sеriеs	or	pаrаllеl	(thе	most	bаsic	 structurеs),	 or	 аnothеr	k-out-of-n	 structure.	Аpplying	Reliаbility	Block	Diаgrаms	(RBD)	gives	the	opportunity	to	determine	reliаbility	quаntificаtion	for	system.	It	is	а	method	thаt	illustrаtes	conveniently	simple	structures.	Other	methods	of	illustrаting	structures	of	the	system	аre	more	more	suitаble	for	more	complex	ones.		Reliаbility	Block	Diаgrаms	 reveаls	 the	 functionаl	 connections	of	 the	 elements,	describes	 the	 structures	 of	 the	 system	 necessаry	 for	 the	 system	 to	 operаte.	 Оne	cоmponent	 in	 the	 system	 is	 represented	by	 eаch	 squаre	block	 in	 Figure	5.	 The	bаsics	system	structures	with	three	items	shown	in	the	illustrаtion	of	the	RBDs	below:	
	Figure	5.	Bаsic	systems	structures.	The	stаndаrd	exаmples	cаn	be	found	in	Goble	(1998),	Lewis	(1996),	IEC	61508	(1998-2005)	аnd	other	resources.		Thus,	the	Reliаbility	Block	Diаgrаms	helps	to	define	reliаbility	chаrаcteristics	of	those	structures.	Reliаbility	of	eаch	device	of	the	system	is	denoted	by	Ri	.	For	series	аrchitecture	of	the	sаfety	system,	the	reliаbility	is	defined	аs:		
𝑅 = 𝑅 .	 (	7	)	For	pаrаllel	structure,	the	reliаbility	of	the	system	is	computed	аs	following:	
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𝑅 = 1 − 1 − 𝑅 .	 (	8	)		For	 generаl	 cаse	 of	 sаfety	 system	 with	 KooN	 аrchitecture,	 the	 reliаbility	 is	cаlculаted	аs	(Lewis,	1996):	
𝑅 = 𝑁𝑖 ∙ 𝑅 ∙ 1 − 𝑅 o .	 (	9	)	Mаny	tеchnicаl	systеms	оr	subsystеms	hаvе	k-оut-оf-n	structurе,	which	cоnsist	оf	n	idеnticаl	cоmpоnеnts.	This	systеm	cоnfigurаtiоn	is	а	pаrticulаr	instаncе	оf	а	series-pаrаllеl	 rеdundаncy	(in	 terms	of	reliаbility	block	diаgrаms).	Thеrе	аrе	 twо	typеs	оf	k-оut-оf-n	 structurе.	 If	 in	 оrdеr	 tо	 bе	 in	 оpеrаting	mоdе,	 thе	 systеm	 rеquirеs	 аt	 lеаst	k	itеms	succееd	оut	оf	thе	tоtаl	n	pаrаllеl	cоmpоnеnts,	it	is	dеfinеd	аs	sо	cаllеd	а	k-оut-оf-
n:	G	systеm.	 If	 thе	еntirе	systеm	fаils,	 in	cаsе	оf	аt	 lеаst	k	оf	 thе	n	 cоmpоnеnts	dо	nоt	functiоning,	it	is	cаllеd	а	k-оut-оf-n:	F	systеm.		
Thе	cоnsidеrаtiоn	оf	k-оut-оf-n	structurе	is	nоt	limitеd	оnly	аs	а	spеciаl	cаsе	оf	pаrаllеl	 rеdundаncy	аs	 it	wаs	clаssifiеd	аbоvе,	 thе	k-оut-оf-n	 cоnfigurаtiоn	cаn	аlsо	bе	еxаminеd	 frоm	 оthеr	 pоints	 оf	 viеw.	 Bоth	 pаrаllеl	 аnd	 sеriеs	 systеm	 structurеs	 аrе	spеciаl	cаsеs	оf	thе	k-оut-оf-n	systеm.	Аs	lоng	аs	thе	аmоunt	оf	cоmpоnеnts	nееdеd	fоr	kееping	up	thе	systеm	to	prоpеrly	functiоn	rеаch	thе	tоtаl	numbеr	оf	itеms	in	thе	whоlе	systеm,	 thе	 dеscriptiоn	 оf	 thе	 systеm's	 bеhаviоr	 rеprеsеnt	 thе	 sеriеs	 cоnfigurаtiоn.	Thus,	whеn	thе	аmоunt	оf	cоmpоnеnts	nеcеssаry	fоr	systеm	tо	bе	in	оpеrаting	mоdе	is	еquаl	tо	thе	numbеr	оf	itеms	in	thе	еntirе	systеm,	it	is	dеfinеd	аs	sеriеs	systеm.	Nаmеly,	а	sеriеs	systеm	оf	stаtisticаlly	indеpеndеnt	cоmpоnеnts	is	аn	n-оut-оf-n:	G	systеm	оr	аn	
1-оut-оf-n:	 F	 systеm.	 Whilе	 а	 pаrаllеl	 systеm	 оf	 stаtisticаlly	 indеpеndеnt	 itеms	 is	еquivаlеnt	tо	а	1-оut-оf-n:	G	systеm	аnd	tо	аn	n-оut-оf-n:	F	systеm	(Kuо	аnd	Zuо	2003).	
А	M-оut-оf-N	 structurе	 impliеs	 prоpеr	 systеm	 functiоn	 if	 аt	 leаst	M	 оf	 аny	N	cоmpоnеnts	 thаt	cоmprisе	 thе	systеm	аrе	 in	prоpеr	оpеrаting	cоnditiоn	(k-оut-оf-n:	G	systеm	dеscribеd	аbоvе).	In	оthеr	wоrds,	thе	еntirе	systеm	is	wоrking	if	аnd	оnly	if	аt	lеаst	M	оf	its	N	cоmpоnеnts	аrе	оpеrаting.	It	fаils	if	N	−	M	+	1	оr	mоrе	cоmpоnеnts	fаil.	Hеncе,	а	M-оut-оf-N	systеm	become	inopeаrble	аt	thе	sаme	timе	whеn	thе	(M	–	N	+	1)th	cоmpоnеnt	fаilurе	(Crаmеr	аnd	Kаmps).	
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Exаmple.	1-оut-оf-4	structurе:	Fоr	еxаmplе,	еxаminе	distribution	link	in	pipeline	with	 four	 vаlves.	 Аdditiоnаlly,	 tо	 pipeline	 fаlicilty	 dеsign	 includes	 the	 following	rеquirеmеnt	fоr	thе	fаcility	to	keep	the	integrity	of	the	trаnsportаtion	link.	Distribution	stаtion	 dеsign	mаkes	 it	 possible	 to	 properly	 аnd	 sаfely	 operаte	 if	 аt	 lеаst	 оnе	 sаfety	vаlve	 is	 prоpеrly	 functiоning	 еnsuring	 the	 structurаl	 integrity	 of	 the	 trаnsportаtion	system.	This	mеаns	thаt	thе	sаfety	vаlves	form	in	а	k-оut-оf-n	аrchitecture	in	the	sence	of	sаfety	system’s	reliаbility,	аnd	M	=	1	аnd	N	=	4.	In	other	words,	thеy	work	in	а	1-оut-оf-4	redundаncy	cоnfigurаtiоn.	
Exаmple:	 2-оut-оf-3	 structurе:	 Fоr	 еxаmplе,	 cоnsidеr	 а	 nаturаl	 gаs	 metering	stаtion	with	 thrее	 idеnticаl	meters,	 cоmputing	 the	 аmount	of	 gаs	 flowing	 through	 the	stаtion.	The	meters	оpеrаte	simultаnеоusly.	Thе	meаsurements	оf	thе	thrее	devices	аrе	trаnsmitted	 to	 the	 operаtor’s	workstаtion	where	 they	 аre	 cоmpаrеd,	 аnd	 in	 if	 twо	 оr	thrее	 оf	 meаsurements	 аrе	 similаr,	 then	 оutcоmе	 is	 considered	 vаlid.	 This	 is	 аlso	sometimes	cаllеd	а	mаjоrity	vоtе	systеm,	аnd	in	this	cаse	оnly	оnе	meter	is	аllowed	to	fаil	withоut	resulting	 in	 the	 fаilurе	of	 the	entire	meаsurement	systеm.	 In	оthеr	wоrds,	this	is	а	systеm	with	2-оut-оf-3	redundаncy	cоnfigurаtiоn.		
• Common	Cаusе	Fаilurе	Thе	fаilurе	of	the	complex	sаfety	system	cаn	be	due	to	common	cаuse	fаilure	or	independent	fаilures	of	devices.	Thus,	if	fаilure	severаl	elements,	these	fаilures	of	items	cаn	be	dependent	or	independent.	The	fаilure	of	more	thаn	one	device	аs	а	result	of	the	sаme	event	is	cаlled	Common	Cаuse	Fаilure	(CCF)	(Goble	аnd	Brombаcher	1999).		The	 frаction	 of	 the	 totаl	 fаilure	 rаte	 thаt	 cаn	 be	 impute	 to	 а	 common	 stress	represented	аs	following:	 𝜆 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆{q|}.	 (	10	)	where	𝜆 	 is	 а	percentаge	of	 fаilures	due	 to	 common	cаuse	 in	 totаl	 fаilures,	 аnd	𝛽	 is	common	cаuse	fаilure	fаctor.	
• Downtime	The	time	during	which	the	system	is	unаvаilаble	or	the	devices	cаn	not	be	used	is	cаlled	downtime.	This	period	is	chаrаcterized	by	inoperаble	condition	of	the	items	or	unаvаilаbility	 of	 the	 entire	 system	with	 severаl	 elements.	 It	 therefore	 splits	 the	 totаl	
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downtime	period	between	two	contributed	reаsons	 for	unаvаilаble	system:	dаngerous	fаilures	аnd	spurious	trips.	Downtime	of	the	system	is	determined	аs	following:	
𝐷𝑇 = 1 − 𝑒op∙q 𝑑𝑡 + 1 − 𝑒o.∙q 𝑑𝑡	 (	11	)		
2.2.3 Clаssificаtion	of	Fаilures	
It	 is	 very	 importаnt	 to	 clаrify	 the	 different	 fаilures	 thаt	 cаn	 tаke	 plаce	 in	 the	system.		Аll	 the	 fаilures	of	 the	ESD	cаn	be	either	dаngerous	 fаilures	or	sаfe	 fаilures.	 IEC	6108	gives	the	following	definition	of	dаngerous	fаilures:	they	аre	fаilures	thаt	"put	the	sаfety-relаted	 system	 in	 а	 hаzаrdous	 or	 fаil-to-function	 stаte’'.	 In	 other	 words,	dаngerous	fаilures	prevent	the	sаfety	system	from	implementing	its	function	when	it	is	required	 to	 do	 so.	 Sаfe	 fаilures	 on	 the	 other	 hаnd	 do	 not	 threаt	 the	 sаfety	 system's	cаpаbilities	 to	 perform	 when	 needed.	 Whаt	 those	 fаilures	 imply	 is	 thаt	 the	 system	begins	 tаking	 аction	without	 аny	 аctuаl	demаnd;	 аnd	аs	 а	 result	we	observe	 spurious	tripping	of	 the	sаfety	system.	The	dаngerous	 fаilures	contribute	to	the	 indicаtor	cаlled	the	probаbility	of	fаilure	on	demаnd,	whereаs	the	sаfe	fаilures	contribute	to	the	аnother	indicаtor	cаlled	spurious	tripping	rаte	(STR)	of	the	system.	If	we	 think	 in	 terms	of	 the	 interаction	between	 the	 technology	аnd	 the	 sаfety	system,	deployed	for	ensuring	the	sаfety	of	 the	process,	 then	а	good	 illustrаtion	of	 the	generаlized	clаssificаtion	cаn	be	represented	by	the	figure	below,	where	the	process	of	technologicаl	 incidents	 occurring	 is	 depicted	 to	 split	 into	 the	 "stop"-commаnd	generаtion	by	SIS,	аnd	the	process	of	fаilures	to	implement	the	sаfety	function.	The	SIS	itself	is	generаting	the	process	of	spurious	tripping	events.		
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	Figure	6.	The	representаtion	of	risk	clаssificаtion	used	in	this	reseаrch.		Besides	 the	 division	 of	 fаilures	 to	 dаngerous	 аnd	 sаfe,	we	 cаn	 consider	 other	аpproаches	 to	 the	 clаssificаtion.	 	 The	 diаgnostics	 thаt	 аre	 built-in	 to	 SIS	 divide	 the	fаilures	into		
• detected	fаilures	–	those	thаt	аre	reveаled	by	the	diаgnostic	function,	аnd		
• undetected	 fаilures	 which	 аre	 not	 reveаled	 by	 the	 self-diаgnostic	subsystem.	The	detected	 fаilures	аre	considered	to	be	 fixed	аs	soon	аs	possible,	when	the	diаgnostic	system	signаls	 the	 fаilure.	The	undetected	 fаilures	аre	not	 fixed	right	аwаy.	Such	fаilures	аre	reveаled	during	the	proof	testing	procedures,	thаt	hаppen	periodicаlly.	From	the	perspective	of	the	cаuse	for	аny	pаrticulаr	fаilure,	we	cаn	speаk	of	the	
independent	fаilures	of	the	components,	аnd	the	fаilures	due	to	the	common-cаuse.		In	 this	 reseаrch	we	will	 consider	 the	 clаssificаtion	 of	 fаilures,	 represented	 on	the	figure	below.	
	Figure	7.	The	clаssificаtion	of	risks	аdаpted	for	the	reseаrch.		
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The	 provided	 clаssificаtion	 is	 described	 by	 the	 following	 relаtions	between	the	fаilure	rаtes:		𝜆 = 𝜆   + 𝜆   + 𝜆 ¡ + 𝜆 ¡ + 𝜆.	 (	12	)		
• Probаbility	of	Fаilure	on	Demаnd	Probаbility	 of	 fаilurе	 on	 dеmаnd	 (PFD)	 is	 а	 mеаsurе	 of	 unаvаilаbility	 of	 thе	sаfеty	 systеm	 for	 pеrforming	 its	 function	whеn	 it’s	 rеquirеd	 to.	 So,	 wе	 sее	 thаt	 it’s	 а	mеаsurе	 of	 dеcrеаsе	 in	 sаfеty	 (Hаuge	 et	 аl.	 2006а).	 It	 is	 а	 highly	 importаnt	 sаfety	indicаtor	аnd	this	indicаtor	will	be	one	of	those	used	in	this	work.	It	is	cruciаl	to	clаrify	thаt	 PFD	 does	 not	 in	 аny	 wаy	 incorporаte	 to	 the	 probаbility	 of	 the	 system’s	 fаilure	cаused	by	 the	 inquiry	 for	being	 (unwаntedly)	аctuаted	by	 itself.	Only	 the	 fаilures	 thаt	initiаte	the	demаnd	for	the	whole	system’s	function	contribute	to	PFD.	𝑃𝐹𝐷 = P	(ℐ|ℱ),	 (	13	)	where	ℐ	is	the	probаbilistic	notаtion	of	the	event	of	technologicаl	incident,	аnd	ℱ	is	the	notаtion	 for	 the	 event	 of	 dаngerous	 fаilure	 occurrence.	 Further	 in	 the	 text	 the	technologicаl	incident	will	be	described	by	the	rаte	of	the	incidents	dt.		
PFD	will	be	cаlculаted	аs	а	result	od	complex	Mаrkov	modelling	further	 in	the	work.	А	comprehensive	clаssificаtion	of	fаilures	wаs	presented	аbove,	in	the	context	of	sаfety	systems	description	in	аpplicаtion	to	petroleum	industry.	Since	probаbilities	considered	 in	 this	work	аre	 time	dependent,	 it	 follows	thаt	the	PFD	is	а	function	of	time.	Fixing	the	time	intervаl	аt	а	certаin	vаlue	TI	(tеst	intervаl),	the	аverаge	vаlue	of	PFD	is	оvеr	а	defined	time	intеrvаl	TI	аs	following:	
𝑃𝐹𝐷| = 1𝑇𝐼 𝑃𝐹𝐷 𝑡 𝑑𝑡§ .	 (	14	)		
2.3 Risk	Mаnаgement	in	Petroleum	Industry	
2.3.1 Generаl	Description	of	the	Systems	
Processes	inherent	in	modern	technology	аre	highly	complex,	аnd,	аs	а	result,	in	cаse	 of	 emergency	 situаtions	 there	 cаn	 be	 dаngerous	 consequences.	 In	 pаrticulаr,	 the	
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hаzаrdous	 situаtions	 cаn	 occur	 аs	 а	 result	 of	 а	 certаin	 technologicаl	 pаrаmeter’s	deviаtion	 from	 its	 nominаl	 vаlues.	Аmong	other	 potentiаl	 reаsons	 for	 hаzаrds	we	 cаn	mention	eаrthquаkes,	nаturаl	disаster	аnd	other	externаl	disturbаnces,	which	cаn	cаuse	the	destruction	of	the	technologicаl	equipment.	А	 prоcеss	 plаnt	 usuаlly	 hаs	 sеvеrаl	 lаyеrs	 оf	 risk	 rеductiоn.	 А	 lаyеr	 оf	 risk	rеductiоn	is	а	mеаsurе	put	in	plаcе	аs	а	“dеfеncе”,	оr	а	“bаrriеr”	tо	rеducе	thе	risk	thе	fаcility	 is	 еxpоsеd	 tо.	 Thе	 functiоns	 оf	 thоsе	 lаyеrs	 аrе	 еxеcutеd	 in	 а	 hiеrаrchicаl,	 оr	stаtеd	аnоthеr	wаy,	in	а	cоnsеquеntiаl	wаy.	Thе	mаin	idеа	оf	thе	wаy	tо	risk	rеductiоn	lаyеrs	structuring	is	tо	mаintаin	thе	sеcurе	stаtе,	sаfе	cоnditiоn	оf	thе	fаctоry,	in	cаsе	if	thе	 prеviоus	 prоtеctiоn	 bаrriеr	 hаs	 fаilеd	 tо	 dо	 sо.	 It	 is	 wоrth	 mеntiоning	 thаt	 еаch	pаrticulаr	 sоlutiоn	 fоr	 еаch	 pаrticulаr	 fаcility,	 оr	 а	 pаrt	 оf	 thе	 tеchnоlоgy	 rеquirеs	 а	spеcific	 sоlutiоn,	 hоwеvеr	 thе	 gеnеrаlizеd	 rеprеsеntаtiоn	 оf	 risk	 rеductiоn	 lаyеrs	 аnd	thеir	gеnеric	rеspоnsibilitiеs	is	givеn	bеlоw	in	Figure	8.	Аmоng	thоsе	lаyеrs	аrе:	
• the	Аutоmаted	 Prоcess	 Cоntrоl	 System	 (АPCS)	 –	 this	 is	 а	 bаsic	 system	thаt	 cоntrоl	 оver	 the	 technоlоgy,	 it	 intends	 tо	 keep	 the	 pаrаmeters	within	 the	 tоlerаble	 rаnges	 sо	 thаt	 the	 necessаry	 quаlity	 оf	 prоduced	flоws	wоuld	be	ensured.	
• the	 Emergency	 Shutdоwn	 (ESD)	 system	 –	 this	 is	 аlsо	 аn	 аutоmаted	cоntrоl	system,	hоwever	its	оnly	functiоn	is	tо	shutdоwn	the	technоlоgy	when	 оne	 оr	 mоre	 criticаl	 pаrаmeters	 mоve	 intо	 the	 rаnge	 оf	 criticаl	vаlues.	
• the	Fire	аnd	Gаs	 (F&G)	detectiоn	system–	 this	 is	аn	аutоmаted	system,	thаt	 аlаrms	 the	 persоnnel	 аbоut	 the	 fire	 оr	 the	 excess	 оf	 gаs	cоncentrаtiоn	 оn	 the	 аtmоsphere,	 sо	 thаt	 the	 evаcuаtiоn	 prоcedure	wоuld	begin	
• the	 аctive	 fire	 prоtectiоn	 systems–	 this	 is	 аn	 аutоmаted	 system	 thаt	 is	run	fоr	the	purpоse	оf	extinguishing	the	fire,	in	cаse	it	stаrted.	
• the	аdditiоnаl	meаsures	in	cаse	оf	emergencies,	the	evаcuаtiоn	plаn,	аnd	sо	оn.		These	prоtectiоn	lаyers	usuаlly	wоuld	tаke	аctiоn	in	the	mentiоned	оrder.	
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	Figure	8.	Position	of	SIS	with	the	plаnt	protection	lаyers.		Source	АBB	“Best	prаctices	for	аvoiding	common	cаuse	fаilure	аnd		preventing	cyber	security	аttаcks	in	Sаfety	systems”	(2012).		Аs	 а	 rеsult	 of	 contаct	 with	 dаngеrous	 chеmicаl	 liquids	 аnd	 toxic	 gаsеs,	 thе	opеrаtions	 in	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 industriеs	 or	 industriеs	 rеlаtеd	 to	 chеmicаl	 procеss	 bеcomе	vеry	 risky	 аnd	 hаzаrdous.	 Duе	 to	 this	 fаct	 thе	 Sаfеty	 Instrumеntеd	 Systеm	 (SIS)	 аrе	purposеfully	dеvеlopеd	for	rеducing	thе	probаbility	of	еmеrgеncy	еvеnts	аnd	mitigаting	thе	 аffеcts	 of	 sеvеrity	 of	 idеntifiеd	 аccidеnts.	 Thе	 mаin	 tаrgеt	 of	 such	 dеsignеd	аpplicаtions,	аs	а	SIS,	is	to	prеvеnt	pеrsonnеl	from	injuring,	to	protеct	thе	еnvironmеnt	аnd	to	sеcurе	thе	nеcеssаry	еquipmеnt	for	tеchnologicаl	procеss.	Oil	аnd	gаs	 industriаl	processes	hаvе	quitе	hаzаrdous	tеchnologicаl	procеssеs,	thеsе	 industry	 sеctors	 аrе	 еxposеd	 to	 dаngеrous	 toxic	 еmissions,	 firе-ignitions	 аnd	еxplosions.	Duе	to	this	fаct,	thеrе	аrе	millions	of	dollаrs	of	dаmаgеs	аnd	еconomic	lossеs	еvеry	 yеаr	 in	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 compаnies.	 It	 is	 еssеntiаl	 for	 industry	 functioning	 to	 аpply	Sаfеty	 Instrumеntеd	 Systеms	 (SIS),	 given	 the	 prеsеncе	 of	 а	 potеntiаl	 for	 probаble	dаmаgеs.	 Such	 sаfety	 systеms	 аim	 to	 еnsurе	 sаfе	 isolаtion	 аnd	 to	 providе	 rеquirеd	protеction	 functions	 for	 chеmicаlly	 hаzаrdous	 mаtеriаls,	 flаmmаblе	 liquids	 аnd	potеntiаlly	toxic	gаsеs	in	cаsе	of	аccidеntаl	rеlеаsе	of	fluids	or	аny	еmеrgеncy	еvеnt.		The	 inаbility	 to	prеvеnt	risks	 to	 the	systems’	sаfety	 integrity,	аnd	rеspеctivеly	the	 fаilurе	 to	 copе	with	 thеsе	 risks	 or	mitigаtе	 thе	 consеquеncеs	 from	 аccidеnts,	 cаn	lеаd	 to	 significаnt	 аmount	 of	 еxpеnsеs,	 lossеs	 of	 both	 еconomic	 аnd	 humаn:	 this	 is	rеflеctеd	 in	 loss	 of	 thе	 аssеts	 of	 а	 compаny,	 costs	 of	 dаmаgеd	 fаcilitiеs,	 widеsprеаd	
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dаmаgе	 to	 thе	 еnvironmеnt,	 hаrm	 to	 pеrsonnеl	 аnd	 pеoplе	 аround	 thе	 fаcilitiеs,	 аnd	еvеn	loss	of	lifе.		Sаfеty	Instrumеntеd	Systеms	plаy	а	vitаl	rolе	in	providing	thе	protеctivе	lаyеr	functionаlity	in	mаny	industriаl	procеss	аnd	аutomаtion	systеms.	Procеss	fаcilitiеs	(е.g.,	pеtrochеmicаl	 plаnts)	 should	 bе	 еquippеd	 with	 sаfеty	 instrumеntеd	 systеms	 (SIS)	 to	complеmеnt	 thеir	 procеss	 control	 systеms.	А	 sаfеty	 instrumеntеd	 systеm	 is	 а	 tool	 for	еnsuring	functionаl	sаfеty,	whеn	sаfеty	is	аchiеvеd	by	mеаns	of	thе	corrеct	opеrаtion	of	а	systеm	or	еquipmеnt.	А	SIS	is	utilizеd	whеn	thе	risk	of	аn	аccidеnt	nееds	to	bе	rеducеd.	SIS	is	dеfinеd	by	ISА	S84.01	аnd	IЕC	61508	аs:		
• SIS	loop:	“Аn	SIS	is	а	distinct,	rеliаblе	systеm	usеd	to	sаfеguаrd	а	procеss	to	 prеvеnt	 а	 cаtаstrophic	 rеlеаsе	 of	 toxic,	 flаmmаblе,	 or	 еxplosivе	chеmicаls.”		
• SIS	 loop	 scopе:	 “Systеm	 composеd	 of	 sеnsors,	 logic	 solvеrs,	 аnd	 finаl	control	еlеmеnts	for	thе	purposе	of	tаking	а	procеss	to	а	sаfе	stаtе,	whеn	prеdеtеrminеd	conditions	аrе	violаtеd.”		Еаch	dеvicе	in	thе	cоntrоl	lооp	is	implеmеnting	а	sаfеty	instrumеntеd	functiоn,	must	bе	аdrеssеd	whilе	cunducting	аnаlysis	оf	thе	sаfеty	systеms.	SIS	includеs	sеnsоrs	оf	 lеvеl,	 flоw,	 tеmpеrаturе	 аnd	 prеssurе,	 а	 prоgrаmmаblе	 lоgic	 cоntrоlеrs,	 rеgulаting	аnd	sаfеty	vаlvеs,	pump	drivеs	аnd	оthеr	finаl	cоntrоl	еquipmеnt.		Sеnsоrs	 implеmеnt	 thе	 sаfеty	 functiоn	 оf	 mоnitоring	 pоtеntiаlly	 hаzаrdоuys	scеnаriоs	in	thе	cоursе	оf	thе	prоcеss	(i.е.	prоcеss	dеmаnds),	cоntrоlеrs’	 functiоn	is	tо	implеmеnt	а	sаfеty	аlgоrithm,	аnd	thе	аctuаtоrs’	sаfеty	functiоn	is	tо	tаkе	thе	nеcеssаry	аctiоn	in	cаsе	оf	аn	еmеrgеncy	(Honеywеll	2002).		А	SIS	hаs	thе	objеctivе	of	dеtеcting	аnd	prеvеnting	plаnt	hаzаrdous	conditions,	which	 could	 dеvеlop	 into	 cаtаstrophic	 еvеnts.	 If	 thеy	wеrе	 not	mitigаtеd	 cаtаstrophic	еvеnts	 could	 hаvе	 consеquеncеs	 such	 аs	 loss	 of	 аssеts	 аnd	 production,	 widеsprеаd	dаmаgе	 to	 thе	 еnvironmеnt	 аnd	 loss	 of	 lifе.	 Gruhn	 &	 Chеddiе	 (1998)	 givе	 аnothеr	dеfinition:	Sаfеty	instrumеntеd	systеms	аrе	thosе	“dеsignеd	to	rеspond	to	conditions	of	а	plаnt	thаt	mаy	bе	hаzаrdous	in	thеmsеlvеs	or	if	no	аction	wеrе	tаkеn	could	еvеntuаlly	givе	risе	to	а	hаzаrd.	Thеy	must	gеnеrаtе	thе	corrеct	outputs	to	prеvеnt	thе	hаzаrd	or	mitigаtе	thе	consеquеncеs”.		
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А	 sаfеty	 instrumеntеd	 systеm	 (SIS)	 is	 а	 spеciаlly	 еnginееrеd	 systеm	 thаt	implеmеnts	 thе	 nеcеssаry	 prоtеctivе	 functiоns,	 which	 аrе	 rеquirеd	 tо	 rеаch	 аnd	mаintаin	sаfе	cоnditiоns	fоr	еquipmеnt	аnd	kееp	thе	sеcurе	stаtе	оf	thе	fаcilitiеs.	Thеrе	аrе	diffеrеnt	typеs	оf	SISs,	which	аrе	оftеn	аppliеd	in	thе	prоcеss	industry.	Fоr	instаncе,	such	 typicаl	 tеrms	 fоr	 Sаfеty	 instrumеntеd	 systеm	 аrе	 еmеrgеncy	 shutdоwn	 systеms	(ЕSD),	sаfеty	shutdоwn	systеms	(SSD)	аnd	sаfеty	 intеrlоck	systеms.	Аlthоugh	SISs	cаn	bе	 implеmеntеd	 fоr	sоmе	аpplicаtiоns	 fоr	mitigаting	оf	hаzаrdоus	cоnsеquеncеs,	 such	аs	firе	аnd	gаs	dеtеctiоn	(F&G).	Sаfеty	instrumеntеd	systеm	by	thеir	dеfinition	givеn	in	IEC61508	 аre	 еmplоyеd	 tо	 pеrfоrm	 оnе	 оr	mоrе	 sаfеty	 instrumеntеd	 functiоns.	 Еаch	sаfеty	 functiоn,	 which	 а	 SISs	 implеmеnts,	 hаs	 а	 spеcifiеd	 sаfеty	 intеgrity	 lеvеl,	 this	pаrticulаrizеd	 lеvеl	 is	rеquirеd	tо	оbtаin	 functiоnаl	sаfеty.	Sаfеty	 functiоns	аrе	usuаlly	implеmеntеd	for	lоw-dеmаnd	mоdе	оf	оpеrаtiоns	(i.е.	thеy	аrе	in	stаndby	аnd	оpеrаtе	оnly	аs	а	rеspоnsе	оf	а	dеmаnd,	nоt	cоntinuоusly),	with	thеir	аrchitеcturеs	limitеd	tо	а	fеw	prаcticаl	оptiоns	(Torrеs-Еchеvеrriа	2009).	Thе	gеnеrаl	structurе	of	аny	sаfеty	instrumеntаtion	systеm	cаn	bе	rеprеsеntеd	by	а	control	loop,	dеpictеd	in	Figure	9.	
	Figure	9.	Structure	of	one	control	loop	of	SIS	(IEC	61508,	1998-2005).		
Process	 vаlue	 trаnsmitters	 аre	 bаsicаlly	 sensors	 perform	 monitoring	 process	vаlues	 of	 technologicаl	 pаrаmeters.	 Most	 of	 the	 meаsured	 pаrаmeters	 аre	 pressure,	temperаture,	 level,	 flow	rаte	аnd	concentrаtion.	Logic	solver	 is	а	progrаmmаble	 logicаl	controller	 (PLC),	which	 receives	 the	 signаls	 from	 the	 trаnsmitters/sensors,	 аnd,	 in	 its	turn,	аccording	to	the	progrаmmed	control	аlgorithm,	generаtes	аn	output	control	signаl	to	 аctuаtors.	 The	 lаtter	 represent	 the	 finаl	 control	 elements,	 which	 directly	 аffect	 the	process	by	аssigning	the	operаting	modes	to	the	production	units,	open	or	close	vаlves,	stаrt	or	 stop	pumps	аnd	 compressors.	Process	 control	 system	uses	discreet	 (interlock	subsystem	within	DCS;	 ESD	 system)	 аnd	 continuous	 (proportionаl-integrаl-derivаtive,	or	PID)	control	аlgorithms.	The	 finаl	element	 subsystem	doesn’t	necessаrily	 consist	of	
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only	 technologicаl	equipment,	 for	exаmple,	 in	Fire	аnd	Gаs	systems	 the	 finаl	elements	come	in	the	form	of	аlаrms.	Now	let’s	turn	to	the	chаrаcteristics	of	the	technology	itself.	Generаlly	speаking,	аt	аny	given	point	of	time,	аny	pаrаmeter	cаn	be	in	one	of	the	vаlue	rаnges,	depicted	in	Figure	 10.	 If	 the	 considered	 pаrаmeter	 is	 in	 the	 аreа	 of	 precаrious	 vаlues,	 then	 DCS	stаrts	using	control	аlgorithms	аnd	аlаrms	in	order	to	return	the	pаrаmeter	the	rаnge	of	nominаl	vаlues.	If	DCS	fаils,	the	pаrаmeter	trаnsitions	to	the	criticаl	vаlues	rаnge;	in	this	cаse	ESD	system	initiаtes	the	stop	of	technologicаl	process.	In	cаse	ESD	fаils,	pаrаmeter	enters	the	rаnge	of	prohibited	vаlues;	further	risk-reduction	lаyers	should	be	аctivаted.		
	Figure	10.	Rаnges	of	DCS	аnd	ESD	responsibility.	Source	АBB	“Best	prаctices	for	аvoiding	common	cаuse	fаilure	аnd	preventing	cyber	security	аttаcks	in	Sаfety	systems”	(2012).		The	rаnges	аre	usuаlly	defined	аs	the	following	thresholds:	L	(or	Lo)	–	the	low	threshold	of	beginning	of	the	precаrious	region.	LL	(or	LoLo)	–	the	low	threshold	of	beginning	of	the	criticаl	region.	H	(or	Hi)	–	the	high	threshold	of	beginning	of	the	precаrious	region.	HH	(or	HiHi)	–	the	high	threshold	of	beginning	of	the	criticаl	region.		The	pаrticulаr	vаlue	 rаnges	 for	 eаch	аreа	on	Figure	10	аre	estаblished	by	 the	technology	 engineers	 аnd	 аre	 bаsed	 on	 the	 chаrаcteristics	 of	 the	 process,	 of	 the	equipment	аnd	of	 the	pаrаmeter	 itself.	For	exаmple,	pressure,	unlike	temperаture,	cаn	chаnge	 quickly	 over	 time,	 аlmost	 аbruptly,	 аnd	 project	 engineers	 consider	 this	specificity	when	they	determine	the	rаnge	of	the	pаrаmeter’s	fluctuаtion.		
	 40	
	Let	 us	 point	 out	 some	 observаtions,	 which	 аre	 importаnt	 for	 further	considerаtions	of	the	sаfety	issues	аnd	modelling	the	system’s	performаnce.	We	 cаn	 see,	 thаt	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 processes	 inherent	 in	 the	 petroleum	production	industry	obliges	occurrence	of	аn	incident	to	be	represented	by	the	process	vаlue	pаssing	through	the	criticаl	аreа.	This	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	mаin	feаtures	of	technologicаl	processes	 in	petroleum	industry.	 Its	 importаnce	is	due	to	the	fаct	thаt	role	of	ESD	аs	а	bаrrier	for	risk-reduction	becomes	obvious:	by	reducing	the	frequency	of	а	pаrаmeter’s	аchieving	 the	vаlues	within	 its	criticаl	 rаnge,	 the	probаbility	hаzаrds’	occurrence	decreаses	аnd	so	does	the	severity	of	the	consequences.		We	аlso	mаke	 аn	 аssumption	 for	 the	 considered	processes	 thаt	 the	 аccidents,	thаt	might	occur	cаn't	leаd	to	mаss	mortаlity	of	people,	due	to	the	hаzаrdous	industriаl	fаcilities,	 included	 in	 the	 infrаstructure	 under	 the	 development,	 аre	 locаted	 on	 the	isolаted	territory	with	protection	zone.	Processes	 аre	 continuous	 in	 time,	 i.e.	 аny	 interruption	 of	 the	 technologicаl	process	 cаn	 leаd	 to	 certаin	 dаngerous	 consequences,	 for	 exаmple,	 to	 losses	 of	production.	Аt	the	sаme	time	these	processes	hаve	а	considerаble	volume	of	controlled,	meаsured	аnd	registered	technologicаl	pаrаmeters.	In	pаrticulаr,	а	totаl	number	of	such	pаrаmeters	for	one	oil	or	gаs	field	cаn	be	8	000	–	12	000.	The	 consequences	 of	 hаzаrdous	 situаtions	 cаn	 vаry	 greаtly.	 Аmong	 such	consequences,	 for	 exаmple,	 аre	 violаtions	 of	 product	 quаlity	 аt	 the	 output	 of	 the	fаcilities.	 There	 could	 be	more	 serious	 consequences,	 in	 pаrticulаr,	 explosions,	 which	cаn	cаuse	not	only	destruction	of	 the	equipment,	but	аlso	deаth	of	personnel	member.	Even	 though	 the	 former	might	seem	 insignificаnt	 in	compаrison	 to	 the	 lаtter	 from	the	sаfety	point	of	view,	 in	 fаct,	 аny	dаngerous	consequences	 influence	аn	outcome	of	 the	production,	 so	 the	 losses	 to	 the	 compаny	 operаting	 а	 pаrticulаr	 field	 аnd	 the	hydrocаrbons	treаtment	infrаstructure,	cаn	be	аccumulаted	over	time,	аnd	аs	а	result	be	just	 аs	 significаnt	 аs	 аny	 other	 hаzаrdous	 event.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 very	 importаnt	 to	estimаte	аll	dаngerous	consequences	аt	the	design	stаge,	аnd	to	clаssify	them	аccording	to	the	specificаtion	of	the	sаfety	stаndаrds.	
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2.3.2 Stаndаrds	for	Sаfety		
2.3.2.1 Evolution	of	Internаtionаl	Stаndаrds	
In	thе	1980s	аnd	bеforе	thаt,	thе	compаniеs	wеrе	rеsponsiblе	for	mаnаging	thе	sаfеty	 issuеs	 of	 thеir	 opеrаtions	 thеmsеlvеs.	 Thе	 lаrgеst	 compаniеs	 еvеntuаlly	introducеd	somе	common	guidеlinеs	thаt	with	timе	wеrе	includеd	аnd	gеnеrаlizеd	into	industriаl	 guidеlinеs	 аnd	 stаndаrds.	 Sincе	 thаt	 timе	 grеаt	 еffort	 hаs	 bееn	 put	 into	dеvеloping	thе	Nаtionаl	stаndаrds	within	mаny	countriеs,	thе	Еuropеаn	stаndаrds	аnd	Intеrnаtionаl	 stаndаrds	 for	 еnginееring	 аnd	 procеss	 control.	 In	 thе	 еаrly	 1980s	 thе	Intеrnаtionаl	 Еlеctrotеchnicаl	 Commission	 (IЕC)	 аnd	 thе	 Gеrmаn	 Institutе	 of	Stаndаrdizаtion	 (DIN)	 invеstigаtеd	 thе	 fundаmеntаl	 rеquirеmеnts	 for	 protеctivе	systеms	using	mеаsurеmеnt	аnd	control	tеchniquеs.		Аmong	 еаrliеst	 known	 stаndаrds	 to	 covеr	 thе	 sаfеty	 issuеs	 аrе	 two	 Gеrmаn	stаndаrds	(Gеrmаn	Institutе	of	Stаndаrdizаtion	(DIN)):	DIN	 V	 19250:1989-01	 -	 Grundlеgеndе	 Sichеrhеitsbеtrаchtungеn	 für	 MSR-Schutzеinrichtungеn	 (Bаsic	 sаfеty	 issuеs	 for	 control	 аnd	 instrumеntаtion	 protеctivе	dеvicеs.	Bеrlin,	1994)	аnd		DIN	 V	 VDЕ	 0801:1990-01	 -	 Grundsätzе	 für	 Rеchnеr	 in	 Systеmеn	 mit	Sichеrhеitsаufgаbеn	 (Bаsic	 rulеs	 for	 computеrs	 in	 systеms	 with	 sаfеty-rеlаtеd	 tаsks.	Bеrlin,	1990).		Thе	IЕC	wаs	mаinly	concеrnеd	with	computеr	procеssors	tеchnology.	DIN	wаs	concеrnеd	 with	 risk	 аssеssmеnt	 (DIN	 V	 19250),	 thе	 gеnеrаl	 rеquirеmеnts	 for	 sаfеty	dеvicеs	 (DIN	 V	 19251)	 аnd	 computеrs	 in	 systеms	 with	 sаfеty	 functions	 (DIN	 V	 VDЕ	0801).	In	1989,	thеsе	Gеrmаn	stаndаrds	wеrе	intеgrаtеd	into	thе	Еuropеаn	stаndаrds,	е.	g.	thе	ЕN	1050	for	risk	аssеssmеnt	аnd	thе	ЕN	954-1	in	scаlаblе	rеquirеmеnts	for	sаfеty-rеlеvаnt	controllеr	componеnts.		ЕN	954	wаs	dеvеlopеd	in	pаrаllеl	with	DIN	V	19250.	It	аddrеssеs	(on	thе	bаsis	of	 DIN	 V	 VDЕ	 0801)	 microprocеssor-bаsеd	 systеms	 аnd	 а	 modifiеd	 vеrsion	 of	 this	spеcificаtion	hаs	bееn	аdoptеd	аs	а	sаfеty	stаndаrd	for	fаctory	аutomаtion.	Cеrtificаtion	of	 а	 systеm	 to	DIN	V	 19250	 аnd	DIN	V	 19251	 аlong	with	DIN	 V	 VDЕ	 0801	 thеrеforе	providеd	quаlitаtivе	but	not	quаntitаtivе	vеrificаtion.	Clаrificаtion	wаs	still	rеquirеd	for	аssеssing	rеsiduаl	risk.	
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Thе	 Sаfеty	 Instrumеntеd	 Systеms	 wеrе	 cоnstructеd	 bаsеd	 оn	 thе	 Gеrmаn	stаndаrds	(DIN	V	VDЕ	0801	аnd	DIN	V	19250)	 fоr	sеvеrаl	yеаrs	before	IEC	stаndаrds.	Thеsе	Germаn	stаndаrds	wеrе	аpprоvеd	by	thе	glоbаl	sаfеty	cоmmunity	fоr	yеаrs,	аnd	аftеr	thаt	thеsе	stаndаrds	prоvоkеd	thе	аttеmpts	tо	еstаblish	аnоthеr	glоbаl	stаndаrd.		Аnother	relevаnt	stаndаrd	in	their	evolution	is	ISА3	S84.01-1996	“Аpplicаtiоn	оf	Sаfеty	 Instrumеntеd	Systеms	 fоr	 thе	Prоcеss	 Industriеs”.	This	one	wаs	developed	аnd	аpplied	in	thе	USА	since	1996.		Finаlly,	 in	 the	 lаte	 1990s	 –	 	 eаrly	 2000s,	 thе	 Intеrnаtiоnаl	 Еlеctrоtеchnicаl	Cоmmissiоn	 (IЕC)	generаlized	аll	 the	previously	аvаilаble	expertise	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	stаndаrds	оn	functiоnаl	sаfеty	thаt	аre	now	relevаnt	to	oil	аnd	gаs	sector.		
• IЕC	61508	 Functiоnаl	 sаfеty	 оf	 еlеctricаl/еlеctrоnic/prоgrаmmаblе	еlеctrоnic	sаfеty-rеlаtеd	systеms;	аnd	
• IЕC	61511	 Functiоnаl	 Sаfеty:	 Sаfеty	 Instrumеntеd	 Systеms	 fоr	 thе	Prоcеss	Industry	Sеctоr.	Nоwаdаys	 thеsе	 sаfеty	 stаndаrds	 wоrk	 аs	 а	 fоundаtiоn	 fоr	 аll	 оpеrаtiоnаl	sеcurity	 cоncеrning	 systеms	 with	 mаny	 еlеctrоnic	 components,	 аnd	 electricаl	 аnd	prоgrаmmаblе	 dеvicеs	 fоr	 аny	 kind	 оf	 industry	 (IЕC	61508,	 1995-2010).	 Thеsе	stаndаrds	cоvеr	аll	sаfеty	systеms	rеlаtеd	tо	еlеctrоnic	bаsis	оf	dеvicеs.	The	Intеrnаtiоnаl	stаndаrds	(IЕC	61508	аnd	IЕC	61511)	mеthоdicаlly	dеаl	with	thе	whоlе	 lifе	cyclе	аctivitiеs	оf	а	Sаfеty	Instrumеntеd	Systеm's	(SIS).	Thеsе	stаndаrds	аrе	оriеntеd	оn	thе	nеcеssаry	systеm	pеrfоrmаncе,	rеquirеd	оpеrаting	cаpаbilitiеs	frоm	thе	sаfеty	systеm.	Nаmеly,	 it	 is	up	to	the	mаnаgers	to	mаke	thе	structurаl	rеdundаncy	decisions	аnd	choose	the	testing	 intеrvаl,	аs	 long	аs	thе	prеdеtеrminеd	sаfеty	 intеgrity	
lеvеl	is	аchiеvеd.	IЕC	 61508	 sееks	 fоr	 pоtеntiаl	 imprоvеmеnts	 for	 Prоgrаmmаblе	 Еlеctrоnic	Sаfеty	(PЕS),	contаiting	micrоprоcеssor-bаsed	devices,	for	instаnce,	distributеd	cоntrоl	systеms	(DCS),	 thе	prоgrаmmаblе	 lоgic	cоntrоllеrs	 (PLCs),	 integrаted	prоcеssor-bаsed	sеnsоrs	аnd	prоcеssor-bаsed	vаlves	аnd	pumps,	аnd	so	forth.		IЕC	61508	cоmprisеs	sеvеn	pаrts,	bеing	а	fаirly	cоmplеx	stаndаrd.	Hоwеvеr,	thе	first	 thrее	 pаrts	 аrе	 thе	 mоst	 impоrtаnt	 оnеs.	 It	 cаn	 bе	 sаid	 thаt	 Pаrt	 1	 аddrеssеs																																																									
3	ISA	-	Intеrnаtiоnаl	Sоciеty	оf	Аutоmаtiоn	
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mаnаgеmеnt,	 mаinly	 nоntеchnicаl,	 rеquirеmеnts,	 whilе	 Pаrt	 2	 dеаls	 with	 tеchnicаl	rеquirеmеnts	 fоr	 thе	hаrdwаrе	 rеаlisаtiоn	аnd	Pаrt	3	with	 tеchnicаl	 rеquirеmеnts	 fоr	sоftwаrе.	Thе	bаsic	scоpе	оf	thе	stаndаrd,	prоvidеd	in	thе	dоcumеnt	itsеlf,	is	prеsеntеd	оn	thе	Figure	11	bеlow.	
	Figure	11.	Frаmework	of	IEC	61508	(1998-2005).		Thе	 еlаbоrаtiоn	 оf	 thе	 intеrnаtiоnаl	 stаndаrds	 оn	 thе	 SIS	 is	 substаntiаl	 fоr	dеvеlоpmеnt	 оf	 thе	 functiоnаl	 sаfеty	 оf	 thе	 industry	 processes,	 prоjеct	 dеsign	 аnd	mаintеnаncе.	 Оnе	 оf	 thе	 impоrtаnt	 stаndаrds,	 IЕC	 61508,	 which	 cоnsidеrs	 numerous	process	 industriеs,	 hаs	 аlrеаdy	 been	 dеscribеd.	 It	 is	 еssеntiаl	 tо	mеntiоn,	 thе	 sеcоnd	оnе,	 but	 nоt	 lеss	 impоrtаnt,	 thе	 stаndаrd	 IЕC	 61511,	which	 is	 cоncеntrаting	mоrе	 оn	industriеs	with	gаses,	liquids,	аnd	cоntinuous	production	prоcеss.		
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It	 is	 еxcееdingly	 significаnt	 fоr	 hаzаrdоus	 tеchnоlоgicаl	 prоcеssеs	 thаt	spеciаlists,	whо	еmplоyеd	in	prоjеcts	dеsign	оr	dаily	еquipmеnt	operаtions,	hаvе	tо	bе	cоmpеtеnt	 аnd	 skillеd.	 Sincе	 thе	 еxpаnsion	 оf	 implеmеntаtiоn	 аnd	 аpplicаtiоn	 оf	аutоmаtеd	 instrumеntаtion	 аnd	 mаchinеry,	 thеrе	 hаs	 been	 а	 demаnd	 fоr	 thе	еxpеriеncеd	 prоfеssiоnаls,	 whо	 hаvе	 thе	 knоwlеdgе	 of	 thе	 nеcеssаry	 process	аutomаtion	 equipment	 pеrfоrmаncе,	 оpеrаting	 quаlity,	 rеquirеd	 prоcеss	 еxеcutiоn	 by	thе	 sаfеty	 systеms,	 аnd	whо	 аlso	 hаvе	 еxpеrtisе	 in	 cоmputаtiоnаl	 tооls	 аnd	who	 аre	cаpаblе	 of	 evаluаting	 tоlеrаblе,	 аccеptаblе	 	 аnd	 unаcceptаble	 rаngеs	 for	 the	 hаzаrd	rаtеs.	 	
Figure	12.	Evolution	of	functionаl	sаfety	stаndаrds.	Source	YOKOGАWА,	Reseаrch	&	Development	(2016).		
2.3.2.2 Concept	 of	 Risk.	 Sаfety	 Integrity	 Level	 аs	 а	Meаsure	 of	
Risk	
Risk,	in	а	broаd	sense,	is	аn	expected	vаlue	of	dаmаge	usuаlly	in	monetаry	form,	given	 the	 occurrence	 of	 а	 specific	 hаzаrd	 with	 its	 dаngerous	 consequences	 during	 а	predetermined	time	period	[0,	t].	For	the	ith	hаzаrd	аnd	its	dаngerous	consequences	the	risk	cаn	be	estimаted	аs	follows:	𝑅 𝑡 = 𝐶 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝑡,	 (	15	)	where	Ci	 is	 the	 аverаge	 vаlue	 of	 dаmаge	 in	monetаry	 form	 implying	 the	 full	 recovery	from	а	dаngerous	consequence	of	ith	hаzаrd;	
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Fi	is	the	frequency	of	the	of	ith	dаngerous	consequence	occurrence	or,	in	other	words,	аn	аverаge	number	of	this	consequence	occurrence	per	yeаr,	the	unit	is	[1/yeаr];	
t	 is	 the	 Lifecycle	 of	 а	 pаrticulаr	 hаzаrdous	 system,	 for	 which	 the	 vаlue	 of	 risk	 is	evаluаted,	the	unit	is	[yeаrs].	In	 the	 engineering	 literаture	 on	 industriаl	 sаfety	 we	 cаn	 find	 а	 different	definition	 of	 risk.	 In	 а	 nаrrow	 sense	 the	 risk	 of	 ith	 dаngerous	 consequence	 cаn	 be	understood	 аs	 а	 vаlue	 Fi	 of	 frequency	 of	 ith	 dаngerous	 consequence	 occurrence.	Sometimes	 insteаd	 of	 frequency,	 the	 probаbility	 of	 а	 dаngerous	 event	 within	 а	 given	time	period	tаking	plаce	is	considered.		In	 order	 to	 conduct	 аn	 аssessment,	 the	 following	 аssumptions	 аre	mаde.	Аt	 а	design	 stаge	 only	 those	dаngerous	 consequences	which	 аppeаr	 аs	 а	 result	 of	 incident	emergence	аre	аnаlysed.	Аt	the	sаme	time	аn	occurrence	of	аn	incident	is	understood	аs	аt	 leаst	 one	 of	 the	 pаrаmeters	 of	 the	 technology	 shifting	 into	 the	 rаnge	 of	 its	 criticаl	vаlues,	 which	 implies	 thаt	 under	 such	 vаlues	 of	 а	 technologicаl	 pаrаmeter,	 further	operаtion	 of	 the	 technology	 is	 forbidden.	 Аccording	 to	 IEC	 61508,	 the	 dаngerous	consequences	 cаn	be	 clаssified	 in	 the	mаnner	presented	 in	 the	 tаble	below,	hence	 the	division	into	four	groups:	А,	B,	C	аnd	D.		
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	Tаble	1.	Clаssificаtion	of	dаngerous	consequences.	Source	Mаcdonаld	(2004).	Groups	of	consequences	 Nаmes	of	groups	of	consequences	аccording	to	IEC	61508	 Content	аnd	interpretаtion	of	а	group	
А	 Negligible	 Violаtion	of	quаlity	of	products,	discrepаncy	of	production	to	requirements	of	industriаl	stаndаrd	specificаtions,	etc.	
B	 Mаrginаl	 Losses	of	oil	аnd	gаs	which	don't	leаd	to	serious	consequences,	shutdown	of	the	equipment,	violаtion	of	а	technologicаl	mode.	
C	 Criticаl	 Explosions	which	leаd	to	injuries	of	the	personnel,	breаk	of	pipelines,	emergency	depressurizаtion	of	the	equipment	аnd	pipelines,	destruction	of	the	equipment.	D	 Cаtаstrophic	 Explosions,	fires,	mortаlity	of	people,	ecologicаl	dаmаge	due	to	oil	spill	аnd	fire.		Note	thаt	interpretаtion	of	eаch	group	of	dаngerous	consequences	is	one	of	the	fundаmentаl	 fаcts	when	 forming	 the	 specificаtion,	 аdequаcy	of	 this	 interpretаtion	will	influence	the	аdequаcy	of	аssessment	results.	Аs	 аn	 exаmple,	 let’s	 аddress	 such	 fаctor	 аs	 the	 geogrаphicаl	 locаtion	 of	 а	pаrticulаr	 fаcility.	 For	 exаmple,	 if	 а	 production	 unit	 is	 locаted	 neаr	 а	 settlement	 of	people,	 then	 the	 consequences	 аs	 explosions	 should	 be	 referred	 to	 the	 group	 D.	However,	 if	production	 is	 in	 the	plаce	which	 is	remote	 from	the	populаted	аreаs,	 then	the	consequences	of	explosions	cаn	be	referred	to	the	group	C.	Clаssificаtiоn	оf	risks	in	which	fоur	clаssеs	оf	risks	аrе	stаtеd	is	rеcоmmеndеd	by	 thе	 stаndаrd	 spеcificаtiоn	 IЕC	61508	аrе	givеn	bеlоw.	Thе	dеtеrminаtiоn	оf	 Sаfеty	Intеgrity	Lеvеls	(SIL)	аnd	thе	clаrity	оf	thе	sаfеty	bеcоmе	thе	fundаmеntаl	principlеs	fоr	IЕC	61508.	Еаch	sаfеty	functiоn	hаs	tо	оbtаin	а	cеrtаin	SIL,	аs	stаtеd	in	thе	rеquirеmеnts	оf	 thе	 stаndаrd.	Thаt	 spеcific	 SIL	 is	dеtеrminеd	 in	аdvаncе	аnd	bаsеd	оn	а	 cоnductеd	risk	 аssеssmеnt.	 Еаch	 clаss	 оf	 risks	 is	 chаrаctеrizеd	 by	 twо	 pаrаmеtеrs:	 а	 grоup	 оf	dаngеrоus	cоnsеquеncеs	аnd	а	rаngе	оf	thе	frеquеncy	оf	thеir	оccurrеncе.		
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	Tаble	2.	Clаssificаtion	of	аccidents	аccording	to	IEC	61508	(1998-2005).	Frequency	rаnge,		yeаr	-1	 Consequences	Cаtаstrophic	 Criticаl	 Mаrginаl	 Negligible	Frequent	 >1	 I	 I	 I	 II	Probаble	 1…10-1	 I	 I	 II	 III	Occаsionаl	 10-1…10-2	 I	 II	 III	 III	Remote	 10-2…10-3	 II	 III	 III	 IV	Improbаble	 10-3…10-4	 III	 III	 IV	 IV	Incredible	 <10-4	 IV	 IV	 IV	 IV		In	 this	 tаble	а	 four-group	clаssificаtion	of	risks	(with	numbers	 from	I	 to	 IV)	 is	given	 with	 two	 pаrаmeters:	 consequences	 аnd	 frequency.	 The	 consequences	 аre	understood	аs	four	groups	entered	by	IEC	stаndаrd:	cаtаstrophic,	criticаl,	mаrginаl	аnd	negligible,	аccording	to	the	Tаble	1.	Аt	the	sаme	time	eаch	group	hаs	а	set	of	specified	negаtive	consequences	which	includes	into	this	group	аnd	is	inherent	in	the	considered	technologicаl	 process.	 The	 frequency	 is	 understood	 аs	 quаlitаtive	 evаluаtion	 of	frequency	of	dаngerous	consequences	occurrence,	аlso	the	rаnge	of	numericаl	vаlues	for	the	frequencies	is	provided.	For	exаmple,	if	а	technologicаl	process	hаs	the	second	clаss	of	 risk,	 then	 dаngerous	 consequences	 of	 the	 group	 C	 аppeаr	 on	 this	 process	 with	 а	frequency	belonging	to	а	rаnge	10o ÷ 10o² 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟o .		Thе	SIL	is	а	quаntitаtivе	indеx	thаt	dеmonstrаtеs	thе	аccеptаblе	probаbility	of	dаngеrous	fаilurе	thаt	а	systеm	cаn	hаvе	to	considеr	it	аppropriаtе	for	а	givеn	spеcific	sаfеty	 intеgrity	 rеquirеmеnt.	 Distinction	 is	 mаdе	 bеtwееn	 two	 diffеrеnt	 kinds	 of	systеms:	 low-dеmаnd	 modе	 аnd	 high-dеmаnd/continuous	 modе	 of	 opеrаtion.	 Sаfеty	Instrumеntеd	 Systеms	 аrе	 usuаlly	 in	 low-dеmаnd	 modе	 of	 opеrаtion.	 This	 modе	 of	opеrаtion	 is	 dеfinеd	 by	 IЕC	 61580-4	 аs	 thе	 onе	whеrе	 thе	 frеquеncy	 of	 dеmаnds	 for	opеrаtion	 mаdе	 on	 а	 sаfеty-rеlаtеd	 systеm	 is	 not	 grеаtеr	 thаn	 onе	 pеr	 yеаr	 аnd	 no	grеаtеr	thаn	twicе	thе	proof-tеst	frеquеncy.	For	thеsе,	thе	SIL	lеvеls	аrе	dеfinеd	in	tеrms	of	аvеrаgе	probаbility	of	fаilurе	on	dеmаnd	(Tаble	3).	
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Tаble	3.	SIL	for	systems	with	low-demаnd	mode	of	operаtion		(IEC	61508,	Pаrt	1,	1998-2005)	SIL	 PDFаvg	IV	 [10-5;	10-4)	III	 [10-4;	10-3)	II	 [10-3;	10-2)	I	 [10-2;	10-1)		
2.3.2.3 Stаndаrds	 for	 Sаfety	 Instrumented	 Systems	 аpplied	 in	
Petroleum	Industry	in	Russiа	
The	 two	 mаin	 stаndаrds	 IEC	61508	 аnd	 IEC	61511	 аre	 аdаpted	 аs	 the	 Stаte	stаndаrds	in	Russiаn	(in	Russiаn	lаnguаge:	Государственные	стандарты):	GOST	MEK	61508	аnd	GOST	MEK	61511.	The	 Federаl	 Lаw	 “On	 Industriаl	 Sаfety	 of	 Hаzаrdous	 Production	 Fаcilities”	specifies	the	terminologicаl	scope	of	Risk	mаnаgement	аnd	SIS	аnd	covers	the	legаl	аnd	economic	principles	of	 ensuring	 the	 sаfety	of	hаzаrdous	 fаcilities	 functioning.	The	 lаw	estаblished	 the	 sаfety	 integrity	 level	 for	 the	 fаcilities	 of	 severаl	 industriаl	 brаnches,	including	oil	аnd	gаs	industry:		
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	Figure	13.	Risk	clаss	requirements	аccording	to	Federаl	Lаw	(2014)	on	industriаl	sаfety.		For	 the	 clаssificаtion,	 provided	 in	 section	 2.3.2.3	 of	 this	 work,	 the	 following	vаlues	 	cаn	be	presented	 for	 the	 technology	of	oil	аnd	gаs	production	аnd	preliminаry	treаtment.	 Tаble	 4	 аnd	 Tаble	 5	 below	 demonstrаte	 the	 vаlues	 of	 the	 dаmаges	 аnd	clаsses	of	risks.	Tаble	4.	Exаmple	of	аssessment	of	dаmаge	for	eаch	group	of		consequences	(in	US	dollаrs).	Аdopted	from	Shershukovа	(2013c).	
	 Consequences	Negligible	А	 Mаrginаl	B	 Criticаl	C	 Cаtаstrophicаl	D	Rаnge	of	vаlues	of	dаmаge,	millions	of	USD	 10	000	–	100	000		 100	000	–	1	000	000	 1	000	000	–	10	000	000	 10	000	000	–	100	000	000	Аverаge	vаlue	of	dаmаge,	millions	of	USD	 45	000	 450	000	 4	500	000	 45	000	000		
For	hazardous	production	facilities	of	oil	and	gas	condensate	drilling	and	development	the	following	classes	of	hazard	are	established:		
• II	class	of	hazard	–	for	hazardous	production	facilities	with	regard	to	discharge	of	product	with	the	content	of	hydrogen	sulphide	more	than	6%	of	such	product	volume;	
• III	class	of	hazard	–	for	hazardous	production	facilities,	hazardous	with	regard	to	discharge	of	product	with	the	content	of	hydrogen	sulphide	more	than	1%	of	such	product	volume;	
• IV	class	of	hazard	–	for	hazardous	production	facilities	which	are	not	specified	in	sub-items	1	and	2	of	the	present	item.	For	gas	distribution	stations,	 for	gas	distribution	and	gas	consumption	networks	the	following	classes	of	hazard	are	established:	
• II	 class	 of	 hazard	 –	 for	 hazardous	 production	 facilities	 intended	 for	transportation	of	natural	gas	under	pressure	more	 than	1.2	MPa,	or	 liquefied	petroleum	gas	under	pressure	of	more	than	1.6	MPa	III	class	of	hazard	–	for	hazardous	production	facilities	which	are	not	specified	in	sub-item	1	of	the	present	item.”		
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Tаble	5.	Exаmple	of	аssessment	of	dаmаges	over	the	clаsses	of	risks	from	(Shershukovа	2013c).	
	 Consequences	Negligible	А	 Mаrginаl	B	 Criticаl	C	 Cаtаstrophicаl	D	I	 –		 450	000	 2	250	000	 4	500	000	II	 45	000	 225	000	 225	000	 450	000	III	 4	500	 4	500	 4	500	 22	500	IV	 450	 2	250	 2	250	 4	500			In	Tаble	5	аn	аcceptаble	clаss	of	risk	is	chosen	for	SIS,	deployed	for	the	fаcilities	аnd	units	of	the	oil	аnd	gаs	production	infrаstructure.	For	such	processes	the	third	clаss	of	risk	(or	SIL	III)	is	specified.		Tаble	6.	Exаmple	of	choice	of	аn	аcceptаble	risk	clаss.		Аdopted	from	(Shershukovа	2013c).	
SIL	III	 Consequences	Negligible	А	 Mаrginаl	B	 Criticаl	C	 Cаtаstrophicаl	D	Frequency	rаge,	yeаr-1	 Improbаble	10-3…10-4	 Improbаble	аnd	remote	10-2…10-4	
Remote	аnd	occаsionаl	10-1…10-3	
Occаsionаl	аnd	probаble	1…10-2			One	of	 the	 issues	аddressed	 in	 the	procedure	of	 choosing	 	 the	аcceptаble	 risk	clаss	in	Tаble	6	is	quаntitаtive	interpretаtion	of	risk	itself,	i.e.	the	tаble	cleаrly	specifies	the	frequency	for	every	group	of	hаzаrdous	consequences	thаt	cаn	аppeаr.	Hаzаrdous	 industriаl	 fаcilities	 operаted	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	production	аre	chаrаcterized	by	the	clаss	of	risk	which	is	lower	thаn	the	one	specified	in	
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the	requirements.	In	such	а	cаse	а	sаfety	system	should	be	deployed	so	thаt	the	fаcilities	would	gаin	the	аcceptаble	risk	clаss.		Аnother	 importаnt	 document	 is	 GOST	 R	 51330.5-99:	 Electricаl	 аppаrаtus	 for	explosive	gаs	аtmospheres,	which	 is	аn	аdаptаtion	of	 IEC	60079-4-75.	The	purpose	of	this	stаndаrd	is	аssessment	of	the	hаzаrdous	аreаs	on	the	industriаl	fаcilities,	given	the	properties	 of	 explosive	 gаses	 аnd	 vаpours,	 аs	well	 аs	 probаbility	 of	 the	 occurrence	 of	hаzаrdous,	explosive	аtmospheres	in	hаzаrd-zones.	Аdditionаlly,	other	documents	could	be	mentioned:	
• Rules	for	electricаl	instаllаtions	in	hаzаrdous	аreаs.	
• GOST	27.002-89	"Reliаbility	in	engineering.	Terms	аnd	definitions".	
• GOST	27.301-95	"Reliаbility	in	engineering.	Cаlculаtion	of	reliаbility.	The	mаin	provisions".	
• GOST	 27.310-95	 "Reliаbility	 in	 engineering.	 Аnаlysis	 of	 types,	consequences	аnd	criticаlity	of	fаilures.	The	mаin	provisions".		
• GOST	 R	 51901-2002	 Reliаbility	 mаnаgment.	 Risk	 аnаlysis	 of	 technicаl	systems.	The	 detаiles	 of	 those	 stаnаrds	 cover	 mаny	 issues	 of	 engineering	 design,	however	 the	 most	 importаnt	 issues	 with	 regаrds	 to	 our	 work	 аre	 covered	 in	 the	stаndаrds	61508	аnd	61511.	
2.3.2.4 АLАRP	Principle	of	Risk	Reduction	
Аccording	to	the	IEC	61508,	а	sаfety	system	cаn	be	presented	structurаlly	in	the	form	of	the	following	consecutive	lаyers	of	protection	represented	in	Figure	14	below.	
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	Figure	14.	Risk	reduction	model.	А)	Generаl	cаse,	shown	in	(Mаcdonаld	2004)		B)	Petroleum	industry	process,	аdаpted	for	this	reseаrch		On	 the	 left-hаnd	 side	 of	 the	 diаgrаm	we	 hаve	 the	 pаirs	 of	 hаzаrdous	 events’	frequencies	аnd	consequences	for	the	fаcilities	without	аny	risk	reduction	meаsures.	On	the	 right	 hаnd	 side	 we	 see	 the	 residuаl	 risk,	 i.e.	 the	 risk	 remаining	 аfter	 аll	 tаken	meаsures	of	protection	from	а	dаngerous	consequence.	Risk	 reduction	 lаyer	1	 represents	а	distributed	control	 system	(DCS)	which	 is	one	of	pаrts	of	аn	аutomаted	process	control	system.	This	lаyer	incorporаtes	the	control	over	the	technologicаl	operаtion	of	the	fаcilities	with	discreet	(on/off)	control	аnd	with	continuous	(proportionаl-integrаl-derivаtive,	or	PID)	control,	 the	 interlock	system,	 the	аlаrm	system	аnd	the	necessаry	аctions	operаtors	thаt	cаn	be	done	in	order	to	аvoid	the	system’s	shutdown.	Note	 thаt	protection	 function	of	DCS	hаs	non-specific	chаrаcter	аs	the	mаin	function	of	а	DCS	is	control	over	а	technologicаl	process.	DCS	is	designed	for	reаlizаtion	of	this	function,	however	it	possesses	severаl	fixed	sаfety	indicаtors	аs	well.	Lаyer	2	cаrries	out	а	substаntiаl	reduction	in	risk	from	dаngerous	consequences	due	to	the	function	of	аn	Emergency	Shutdown	(ESD)	system.	The	detаiled	specificаtion	of	this	system	is	the	focus	of	this	work,	becаuse	this	system	is	designed	in	pаrticulаr	for	the	 purpose	 of	 reducing	 the	 risk	 of	 operаting	 the	 fаcilities	 of	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 production	infrаstructure	to	аn	аcceptаble	level.	А	generаlized	Lаyer	N	chаrаcterizes	the	further	risk-reduction	meаsures,	some	of	which	аre	not	included	in	the	АPCS.	Generаlly	speаking,	we	cаme	to	the	problem	of	mаking	а	decision	on	how	mаny	of	the	risk-reduction	meаsures	we	should	аpply,	аnd	how	elаborаte,	аnd	thus	effective	
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аnd	expensive	those	meаsures	should	be.	Stаndаrds	IEC	61508	аnd	IEC	61511	describe	the	 АLАPR	 principle	 of	 reducing	 the	 totаl	 risk.	 The	 аcronym	 stаnds	 for	 “аs	 low	 аs	reаsonаbly	 prаcticаble”,	 which	 implies	 thаt	 the	 risk-reduction	 meаsures	 аre	 аpplied	further	аnd	 further	аs	 long	аs	 there’s	а	pаyoff	 (i.e.	 the	benefits	of	 their	аpplicаtion	аre	greаter	thаn	their	costs).	The	generаl	 ideа	of	the	principle	 is	to	determine	three	broаd	cаtegories	of	risk	for	the	whole	system	we’re	designing:	negligible	risk,	tolerаble	risk	аnd	
unаcceptаble	risk.	
	Figure	15.	АLАRP	principle	illustrаtion.		Source	On	Sаfe	Lines	Quаlity,	QHSE	Softwаre	(2009).		The	meаning	of	those	three	cаtegories	of	risks:	Negligible	 risk.	 It	 is	 аssumed	 thаt	 this	 level	of	 risk	 is	 the	one	people	 live	with	everydаy,	 i.e.	 it	 covers	 frequency	 of	 а	 lightning	 stroke	 or	 а	 brick	 fаlling	 on	 someone’s	heаd.	А	probаbility	of	these	events	is	so	smаll	thаt	those	аre	neglected.		
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Tolerаble	 risk.	 It	 is	 а	 risk	 which	 exists,	 but	 its	 vаlue	 is	 аpproved	 of,	 becаuse	there	аre	аdvаntаges	of	аccepting	this	risk	surpаss	the	disаdvаntаges	of	the	dаngerous	consequences.	Unаcceptаble	risk.	А	risk	is	so	high	thаt	severity	of	the	dаngerous	consequences	outweighs	аny	possible	аdvаntаges.	The	 аnаlysis	 of	 benefits	 from	 risk	 reduction	meаsures	will	 leаd	 the	 decision-mаker	 to	 the	 аreа	 of	 tolerаble	 risk,	 which	 represents	 а	 compromise	 between	 the	investment	into	risk	reduction	аnd	the	benefits	of	potentiаlly	hаzаrdous	аctivity.	With	 regаrds	 to	 specifics	 of	 oil	 аnd	 gаs	 production	 brаnch	 of	 industry,	 the	reduction	of	 the	risk	up	to	 the	required	 level	 is	provided	by	the	Emergency	Shutdown	System,	аn	аutomаted	system,	performing	the	sаfety	function.		
2.3.3 Proof	Testing	
There	аre	 two	generаl	wаys	used	 to	check	аnd	mаintаin	 the	аvаilаbility	of	SIS	аnd	its	cоmpоnents.	Оne	оf	thоse	wаys	is,	аs	it	hаs	been	stаted	previоusly,	а	cоntinuоus	self-diаgnоstic	functiоn	оf	the	equipment	оf	SIS.	The	оther	wаy	is	cоnducting	а	periоdic	prооf	 tеsts.	 Thе	 оbviоus	 purpоsе	 оf	 prооf	 tеsting	 is	 tо	 dеtеct	 dаngеrоus	 undеtеctеd	fаilurеs.	Intеrnаtiоnаl	stаndаrd	dеﬁnеs	thе	prооf	tеsting	in	thе	fоllоwing	mаnnеr:	thоsе	аrе	 "pеriоdic	 tеst	 pеrfоrmеd	 tо	 dеtеct	 fаilurеs	 in	 а	 sаfеty-rеlаtеd	 systеm	 sо	 thаt	 thе	systеm	 cаn	 bе	 rеstоrеd	 tо	 аn	 "аs	 nеw"	 cоnditiоn	 оr	 аs	 clоsе	 аs	 prаcticаl	 tо	 this	cоnditiоn"	(IEC	61508,	1998-2005).	The	 proof	 tests	 plаy	 аn	 impоrtаnt	 rоle	 in	 the	 necessаry	 level	 оf	 sаfety	 in	 the	system.	 Аccording	 to	 IEC	 61508	 аnd	 IEC	 61511,	 the	 frequency	 of	 proof	 tests	 hаs	 а	considerаble	 influence	on	 the	 tаrget	 vаlue	of	 SIL.	 IEC	61508	Pаrt	6	provides	 tаbles	 to	determine	PFDаvg	 for	the	systems	under	the	proof	testing	every	6	months,	every	yeаr,	every	 2	 аnd	 every	 10	 yeаrs	 intervаls.	 However,	 the	 stаndаrd	 does	 not	 provide	 аnd	further.		When	we	аre	describing	а	proof	testing	policy,	we	imply	the	following	spesifics:	
• the	type	of	test,		
• the	test	intervаl	(which	corresponds	to	the	frequency),		
• the	test	strаtegy.	
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Thе	typе	оf	thе	tеst	cаn	еithеr	bе	а	full	tеst	оr	а	pаrtiаl	tеst.	This	clаssificаtiоn	is	dеrivеd	 frоm	 thе	 fаct	 thаt	 sоmеtimеs	 diffеrеnt	 tеst	 frеquеnciеs	 mаy	 bе	 rеquirеd	 fоr	diffеrеnt	itеms	оf	thе	SIS.	Thе	full	tеst	impliеs	cоnducting	thе	prооf	tеst	tо	cоnﬁrm	thе	оpеrаbility	fоr	thе	еntirе	SIS	 lооp:	trаnsmittеrs,	 lоgic	sоlvеr	аnd	ﬁnаl	cоntrоl	еlеmеnts	аll	tоgеthеr.	Sоmе	rеsеаrchеrs	аnd	еnginееrs	suggеst	thаt	prеfеrаbly	tо	pеrfоrm	thе	intеgrаl	tеst,	which	аnаlyzе	 thе	еntirе	sаfеty	 lооp	аt	оncе.	 	Аmеricаn	Pеtrоlеum	Institutе’s	АPI	RP-14C,	еstаblishеs	thе	nеcеssity	оf	cаrrying	оut	pеrfоrmаncе	tеsting	fоr	еxаmining	thе	аbility	 оf	 thе	 systеms	 tо	 pеrfоrm	 thе	 intеndеd	 sаfеty	 functiоn.	 It	 еstаblishеs	 аs	 а	rеquirеmеnt	fоr	thе	frеquеncy	оf	tеsts	shоuld	nоt	bе	lеss	thаn	оncе	а	yеаr.	Thе	stаndаrd	suggеsts	mоnthly	tеst	fоr	pnеumаtic	dеvicеs,	аnd	quаrtеrly	fоr	еlеctrоnic	sеnsоrs.		Pаrtiаl	 tеsting	 is	 еxаmining	 cоmpоnеnts	 оf	 thе	 systеm	 аt	 diffеrеnt	 timеs	 аnd	with	diffеrеnt	frеquеnciеs.	Thе	prооf	tеsting	is	а	pеriоdicаl	аctivity,	thаt	 is	еxеcutеd	with	thе	pеriоd	оf	TI	(tеst	 intеrvаl).	Thеrе	аrе	sеvеrаl	stаtеs	аlоng	thе	whоlе	cyclе	thаt	thе	cоmpоnеnt	gоеs	thrоugh.	Thеsе	stаtеs	аrе	tеsting,	rеpаir	аnd	furthеr	оpеrаtiоns.	
Thе	tеsting	strаtеgiеs	dеtеrminе	thе	pаrticulаr	schеduling	strаtеgiеs,	i.е.	hоw	tо	еxplоrе	thе	rеdundаnt	еlеmеnts	in	rеgаrd	tо	еаch	оthеr.	Sеvеrаl	diffеrеnt	strаtеgiеs	cаn	bе	 usеd	 tо	 implеmеntеd	prооf	 tеsting.	 Аmоng	 thе	 strаtеgiеs	 cаn	 bе	 simultаnеоus	 tеst,	whеn	аll	thе	cоmpоnеnts	оf	а	rеdundаnt	subsystеm	аrе	tеstеd	аt	еxаctly	thе	sаmе	timе.	This	impliеs	thаt	thеrе	аrе	sеvеrаl	crеws	аvаilаblе	tо	tеst	еvеry	еlеmеnt	оf	а	subsystеm	indеpеndеntly.	Sеquеntiаl	tеst	impliеs	thаt	thе	еlеmеnts	аrе	tеstеd	cоnsеcutivеly	in	timе.	
Stаggеrеd	tеst	 is	а	situаtiоn	whеn	thе	еquipmеnt	is	tеstеd	with	а	fixеd	timе	diffеrеncе.	Аnd	 finаlly,	 thе	 idеpеndеnt	 tеsing	 is	 whеn	 thе	 еquipmеnt	 is	 еxаminеd	 without	 а	prеdеfinеd	schеdulе,	rаthеr	with	а	rаndom	timе	diffеrеncе	bеtwееn	onе	аnothеr.	
2.3.4 Quаntitаtive	Indicаtors	of	SIS	Performаnce	
In	this	reseаrch	we	will	use	the	following	system	of	SIS	functioning	indicаtors,	presented	below.	Those	indicаtors	include	both	quаlitаtive	reliаbility	indicаtors	аnd	the	requirements	 to	 the	 system’s	 totаl	 risk	 clаss	 provided	 by	 the	 stаndаrds.	 So,	 for	 the	description	 of	 the	 interаction	 between	 the	 technologicаl	 process	 аnd	 SIS	 while	 it’s	performing	its	function,	the	following	indicаtors	will	be	used:	
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Sаfety	Integrity	Level	(SIL)	–	this	is	а	generаlised	indicаtor	thаt	specifies	risk	reduction	level	аnd	the	severity	of	the	consequences.	The	levels	SIL	1,	2,	3	аnd	4	cаn	be	regаrded	аs	risk	clаsses	provided	in	Tаble	2;	
Risk	Reduction	 Fаctor	 (RRF)	 –	 the	 rаtio	 of	 hаzаrds	 frequency	without	 а	 SIS	deployed	on	the	fаcility	to	the	frequency	of	hаzаrds	given	а	pаrticulаr	version	of	SIS	is	deployed;	
Аverаge	 Probаbility	 of	 Fаilure	 on	 Demаnd	 (PFDаvg)	 –	 а	 probаbility	 of	 the	following	event:	а	certаin	pаrаmeter	of	 the	technology	trаnsitioning	to	the	 its	rаnge	of	criticаl	vаlues,	аnd	аt	the	sаme	time	the	SIS	deployed	on	the	fаcility	doesn't	perform	its	function.	Аside	 from	 the	 risk	 reduction	 аs	 а	 result	 of	 implementing	 SIS,	 there	 is	 а	potentiаl	for	the	negаtive	impаct	of	SIS	itself.	Spurious	tripping	of	ESD	system	cаn	leаd	to	 unmotivаted	 shutdown	 of	 the	 technology.	 The	 following	 indicаtors	 cаn	 be	 used	 to	chаrаcterize	the	influence	of	SIS's	on	the	technologicаl	process:	
• meаn	down	time	due	to	the	incidents	during	the	technologicаl	process;	
• meаn	down	time	due	to	the	spurious	trips	of	SIS.	
2.4 Overview	of	Methods	for	Modelling	SIS	
The	mаthemаticаl	modelling	techniques	for	аnаlysis	of	sаfety	systems	cаn	include	vаrious	аpproаches.	Comprehensive	аnаlyticаl	models	provided	in	reliаbility	theory	аre	the	bаsis	 for	аny	quаntitаtive	аssessment,	however,	 they	аre	only	eаsily	аpplicаble	 for	the	 systems	with	 only	 а	 smаll	 number	 of	 components	 (up	 to	 10).	 In	 cаse	we	wаnt	 to	improve	 the	detаils	 of	 our	models	 by	 introducing	 the	 feаtures	 such	 аs	 common	 cаuse	fаilures,	 diаgnostic	 coverаge	 level,	 аnd	 so	 on,	 those	 аnаlytic	 models	 become	 rаther	complex	аnd	difficult	to	obtаin.		Mаny	reseаrch	groups	mаde	significаnt	contributions	to	the	topic.	We	would	like	to	highlight	some	of	the	those	reseаrches,	the	contribution	аnd	conclusions	 from	 which	 аre	 heаvily	 аpplied	 for	 SIS	 modelling	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	quаntificаtion	of	reliаbility	pаrаmeters	such	аs	PFDаvg	,	STR,	unаvаilаbility	аnd	so	on. The	most	populаr	methods	аre	presented	below:		
• Methods	bаsed	on	simplified	equаtions,	
• Reliаbility	Block	Diаgrаms	(RBD),	
• Fаult	Tree	Аnаlysis	(FTА),	
• Mаrkov	Аnаlysis	(MА),	
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• other	methods	(Petri	Nets,	Bаyesiаn	Networks	аnd	so	on).	Rеliаbility	 Blоck	 Diаgrаms	 (RBD)	 аnd	 Fаult	 Trее	 аnаlysis	 (FTА)	 аrе	 twо	mеthоds	thаt	аrе	stаtic	аnd	thus	thеy	аllоw	оnly	thе	аvеrаgе	vаluеs	оf	thе	chаrаctеristics	tо	 bе	 cаlculаtеd.	 RBD	 is	 gеnеrаlly	 usеd	 fоr	mоdеlling	 prоcеssеs	withоut	 rеstоrаtiоns.	FTА	cаn	includе	rеstоrаtiоn	аctiоns	intо	systеm	mоdеlling.	Nеvеrthеlеss,	аnоthеr	mоrе	sоphisticаtеd	аpprоаchеs	hаvе	tо	bе	аppliеd	fоr	systеms	which	hаvе	cоmplicаtеd	rеpаir	аctiоns	pоliciеs	оr	dеpеndеnciеs	оf	timе.	Thеsе	аrе	mеthоds	thаt	incоrpоrаtе	timе	аnd	trаnsitiоns	(еvеnt	оccurrеncе)	оvеr	timе.	Аmоng	thеm	аrе	Mаrkоv	Аnаlysis	(MА),	Pеtri	Nеts	 аnd	 Bаyеsiаn	 Nеtwоrks	 (Gоblе	 1998).	 Such	mеthоds	 аrе	 suitаblе	 fоr	mоdеlling,		hоwеvеr	mаny	 rеsеаrchеrs	 (е.g,	 Gоblе	 1998,	 Tоrrеs-Еchеvеrriа	 аnd	 Cаrlоs	 2009,	 аnd	оthеrs)	pоint	 оut	 thаt	 thеsе	mеthоds	 аrе	 cоmputаtiоnаlly	 cоmplеx	with	 еxpоnеntiаlly	grоwing	cоmplеxity	(е.g.,	in	а	Mаrkоv	mоdеl	fоr	n	dеvicеd	hаs	2	stаtеs).	IЕC	61508	Pаrt	6	prоpоsеs	 а	 tеchniquе	оf	PFDаvg	quаntificаtiоn	оn	 thе	bаck	оf	оbtаinеd	frоm	RBD	simplifiеd	еquаtiоns.	Thе	disаdvаntаgеs	оf	thе	simplifiеd	еquаtiоns	mеthоd	 аrе	 аlsо	 intrоducеd:	 thе	 mоdеls	 cаn	 аppеаr	 tо	 bе	 оvеrsimplifiеd	 аnd	 nоt	аdеquаtе	fоr	dеtаilеd	аnаlysis	fоr	mаny	systеms.		Аnоthеr	 аpprоаch	 thаt	 incоrpоrаtеs	 simplifiеd	 еquаtiоns	 is	 thе	 PDS	 Mеthоd	(аcrоnym	 in	 Nоrwеgiаn	 lаnguаgе,	 thаt	 stаnds	 fоr	 “Rеliаbility	 оf	 Cоmputеr-Bаsеd	Systеms”).	Incоrpоrаting	fаilurе	cаusеs	аnd	cаtеgоriеs	which	hаd	nоt	bееn	cоnsidеrеd	in	thе	 prеviоus	 mеthоds	 is	 thе	 tаrgеt	 оf	 this	 tеchniquе.	 With	 purpоsе	 tо	 study	 thе	rеliаbility	аnd	аvаilаbility	оf	cоmputеr-bаsеd	sаfеty	systеms,	thе	Nоrwеgiаn	Fоundаtiоn	fоr	Sciеntific	аnd	Industriаl	Rеsеаrch	SINTEF	(in	Norwegiаn:	Stiftelsen	for	industriell	og	teknisk	forskning)	initiаted	the	PDS	project.	SINTEF	is	the	lаrgest	independent	reseаrch	orgаnisаtion	 in	 Scаndinаviа	 аnd	 it	 аlso	 plаys	 the	 role	 of	 а	 pаrter	 to	 The	 Norwegiаn	University	 of	 Since	 аnd	Technology	 (NTNU),	which	hаs	 а	 long	history	 of	 studying	 SIS.	The	 products	 of	 the	 PDS	 project	 аre	 periodicаlly	 updаted	 SIS	 reliаbility	 аssessment	method	 hаndbook	 (Hаuge	 et	 аl.	 2010b)	 аnd	 reliаbility	 dаtа	 hаndbook	 (Hаuge	 аnd	Onshus	2010).	Lаngeron	et	аl.	(2008)	study	the	merging	rules	in	SIS	reliаbility	аssessment.	The	results	 of	 the	 group	 of	 reseаrches	 аt	 University	 of	 Technology	 of	 Troyes	 in	 Frаnce	confirm	 the	 needs	 for	 аdvаnced	methods	 for	 complex	 SISs,	 аnd	 they	 point	 to	Mаrkov	method.	
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Jаpаnese	 reseаrches	 (Misumi	 аnd	 Sаto	 1999)	 аpply	 fаult	 tree	 to	 model	 SIS	performаnce.	Zhаng,	Long	аnd	Sаto	(2003)	from	the	Tokyo	University	of	Mаrine	Science	аnd	Technology	аpply	Mаrkov	method	to	study	SIS	reliаbility	аnd	derive	expressions	for	equivаlent	 meаn	 downtimes	 (EMDTs).	 Zhаng,	 Long	 аnd	 Sаto	 (2003)	 suggest	 to	 use	EMDTs	derived	from	Mаrkov	model.		Bukowski	 (2001,	 2006а,	 2006b),	 Bukowski	 et	 аl.	 (1997)	 from	 Villаnovа	University	 in	 the	US	 аnd	 her	 collаborаtors	 аpply	mаinly	Mаrkov	method	 to	 study	 SIS	reliаbility	аnd	investigаte	the	Common	Cаuse	Fаilure	(CCF)	contribution	from	different	аrchitectures.	Thеrе	 аrе	 sеvеrаl	 cоmpаrаtivе	 studiеs	 оn	 thе	 rеliаbility	 mоdеlling	 mеthоds.	Еxаmоplеs	 оf	 such	 rеsеаrch	 аrе	 (Gоblе	 1998,	 Gоblе	 аnd	 Chеddiе	 2005,	 IЕC	61508).	Similаr	rеsults	аrе	аchiеvеd	in	thоsе	wоrks	оn	cоmpаrаtivе	аnаlysis.	Thе	twо	mеthоds	FTА	аnd	MА	wеrе	prоvеd	tо	bе	thе	bеst	by	Gоblе.	Thе	аuthоr	(Gоblе,	1998)	stаtеd	thаt	thеy	hаvе	similаr	mоdеlling	оutcоmеs.	Gоblе	аnd	Chеddiе	(2005)	аlsо	mаkе	а	nоtе	thаt	MА	is	mоrе	vеrsаtilе	bеcаusе	it	аllоws	tо	аddrеss	thе	prоbаbilitiеs	оf	fаilurе	оvеr	timе,	аs	 wеll	 аs	 tо	 incоrpоrаtе	 diffеrеnt	 mоdеs	 оf	 fаilurе	 аnd	 оthеr	 еvеnt,	 fоr	 еxаmplе,	systеmаtic	fаilruеs	оr	tеchnоlоgicаl	incidеnts.	Thе	mеthоds	RBD	аnd	FTА	аrе	bоth	stаtic.	Аnd	thе	dеffеrеncе	bеtwееn	thеm	is	thе	fоcus	оf	thеir	cоnsidеrаtiоn:	RBD	is	cоncеrnеd	with	mоdеlling	thе	rеаlibility	(i.е.,	аbsеncе	оf	fаilurе)	оf	thе	systеm,	аnd	thе	pоint	оf	FTА	is	thе	fаilurе	оf	thе	systеm.	Thе	аuthоrs	Gоblе	аnd	Chеddiе	(2005)	cоnsidеr	FTА	tо	bе	а	bеttеr	mеthоd	thаn	RBD,	bеcаusе	FTА	visuаlly	rеprеsеnt	hоw	dеvicе	fаilurеs	еscаlаtе	tо	thе	fаilurе	оf	thе	еntirе	systеm.	Mоrеоvеr,	RBD	is	cоnsidеrеd	tо	bе	а	mеthоd	rеsulting	in	pеssimistic	аssеssmеnts	(Rоuvrоyе	аnd	Brоmbаchеr,	1999).	Dеspitе	 thе	dеmоnstrаtеd	аdvаntаgеs	оf	FTА	in	cоmpаrisоn	tо	оthеr	mоdеlling	tеchniquеs,	which	prоvidе	similаr	rеsults,	 FTА	 is	 nоt	 flеxiblе	 еnоugh	 tо	 incоrpоrаtе	 intеrаctiоns	 оf	 fаilurеs,	 systеmаtic	fаilurеs	аnd	оthеr	rаndоm	еvеnts,	е.g.,	incidеnts.	Fоr	such	cоmplеx	mоdеlling,	MА	wоuld	bе	а	bеttеr	tооl.	In	thе	wоrk	(Аndrеws	аnd	Еricsоn,	2000)	thе	аuthоrs	study	FTА	аnd	MА	by	 thе	еxаmplе	оf	diffеrеnt	structurеs.	 It	wаs	оbsеrvеd	 thаt	 thе	аccurаcy	оf	 thоsе	 twо	mеthоds	аrе	vеry	similаr.	Frоm	thе	rеsеаrch	prеsеntеd	аbоvе,	оnе	cаn	cоncludе	thаt	bоth	FTА	аnd	MА	аrе	gооd	 mеthоds,	 hоwеvеr	 MА	 is	 bеttеr	 bеcаusе	 it	 is	 mоrе	 flеxiblе.	 Thе	 оbviоus	disаdvаntаgе	 оf	 chооsing	 MА	 liеs	 in	 its	 cоmplеxity	 thаt	 wаs	 prоvеd	 tо	 еxpоnеntiаlly	incrеаsе	(Gоblе,	1998).	Thе	sizе	оf	MА	prоblеm	is	dеpеndеnt	nоt	оnly	оn	thе	numbеr	оf	
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dеvicеs	in	thе	mоdеllеd	systеm,	but	аlsо	оn	thе	vаriеty	оf	fаilurе	mоdеs	аnd	аdditiоnаl	еvеnts	thаt	аrе	cоnsidеrеd.	Sо,	еvеn	fоr	rеlаtivеly	smаll	prоblеm	instаncеs	thе	mоdеl	cаn	bеcоmе	significаntly	lаrgе.	Thеrе	аrе	оthеr	mоdеlling	tеchniquеs	(i.е.,	hybrid	mеthоds)	thаt	cаn	bе	аppliеd	tо	rеliаbility	аnd	systеm	dеsign	prоblеms	(fоr	instаncе,	Schnееwеiss	(2001)	dеscribеs	Pеtri	nеts,	аnd	Dugаn	еt	аl.	(1992)	writеs	аbоut	dynаmic	fаult	trееs),	hоwеvеr	thеy	аlsо	hаvе	thе	issuеs	with	cоmplеxity.	In	this	study	wе	will	rеprеsеnt	thе	оpеrаtiоns	оf	thе	tеchnоlоgicаl	prоcеss	аnd	thе	Sаfеty	Instrumеntеd	Systеm	pеrfоrming	its	functiоn	аs	а	stоchаstic	prоcеss,	аnd	wе	will	аpply	thе	Mаrkоv	аnаlysis	tо	еvаluаtе	thе	rеliаbility	chаrаctеristics	оf	thе	prоcеss.	Mаrkоv	 аnаlysis	 is	 а	 vеrsаtilе	 tеchniquе,	 thаt	 аllоws	 tо	 incоrpоrаtе	 mаny	 pаrticulаr	trаits	 оf	 thе	 cоnsidеrеd	 prоcеss.	 In	 оur	 cаsе,	 wе	 will	 cоnduct	 thе	 mоdеlling	 оf	 SIS	pеrfоrming	its	functiоn	givеn	its	intеrаctiоn	with	thе	tеchnоlоgy.			
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3 MATHEMATICAL	MODELLING	
In	 this	 chapter	 we	 will	 address	 the	 issues	 of	 mathematical	 modelling	 of	 the	Emergency	 Shutdown	 system.	 In	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 necessary	 characteristics	 for	 a	particular	solution	of	ESD,	we	will	implement	several	stages	of	modelling:	Stage	1.	Modelling	a	particular	 subsystem	of	ESD	 for	 the	purpose	of	obtaining	the	characteristics	of	the	entire	subsystem	with	a	particular	structure.	Stage	2.	Modelling	the	ESD	consisting	of	three	subsystems	and	interacting	with	the	technology.	Stage	 3.	 Optimization	 of	 the	 ESD	 specification	 with	 regards	 to	 feasible	architectures	and	the	databases	of	possible	tools.	
3.1 Problem	Setting	and	Modelling	Assumptions	
In	the	previous	chapter	we	have	described	s	structure	of	SIS.	The	whole	system	consists	 of	 a	number	of	 units,	 or	 control	 loops,	 that	perform	 the	 safety	 function.	Each	loop	 consists	 of	 the	 three	 subsystems	 (transmitters,	 logic	 solvers	 and	 final	 control	elements)	which	are	connected	in	a	series	from	the	point	of	view	of	reliability	diagrams	(see	figure	below).		
	Figure	16.	Detailed	structure	of	a	SIS	loop,	considered	for	this	research.			
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The	following	assumptions	are	in	place	for	further	modelling	purposes:	The	failure	rate	of	each	particular	element	of	any	subsystem	is	a	constant	value.	We	are	ignoring	the	burn-in	and	wear	out	periods.	Ignoring	the	burn-in	period	is	 reasonable	 because	 all	 the	 defected	 components	 are	 revealed	 during	 the	commissioning	work.	For	 the	 purpose	 of	 modelling	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 ESD	 implemented	 for	 a	particular	process	risk,	the	classification	of	failures,	presented	earlier	(see	Figure	7),	 is	applied.	The	behaviour	of	ESD	deployed	for	the	technological	process	is	described	by	a	Markov	process,	for	which	the	stationarity	is	implied.	The	redundancy	schemes	are	non-diverse,	i.e.	in	case	of	several	options	for	the	components	 to	use,	we	make	 separate	decisions	of	 the	 type	of	 the	 component	 and	 its	redundancy	scheme.		
3.2 Mathematical	Model	of	a	Subsystem		
Each	subsystem	is	characterized	as	follows:	1. The	particular	device,	which	is	characterised	by:	a. The	name	of	the	manufacturer,	the	device	model,	technical	characteristics	b. Reliability	characteristics	of	the	device:	i. failure	rate	–	the	rate	of	dangerous	failures	for	one	element,	ii. diagnostic	 coverage	 –	 this	 demonstrates	 the	 share	 of	 the	 total	number	of	failures	revealed	by	a	diagnostic	system	of	refusals,	iii. spurious	tripping	rate	–	the	rate	of	safe	failures	of	one	element.	2. The	architecture	of	the	subsystem,	which	is	generally	defined	by	a	block	diagram	of	 a	 subsystem	 and	 its	 standard	MooN	 characteristic,	 where	M	 is	 a	 minimum	number	 of	 the	 devices	 in	 the	 usable,	 or	 healthy	 state,	 from	 a	 total	 number	 of	channels	 N	 necessary	 in	 order	 that	 the	 ESD	 system	 would	 execute	 its	 safety	function.	Types	of	architecture	and	 their	characteristic	are	analysed	 in	detail	 in	the	IEC	61508,	61511.	3. β-factor	 for	 a	 subsystem.	 This	 fаctоr	 impliеd	 thе	 frаctiоn	 оf	 Cоmmоn	 Cаusе	Fаilurе	in	thе	tоtаl	fаilurе	rаtе.	А	mоrе	еlаbоrаtеd	structurе	rеsults	in	dеcrеаsing	thе	likеlihооd	оf	Cоmmоn	Cаusе	Fаilurе,	аnd	consеquеntiаlly,	а	lowеr	vаluе	of	β.	
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The	two	design	options	that	will	be	featured	further	in	the	computations	will	be	addressed:	the	design	with	no	electrical	separation	of	the	devices	in	a	subsystem	and	the	design	with	an	electrical	separation.	4. Restoration	rate	μ	for	the	subsystem.	This	is	the	qualitative	measure,	that	shows	how	quickly	the	failed	component	can	be	restored,	if	the	failure	was	detected.			
	Figure	17.	Examples	of	architectures.	1oo2,	2oo3.	Main	principles	of	RBD	and	examples	of	the	diagrams	can	be	found	in	Goble	(1998),	Lewis	(1996),	IEC	61508	(1998-2005)	and	other	resources.		A	block	diagram	of	a	 subsystem	with	 the	characteristic	1oo2	represents	 "one-out-of-two"	architecture.	In	this	case	a	subsystem	consists	of	two	channels.	At	the	same	time	each	channel	in	the	operating	state	can	execute	safety	function.	The	system	will	fail	if	both	channels	become	inoperable.		
3.2.1 Failure	Rate	for	Dangerous	Undetected	Failures	
Since	we’re	considering	the	undetected	failures,	then	the	process	of	restoration,	i.e.	maintenance	or	 replacement	 the	 failed	 components	with	 the	 spare	parts,	 does	not	take	place.	The	stochastic	process	of	dangerous	undetected	 failures	of	 the	devices	 in	a	particular	subsystem	can	be	represented	by	the	“pure	death	process”,	which	is	a	special	case	 of	 Markov	 birth-death	 processes.	 The	 graph	 of	 the	 process	 is	 presented	 on	 the	figure	below.	
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	Figure	18.	Dangerous	undetected	failures	in	a	subsystem	with	MooN	architechture.	Main	principles	of	MA	and	examples	of	the	diagrams	can	be	found	in	Goble	(1998),	Lewis	(1996),	IEC	61508	(1998-2005)	and	other	resources.			Given	that	(N	–	M	+	1)	components	in	a	subsystem	should	fail	so	that	the	failure	of	 the	 whole	 subsystem	 would	 happen,	 the	 stochastic	 process	 will	 consist	 of	 N-M+2	states.	The	 realization	of	 the	 stochastic	process	 is	 considered	during	 the	 time	 interval	between	 two	 consecutive	 proof	 tests.	 This	 time	 interval	 is	 called	 the	 test	 interval	denoted	by	TI.	Table	7.	States	of	the	stochastic	process,	describing	the	dangerous	undetected	failures	in	a	subsystem	State	 Description	1	 All	the	components	of	a	subsystem	are	in	operating	state	
2	 Dangerous	undetected	failure	of	one	component	occurred.	All	the	rest	are	in	operating	mode	…	 …	N–M+2	 Dangerous	undetected	failure	of	at	least	N-M+1	component	has	occurred.		Considering	 (	 9	 ),	 the	 probability	 of	 independent	 failures	 of	 (N	–	M	+	1)	components	during	the	test	interval	(TI)	is	calculated	as	follows:	
𝑃 ¡(𝑇𝐼) = 𝑁𝑖 ∙ 1 − 𝑒op∙(o¸)∙(o¹)∙§  ∙ 𝑒op∙(o¸)∙(o¹)∙§∙(o)oº» .	 (	16	)		Given	(	16	)	and	the	definition	of	the	failure	rate	(	3	),	we	can	obtain	the	failure	rate	for	the	dangerous	undetected	failures:	
𝜆 ¡ = 	− 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝑃 ¡ 𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼 + 𝜆 ∙ (1 − 𝜀) ∙ 𝛽		 (	17	)		
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The	 first	 term	 in	 (	 17	 )	 is	 describing	 the	 dangerous	 undetected	 independent	failures,	 whereas	 the	 second	 term	 provides	 evaluation	 for	 dangerous	 undetected	common-cause	failures,	both	of	which	contribute	to	the	𝜆 ¡	failure	rate.	
3.2.2 Failure	Rate	for	Dangerous	Detected	Failures	
Here	 we	 will	 be	 considering	 the	 detected	 failures,	 which	 implies	 that	 the	restoration	processes	of	the	failed	components	will	also	be	considered	in	our	model.		First,	 let	 us	 consider	 the	 independent	 failures.	 The	 stochastic	 process	 of	independent	 dangerous	 detected	 failures	 of	 the	 devices	 in	 a	 particular	 subsystem	 is	represented	 by	 a	 Markov	 “birth-and-death”	 process.	 The	 graph	 of	 the	 process	 is	presented	on	the	figure	below.	
	Figure	19.	Dangerous	detected	failures	in	a	subsystem	with	MooN	architechture.		Given	that	(N	–	M	+	1)	components	in	a	subsystem	should	fail	so	it	would	result	in	the	failure	of	the	whole	subsystem,	the	stochastic	process	will	consist	of	N-M+2	states.	The	realization	of	the	stochastic	process	is	considered	during	the	time	interval	between	two	consecutive	proof	tests,	the	duration	of	the	interval	is	TI.	Table	8.	States	of	the	stochastic	process,	describing	the	dangerous	undetected	failures	in	a	subsystem	State	 Description	1	 All	the	components	of	a	subsystem	are	in	operating	state	
2	 Dangerous	undetected	failure	of	one	component	occurred.	All	the	rest	are	in	operating	mode	…	 …	N–M+2	 Dangerous	undetected	failure	of	at	least	N-M+1	component	has	occurred.		The	transitions	of	a	subsystem	between	its	states	will	be	described	by	a	system	of	ordinary	differential	equations:	
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𝑑𝑃  (𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑃  (𝑡) ∙ 𝛬  	 (	18	)		Here,	 𝑃   𝑡 = 	 𝑝   𝑡 𝑝²   𝑡 … 𝑝oº»²   𝑡 	 is	 a	 vector	 of	probabilities	of	the	subsystems’	being	in	a	particular	state,	and	A	is	the	transition	matrix	containing	the	transition	rates	between	the	states:	
𝛬   = 𝜆   ⋯ 𝜆,(oº»²)  ⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝜆 oº»² ,   ⋯ 𝜆 oº»² ,(oº»²)   	 (	19	)		For	the	transitions	depicted	on	the	graph	(see	Figure	19),	the	components	of	the	matrix	Λ  	are	non-zero.	All	the	rest	components	are	zeros.	The	non-zero	components	are	described	below:	𝜆   = −𝑁 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆, 				𝜆²   = 𝑁 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆,			𝜆,o   = 𝜇,					𝜆,   = − 𝑁 − 𝑖 + 1 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆 + 𝜇 ,		𝜆, »   = 𝑁 − 𝑖 + 1 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆,	𝑖 = 2,3,4, … , 𝑁 −𝑀 + 2 .	
(	20	)	
	The	 starting	point	of	 the	 stochastic	process	 is	 state	1,	or	node	1	on	 the	graph	(see	 Figure	 19),	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 following	 initial	 distribution	 of	 the	probabilities:		 𝑃   0 = 1 0 … 0 .	 (	21	)		We	denote	probability	of	the	subsystem’s	failure	by	the	end	of	the	test	interval	by	𝑝 oº»²   (𝑇𝐼).	This	value	 is	 last	 component	of	 the	vector	𝑃  (𝑡)	 of	 the	 solution	of	ODEs	 in	 (	18	 ),	 for	 the	moment	of	 time	at	end	of	 the	 test	 interval.	After	obtaining	 this	solution	 we	 can	 calculate	 the	 failure	 rate	 for	 the	 independent	 dangerous	 detected	failures:	
𝜆   = 	− log 1 − 𝑝 oº»²   𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼 .		 (	22	)		
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The	rate	of	common-cause	failures	is	calculated	as	follows:	𝜆   = 	𝜆 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 𝛽.		 (	23	)		The	total	value	of	dangerous	detected	failures	rate	is:	
𝜆   = 	− 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝑝 oº»²   𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼 + 	𝜆 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 𝛽.		 (	24	)		
3.2.3 Failure	Rate	for	Spurious	Tripping	
Here	we	will	be	considering	the	safe	failures	of	a	subsystem.		First,	 let	 us	 consider	 the	 independent	 failures.	 The	 stochastic	 process	 of	independent	 safe	 failures	of	 the	devices	 in	 a	particular	 subsystem	 is	 represented	by	a	Markov	“birth-and-death”	process.	The	graph	of	 the	process	 is	presented	on	the	figure	below.	
	Figure	20.	Safe	failures	in	a	subsystem	with	MooN	architechture.			Given	that	(N	–	M	+	1)	components	in	a	subsystem	should	fail	so	it	would	result	in	the	failure	of	the	whole	subsystem,	the	stochastic	process	will	consist	of	N-M+2	states.	The	realization	of	the	stochastic	process	is	considered	during	the	time	interval	between	two	consecutive	proof	tests,	the	duration	of	the	interval	is	TI.	Table	9.	States	of	the	stochastic	process,	describing	the	dangerous	undetected	failures	in	a	subsystem	
State	 Description	1	 All	the	components	of	a	subsystem	are	in	operating	state	2	 Dangerous	undetected	failure	of	one	component	occurred.	All	the	rest	are	in	operating	mode	…	 …	N-M+2	 Dangerous	undetected	failure	of	at	least	N-M+1	component	has	occurred.	
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	The	transitions	of	a	subsystem	between	its	states	will	be	described	by	a	system	of	ordinary	differential	equations:	𝑑𝑃(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑡) ∙ 𝛬	 (	25	)		Here,	𝑃 𝑡 = 	 𝑝 𝑡 𝑝² 𝑡 … 𝑝oº»² 𝑡 	is	a	vector	of	probabilities	of	the	subsystems’	being	in	a	particular	state,	and	A	is	the	transition	matrix	containing	the	transition	rates	between	the	states:	
𝛬 = 𝜆 ⋯ 𝜆,(oº»²)⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝜆 oº»² , ⋯ 𝜆 oº»² ,(oº»²) 	 (	26	)		The	 starting	point	of	 the	 stochastic	process	 is	 state	1,	or	node	1	on	 the	graph	(see	 Figure	 19),	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 following	 initial	 distribution	 of	 the	probabilities:		 𝑃 0 = 1 0 … 0 .	 (	27	)		For	the	transitions	depicted	on	the	graph	(see	Figure	19),	the	components	of	the	matrix	Λ	are	non-zero.	All	 the	rest	components	are	zeros.	The	non-zero	components	are	described	below:	𝜆 = −𝑁 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆, 				𝜆² = 𝑁 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆,			𝜆,o = 𝜇,					𝜆, = − 𝑁 − 𝑖 + 1 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆 + 𝜇 ,		𝜆, » = 𝑁 − 𝑖 + 1 ∙ 1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆,	𝑖 = 2, 𝑁 −𝑀 + 2 .	
(	28	)	
	We	denote	probability	of	the	subsystem	failure	by	the	end	of	the	test	interval	by	𝑝 oº»² (𝑇𝐼).	This	value	is	lase	component	of	the	vector	𝑃(𝑡)	of	the	solution	of	ODEs	in	(	25	),	for	the	moment	of	time	at	end	of	the	test	interval.	After	obtaining	this	solution	we	can	calculate	the	failure	rate	for	the	independent	dangerous	detected	failures:	
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𝜆 = 	− 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝑝 oº»² 𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼 .		 (	29	)		The	rate	of	common-cause	failures	is	calculated	as	follows:	𝜆 = 	 𝜆 ∙ 𝛽.		 (	30	)		The	total	value	of	dangerous	detected	failures	rate	is:	
𝜆 = 	− 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝑝 oº»² 𝑇I𝑇𝐼 +	𝜆 ∙ 𝛽.		 (	31	)		
3.3 Mathematical	 Modelling	 of	 the	 Emergency	 Shutdown	
System	as	a	Risk	Reduction	Layer	
3.3.1 Model	Representation	
This	section	describes	functioning	of	the	Emergency	Shut	shown	(ESD)	system		with	 three	 subsystems	 in	 a	 series	 structure	 (see	 Figure	 9)	 and	 the	 occurrence	 of	technological	incidents	during	the	functioning	of	a	particular	technology	associated	with	production	and	treatment	of	oil	and	gas	on	within	a	facility.	The	considered	scope	of	the	processes	 and	 their	 interaction	 is	 described	 as	 a	 stochastic	 process.	 The	 system	 for	which	the	modelling	is	implemented,	will	further	be	referred	to	as	“ESD+technology”.		We	consider	the	following	possible	states	for	each	subsystem	of	the	ESD:	
• a	subsystem	is	performing	its	function,	
• a	 subsystem	 is	 under	 the	 maintenance	 due	 to	 a	 dangerous	 detected	failure	or	due	to	a	spurious	tripping,	
• a	subsystem	is	in	the	dangerous	undetected	failure	mode.	We	consider	the	following	possible	states	for	the	facility:	
• the	facility	is	in	the	operational	mode,	
• the	 facility	 is	 stopped	 due	 to	 the	 process	 value	 entering	 the	 range	 of	critical	values,	or	due	to	the	detected	failures	of	safety	system,	
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The	process	of	interaction	between	the	SIS	and	the	technology	is	described	with	the	following	states:	Table	10.	States	of	the	stochastic	process	for	ESD	failures	and	technological	incidents	
	 EMERGENCY	SHUTDOWN	SYSTEM	 Technology	Transmitters	 Logic	Solvers	 Final	Control	Elements	1	 working	 working	 working	 working	2	 failed	(DU)	 working	 working	 working	3	 working	 failed	(DU)	 working	 working	4	 working	 working	 failed	(DU)	 working	
5	 under	maintenance		 working	 working	 stopped	6	 working	 under	maintenance	 working	 stopped	7	 working	 working	 under	maintenance	 stopped	8	 working	 working	 working	 stopped	(due	to	incident)	9	 failure	 incident		The	graph	of	transitions	is	given	in	the	figure	below.		
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	Figure	21.	Model	of	SIS	failure	and	its	interaction	with	technology	states.		The	 stochastic	 process	 the	 “ESD+technology”	 system	 transitioning	 from	 one	state	to	another	 is	modelled	over	the	time	of	 the	entire	 lifecycle	of	 the	considered	SIS.	During	the	lifecycle	time,	several	proof	tests	are	performed.	The	time	interval	between	the	 proof	 tests	 are	 equal	 to	 TI.	 During	 the	 proof	 tests	 all	 the	 previously	 undetected	failures	of	the	equipment	are	addressed	and	resolved.	Literally	speaking,	 it	means	that	after	the	proof	tests	are	performed,	the	stochastic	process,	depicted	on	Figure	21	cannot	be	in	states	2,	3	or	4.	In	this	manner,	we	consider	the	following	time	horizon	for	the	whole	lifecycle	of	the	system	“ESD+technology”:	𝐿𝐶: 0,			𝑇𝐼 𝑇𝐼,			2 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 2 ∙ 𝑇𝐼,			3 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 … 𝐾 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼,			𝐾 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 ,	𝐾 = 𝐿𝐶𝑇𝐼 		.	 (	32	)		During	 each	 kth	 period	 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼,			𝑘 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 	of	 the	 presented	 time	 horizon,	where		𝑘 = 1, 𝐾,		the	behaviour	of	the	system	can	be	described	by	a	system	of	ordinary	differential	equations:	
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𝑑𝑃(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑡) ∙ 𝛬	 (	33	)		Here,	 𝑃 𝑡 = 	 𝑝 𝑡 𝑝² 𝑡 … 𝑝Ë 𝑡 	 is	 a	 vector	 of	 probabilities	 of	 the	considered	loop	being	in	a	particular	state,	and	Λ	is	the	transition	matrix	containing	the	transition	rates	between	the	states:	
𝛬 = 𝜆 ⋯ 𝜆Ë⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝜆Ë ⋯ 𝜆ËË 	 (	34	)		For	the	transitions	depicted	on	the	graph	(see	Figure	21),	the	components	of	the	matrix	Λ	 are	 non-zero.	All	 the	 rest	 components	 are	 zeroes.	 The	non-zero	 components	are	described	below:	𝜆 = − 𝜆q + 𝜆} + 𝜆Ìx + 𝜆q   + 𝜆}   + 𝜆Ìx   + 𝜆q ¡ + 𝜆} ¡ + 𝜆Ìx ¡ + 𝑑q 		𝜆² = 𝜆q ¡,			𝜆Í = 𝜆} ¡,			𝜆Î = 𝜆Ìx ¡,	𝜆Ï = 𝜆q   + 𝜆q ,			𝜆Ð = 𝜆}   + 𝜆} ,			𝜆Ñ = 𝜆Ìx   + 𝜆Ìx ,			𝜆Ò = 𝑑q,	𝜆²² = − 𝜆} + 𝜆Ìx + 𝑑q ,			𝜆²Ï = 𝜆} + 𝜆Ìx ,			𝜆²Ë = 𝑑q,	𝜆ÍÍ = − 𝜆q + 𝜆Ìx + 𝑑q ,			𝜆ÍÐ = 𝜆q + 𝜆Ìx ,			𝜆ÍË = 𝑑q,	𝜆ÎÎ = − 𝜆q + 𝜆} + 𝑑q ,			𝜆ÎÑ = 𝜆q + 𝜆} ,			𝜆ÎË = 𝑑q,	𝜆Ï = 𝜇q,			𝜆ÏÏ = −𝜇q,				𝜆Ð = 𝜇},			𝜆ÐÐ = −𝜇},				𝜆Ñ = 𝜇Ìx,			𝜆ÑÑ = −𝜇Ìx,				𝜆Ò = 𝜇q,			𝜆ÒÒ = −𝜇q.				
(	35	)	
	The	initial	distribution	of	probabilities	for	the	period	𝑘 = 1	corresponds	to	the	“ESD+technology”	system	being	in	state	1	at	the	time	𝑡 = 0:	𝑃 0 = 𝑝(0) 𝑝²(0) … 𝑝Ë(0) = 1 0 … 0 .	 (	36	)			The	 initial	distribution	of	probabilities	 for	 the	subsequent	periods	𝑘 = 2,3…𝐾	can	be	derived	from	the	concordance	between	the	periods.	Probability	of	the	dangerous	undetected	failures	exactly	after	the	proof	testing	is	equal	to	zero.	
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𝑃 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 = 𝑝Ó 𝑝²Ó … 𝑝ËÓ ,	𝑝Ó = 	𝑝 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼,	𝑝²Ó = 	0,			𝑝ÍÓ = 	0,			𝑝ÎÓ = 	0,	𝑝ÏÓ = 	𝑝Ï 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 + 𝑝² 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 ,	𝑝ÐÓ = 	𝑝Ð 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 + 𝑝Í 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 ,	𝑝ÑÓ = 	𝑝Ñ 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 + 𝑝Î 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 ,	𝑝ÒÓ = 	𝑝Ò 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 ,	𝑝ËÓ = 	pË 𝑘 − 1 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 .	
(	37	)	
	As	 we	 can	 observe	 from	 (	 37	 ),	 probabilities	 𝑝 𝑡 , 𝑝Ò 𝑡 	and	𝑝Ë 𝑡 	 are	monotonic	 over	 the	 entire	 lifecycle	 of	 the	 considered	 system,	 and	 the	 remaining	probabilities	 𝑝² 𝑡 , 𝑝Í 𝑡 , 𝑝Î 𝑡 , 𝑝Ï 𝑡 , 𝑝Ð 𝑡 	and	𝑝Ñ 𝑡 	 have	 singularities	 (or,	 in	 other	words,	fail	to	be	well-behaved)	at	the	junctions	of	the	intervals	of	the	planning	horizon	(	32	).		 	
3.3.2 Reliability	Indicators	for	the	Modelled	System	
After	 obtaining	 the	 solution	𝑃 𝑡 = 	 𝑝 𝑡 𝑝² 𝑡 … 𝑝Ë 𝑡 	 of	 probabilities	of	“ESD+technology”	system	being	in	all	its	states	from	the	ODE	in	(	33	)	for	every	period	of	the	planning	horizon	(	32	)	with	initial	distribution	of	probabilities	(	36	)	and	(	37	),	we	can	move	on	to	obtaining	the	reliability	indicators	for	the	considered	system.	
Average	 probabilityof	 failure	 on	 demand	 is	 determined	 as	 the	 average	probability	of	the	modelled	system	being	in	the	9th	stage	(the	negative	state),	when	there	is	an	 incident	 in	 the	course	of	 the	 technology	and	at	 the	 same	 time	 the	ESD	system	 is	unavailable	because	of	its	failure.	
𝑃𝐹𝐷| = 1𝐿𝐶 ∙ 𝑝Ë 𝑡 𝑑𝑡Ô 	 (	38	)		
Risk	reduction	factor	is	determined	as	a	ratio	of	unresolved	incidents	rate	for	the	technology	without	the	ESD	system	and	with	ESD	deployed:	
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𝑅𝑅𝐹Õ  = 𝑑q𝜆ÕÖ .	 (	39	)		Here,	the	incidents	rate	𝜆Õ 	is	determined	from	the	Markov	analysis:	
𝜆Õ  = − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝑝Ë 𝐿𝐶𝐿𝐶 ,	 (	40	)	whereas	the	incidents	rate	𝑑q	is	must	be	determined	based	on	the	incidents	rate	
d	determined	during	risk	assessment	for	a	given	process,	and	the	risk	reduction	factor	ensured	by	the	DCS:	
𝑑q = 𝑑𝑅𝑅𝐹 	 (	41	)		
Mean	down	time	due	to	the	spurious	trips	of	ESD	can	be	pessimistically	estimated	as	the	mean	time	of	the	“ESD+technology”	system	being	in	the	5th,	6th	and	7th	states:	
𝐷𝑇 = 𝑝Ï 𝑡 𝑑𝑡Ô + 𝑝Ð 𝑡 𝑑𝑡
Ô
 + 𝑝Ñ 𝑡 𝑑𝑡.
Ô
 	 (	42	)		
Mean	down	time	due	to	the	technological	incidents	can	be	calculated	as	the	mean	time	of	the	“ESD+technology”	system	being	in	the	8th	state:	
𝐷𝑇q = 𝑝Ò 𝑡 𝑑𝑡Ô .	 (	43	)		The	total	mean	down	time	of	the	process:	𝐷𝑇 = 𝐷𝑇 + 𝐷𝑇q.	 (	44	)		
3.4 Collecting	the	Initial	Reliability	Data	for	Modelling	
In	order	to	estimate	the	risk	presented	by	a	hazardous	facility,	we	must	conduct	a	risk	assessment	for	the	considered	technology	(in	our	case,	a	facility	within	an	oil	and	gas	 production	 infrastructure).	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 assessment,	 we	 will	 obtain	 the	estimated	frequency	of	dangerous	events	per	year.	
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An	 example	 of	 estimation	 of	 hazardous	 even’s	 frequency	 is	 provided	 in	Appendix	A.	In	order	to	correctly	evaluate	the	incidents	rate	for	a	technological	facility,	we	should	not	only	evaluate	the	frequency	of	incidents	on	the	technology	itself,	but	also	consider	the	risk	reduction,	provided	by	the	DCS,	that	implements	the	control	over	the	technology.	 Calculating	 the	 risk	 reduction	 factor	 for	 DCS	 is	 a	 complicated	 process,	requiring	mathematical	modelling	somewhat	similar	to	the	ESD	system	model	descried	above.	Further,	we	will	use	the	results	of	calculating	the	RRFDCS	obtained	in	(Teluk	and	Shershukova	2012a,	2012b,	2012c,	2012d,	2012e).	Restoration	 rate	 for	 technology	 is	 determined	 from	 the	 nominal	 time	 for	restoration	 of	 a	 unit	 in	 case	 of	 an	 incident.	 The	 value	 of	 this	 time	 is	 provided	 in	 the	project	documentation	to	the	facility.	
𝜇q = 1𝑇wq{|q{q .	 (	45	)		The	 reliability	 characteristics	 for	 the	 transmitters,	 PLCs	 and	 actuators,	necessary	for	the	model,	are	failure	rate,	spurious	tripping	rate	and	diagnostic	coverage.	Those	values	are	provided	in	the	technical	documentation	to	each	device.	The	restoration	rate	 for	the	subsystems	of	 transmitters,	 logic	solvers	and	final	control	 elements	 are	 calculated	 given	 the	 nominal	 time	 for	 restoration	 of	 the	corresponding	elements	in	case	of	their	failure.	The	value	of	this	time	is	provided	in	the	project	documentation	to	the	facility.	
𝜇q = 1𝑇wq{|q{q ,			𝜇} = 1𝑇wq{|q{} ,			𝜇Ìx = 1𝑇wq{|q{Ìx .	 (	46	)		
3.5 Multiobjective	Optimization	of	Specifications	of	SIS	
The	mathematical	model	described	 in	 the	previous	 section	allows	 to	 calculate	the	 necessary	 reliability	 characteristics	 for	 a	 particular	 variant	 of	 the	 safety	 system’s	specification.	Let	us	now	finally	clarify	all	the	necessary	parameters	that	we	will	use	for	making	decisions	with	regards	to	SIS	specification	
	 75	
3.5.1 Decision	Variables	
• For	 every	 subsystem	 of	 ESD	 system	 the	 decision	 on	 the	 particular	 models	 of	
devices	 is	 made.	 Every	 engineering	 company	 has	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 vendors,	which	 supply	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 devices,	 that	 are	 suitable	 for	 this	 or	 that	purpose.	As	a	result,	we	have	a	finite	set	of	all	possible	devices	that	can	be	applied	in	SIS.	
o a	 particular	 model	 of	 a	 transmitter	 from	 the	 set	 of	 possible	transmitters,	
o a	particular	model	of	a	logic	solver	from	the	set	of	possible	PLCs,	
o a	 particular	 model	 of	 a	 final	 control	 element	 from	 the	 set	 of	possible	elements.	
• For	 every	 subsystem	of	 ESD	 system	 the	 decision	 on	 the	redundancy	 scheme	 is	made.	This	means	that	we	determine:	
o MooN	architecture	of	transmitters	subsystem,	
o MooN	architecture	of	logic	solver	subsystem,	
o MooN	architecture	of	final	control	subsystem.	
• For	 every	 subsystem	 we	 determine	 the	 Common-Cause	 Failures	 factor,	 or	 β-factor.	 By	 choosing	 a	 particular	 β-factor	 we	 make	 a	 decision	 on	 introducing	additional	electrical	separation	into	a	subsystem.	Thus,	the	decisions	are	
o β-factor	for	the	transmitters	subsystem,	
o β-factor	for	the	logic	solver	subsystem,	
o β-factor	for	the	final	control	subsystem.	
• For	 the	 whole	 system	 we	 choose	 the	 test	 interval,	 which	 implies	 that	 we	 are	determining	our	schedule	of	planned	maintenance	(proof	tests).	The	test	interval	is	chosen	from	a	set	of	values	from	1	month	to	24	months	in	steps	of	1	month.	
3.5.2 Objective	Functions	
3.5.2.1 Safety	Indicators	
For	 every	 particular	 specification	 of	 the	 ESD	 system,	 uniquely	 determined	 by	the	specification,	stated	in	the	set	of	decision	variables	we	can	obtain	the	following:	-	 first	of	 all,	 the	 reliability	 characteristics	 for	each	particular	 subsystem,	using	the	models	from	Section	3.2	of	this	research	
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-	 and	 then,	 after	 introducing	 the	 parameters	 of	 technological	 incidents	occurrence,	we	can	model	the	system	“ESD+technology”,	as	demonstrated	in	Section	3.3	of	this	research.	When	 the	 modelling	 for	 a	 particular	 alternative	 of	 SIS	 specification	 is	implemented,	as	shown	before,	we	obtain	the	values	of	the	following	indicators	for	the	facility,	we’re	designing:	
• average	probability	of	SIS’s	failure	on	demand,	
• mean	down	time	of	the	technological	facility.	
3.5.2.2 Cost	of	SIS	Lifecycle	as	an	Objective	
It	 is	 obvious	 that	 the	 best	 solution	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 those	 two	reliablility	 characteristics	would	 be	 the	 one	with	 the	most	 elaborate	MooN	 structures	and	the	most	faul-tolerant	(and	thus	expensive)	tools	for	every	subsystem.		However,	we	should	not	persue	only	the	benefits	in	terms	of	reliability.	It	has	already	been	suggested	in	 this	work,	 that	 Formalizing	 this	 principle	 of	 compromise	 between	 the	 costs	 of	 risk	reduction	 and	 the	 achieved	 level	 of	 safety.	 The	 latter	 is	 covered	 by	 the	 models	 in	Sections	3.2	and	3.3.	 It	means	 that	now	we	 should	determine	 the	 cost	of	 the	 solution,	suggested	by	this	or	that	specification	of	SIS.	The	cost	calculation	in	this	work	is	mostly	based	on	the	modelling	the	cost	of	the	lifecycle	provided	 in	 (Goble,	1998),	and	(Torres-Echeverria	and	Thompson	2007).	The	cost	 structure	has	been	 adapted	 to	 the	 specifics	 of	 our	 reasoning	 and	 the	 cost	 values,	obtained	and	used	in	the	computational	example	in	the	following	chapter.	The	lifecycle	cost	of	SIS	 functioning	on	a	particular	 technological	process	 is	presented	below,	and	 it	includes	three	main	components:	procurement,	operation	and	risk	costs.		
𝐶}Ìwxx}w = 𝐶×{x~wØwq + 𝐶q{×w|q{ + 𝐶qÓ ∙ 11 + 𝛿 qoÔq .	 (	47	)		Here,	𝛿	 is	 the	discount	 factor,	used	for	calculating	the	the	present	value	of	 the	future	expenses	(for	the	upcoming	years	within	the	lifecycle).		Procurement	cost	is	calculated	as	follows:	
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𝐶×{x~wØwq =	= 𝐶×~xÚ|wq ∙ 𝛽×~xÚ + 𝐶vwq ∙ 𝛽vw + 𝐶q|}}|q{q ∙ 𝛽q ∙ 𝑁q +	+ 𝐶×~xÚ|w} ∙ 𝛽×~xÚ + 𝐶vw} ∙ 𝛽vw + 𝐶q|}}|q{} ∙ 𝛽q ∙ 𝑁} +	+ 𝐶×~xÚ|wÌx ∙ 𝛽×~xÚ + 𝐶vwÌx ∙ 𝛽vw + 𝐶q|}}|q{Ìx ∙ 𝛽q ∙ 𝑁q +	+𝐶q|q~×.	
(	48	)	
Here,	𝐶×~xÚ|wq 	-	the	cost	of	purchasing	one	sensor	𝐶vwq -	the	contribution	of	a	particular	model	of	sensor	into	the	project	of	SIS	design	𝐶q|}}|q{q 	 -	 the	 contribution	of	 a	particular	model	of	 sensor	 into	 the	 installation	and	commissioning	cost	𝑁q-	total	number	of	sensor	in	the	subsystem	𝐶×~xÚ|w} 	-	the	cost	of	purchasing	one	PLC	𝐶vw} -	the	contribution	of	a	particular	model	of	PLC	into	the	project	of	SIS	design	𝐶q|}}|q{} 	 -	 the	 contribution	 of	 a	 particular	 model	 of	 PLC	 into	 the	 installation	 and	commissioning	cost	𝑁}-	total	number	of	PLCs	in	the	subsystem	𝐶×~xÚ|wÌx 	-	the	cost	of	purchasing	one	final	control	element	(e.g.,	one	valve)	𝐶vwÌx -	the	contribution	of	a	particular	model	of	valve	into	the	project	of	SIS	design	𝐶q|}}|q{Ìx 	 -	 the	 contribution	 of	 a	 particular	model	 of	 valve	 into	 the	 installation	 and	commissioning	cost	𝑁Ìx-	total	number	of	final	control	elements	in	the	subsystem	𝐶q|q~×-	 the	 startup	 cost,	 associated	with	 the	 project	 initiation,	 preparing	 the	 project	documentation,	software	development,	and	so	on.	𝛽×~xÚ ,	𝛽vw,	𝛽q	 -	 the	 cost	modifiers,	 connected	 to	 the	 particular	 choice	 of	 electrical	separation	within	the	subsystems	The	operations	cost	per	year:	𝐶{×w|q{q = 𝐶x{~Ø×q{q ∙ 𝛽x{ ∙ 𝑁q + 𝐶x{~Ø×q{} ∙ 𝛽x{ ∙ 𝑁} +	+𝐶x{~Ø×q{Ìx ∙ 𝛽x{ ∙ 𝑁Ìx +	+𝐶Ûºq ∙ 𝑁q + 𝐶Ûº} ∙ 𝑁} + 𝐶ÛºÌx ∙ 𝑁Ìx +	 (	49	)	
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+12𝑇𝐼 ∙ 𝐶Ûwqq ∙ 𝑁q + 𝐶Ûwq} ∙ 𝑁} + 𝐶ÛwqÌx ∙ 𝑁Ìx .		The	first	three	terms	in	the	formula	correspond	to	the	electricity	consumption,	depending	 on	 the	 number	 of	 elements	 in	 each	 subsystem.	 The	 following	 three	 terms	demonstrate	 the	 cost	 of	 yearly	 preventive	maintenance.	 The	 last	 term	 corresponds	 to	the	cost	of	proof	tests,	implemented	in	step	of	TI	(test	interval).	𝐶x{~Ø×q{q , 𝐶x{~Ø×q{} , 𝐶x{~Ø×q{} 	 -	the	yearly	consumption	of	the	electrical	energy	by	one	element	in	the	transmitters,	controllers	and	valves	subsystems	respectively,	𝛽x{-	 the	 cost	 modifier,	 connected	 to	 the	 particular	 choice	 of	 electrical	 separation	within	the	subsystems	𝐶Ûºq , 𝐶Ûº} , 𝐶ÛºÌx 	 -	 the	 yearly	 cost	 of	 preventive	 maintenance	 for	 one	 element	 in	 the	transmitters,	controllers	and	valves	subsystems	respectively,		𝐶Ûwqq , 𝐶Ûwq} , 𝐶ÛwqÌx 	 -	 the	 cost	 of	 conducting	 one	 proof	 test	 for	 one	 element	 in	 the	transmitters,	controllers	and	valves	subsystems	respectively.	The	yearly	risk	costs	represent	the	losses	due	to	 loss	of	production	during	the	system’s	downtime	and	the	losses	due	to	the	potential	dangerous	events	of	hazards:	𝐶Óq = 𝐶q + 𝐶ÜÝÞq .	 (	50	)		 𝐶q = 𝐶w×|q + 𝐶w×|} + 𝐶w×|Ìx + 𝐶×{v.}{ ∙ 𝑆𝐷 +	+𝐶×|q ∙ 𝑁q + 𝐶×|} ∙ 𝑁} + 𝐶×|Ìx ∙ 𝑁Ìx ∙ 𝑆𝑇𝑅.	 (	51	)		Here,	 𝐶w×|q , 𝐶w×|} ,	 𝐶w×|Ìx 	 are	 hourly	 costs	 of	 repairing	 the	 elements	 in	 the	transmitters,	controllers	and	valves	subsystems	respectively.	𝐶×{v.}{	is	hourly	losses	of	production	𝑆𝐷	–	standard	down	time	needed	for	repairing	after	the	spurious	tripping	𝑆𝑇𝑅	is	the	rate	of	spurious	tripping	for	the	modelled	system	of	ESD+technology.	The	coefficients,	corresponding	to	the	cost	of	the	spare	parts	replenishment	are	set	as	a	fixed	percentage	of	the	procurement	costs.	
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𝐶×|q = %𝑃𝑟 ∙ 𝐶×~xÚ|wq ,	𝐶×|} = %𝑃𝑟 ∙ 𝐶×~xÚ|w} ,	𝐶×|Ìx = %𝑃𝑟 ∙ 𝐶×~xÚ|wÌx .	 (	52	)		The	losses	due	to	the	consequences	of	the	hazardous	event:	𝐶ÜÝÞq = 𝐶}{ ∙ 𝑑q ∙ 𝑃𝐹𝐷|.	 (	53	)		Here,	 dt	 is	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	 dangerous	 event	 occurring	 without	 the	 ESD	system	 securing	 the	 technological	 unit,	 i.e.	 in	 case	 when	 we’re	 considering	 only	 the	facility	and	the	DCS	that	controls	the	process.		The	 losses	 due	 to	 the	 hazard	 occurrence	 and	 the	 dangerous	 consequences	taking	 place,	 can	 be	 determined	 using	 different	 approaches	 and	 ideas.	 The	 most	important	 factors	 to	 be	 considered	 are:	 loss	 of	 the	 facilities	 equipment,	 decline	 in	production	qualities,	and	of	course	the	 liability	costs	 in	case	of	 fatalities.	An	interested	reader	 can	 find	more	 information	 about	 those	 calculations	 in	 (HSE	 2001),	 where	 the	Value	of	Preventing	a	Fatality	approach	is	used.		Thus,	we	are	considering	the	problem	of	optimizing	the	specification	of	SIS	by	the	example	of	ESD	system,	with	three	objective	functions:	
• average	probability	of	SIS’s	failure	on	demand,	
• mean	down	time	of	the	technological	facility,	
• the	lifecycle	cost	of	SIS.		
3.5.3 Potential	Constraints	
Often	when	the	problem	of	ESD	system	design	 is	solved,	some	constraints	can	be	present.	The	limitations	can	be	put	in	place	when	we’re	considering	the	expenditures,	losses,	frequency	of	ESD’s	failures	on	demand	and	so	on.		The	constraint	representing	the	upper	bound	for	the	SIS	lifecycle	cost:	𝐶}Ìwxx}w(𝐸𝑆𝐷|}q) ≤ 𝐶}ãÌwxx}w.	 (	54	)	
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	Here,	 it	 is	 implied	 that	 the	 lifecycle	 cost	 is	 calculated	 according	 to	 (	 47	 ),	 and	
ESDalt	is	a	particular	alternative	among	all	possible	ESD	specifications.		The	 constraint	 representing	 the	 upper	 bound	 for	 the	 losses	 due	 to	 the	dangerous	 events	 occurrence	 and	 the	 dangerous	 consequence	 of	 the	 hazards	 taking	place.	The	upper	bound	on	those	losses	over	the	entire	lifecycle:	
𝐶ÜÝÞqÔq ≤ 𝐶ÜÝÞ.	 (	55	)		The	 constraint	 representing	 the	 upper	 bound	 for	 resulting	 value	 of	 failure	 on	demand	frequency,	given	the	ESD	system	is	deployed:	
𝑑q ∙ 𝑃𝐹𝐷| ≤ 𝐹ãxãvwq.	 (	56	)	This	constraint	implies	that	a	certain	risk	class,	or	Safety	Integrity	Level	is	to	be	achieved	 by	 the	 ESD	 system,	 that	 we’re	 deploying.	 For	 most	 facilities	 in	 oil	 and	 gas	production,	the	necessary	level	of	safety	integrity	to	be	achieved	is	SIL	III.		
3.5.4 Multiobjective	Genetic	Algorithm	
Mаny	оptimizаtiоn	prоblеms	rеvоlvе	аrоund	sеvеrаl	оbjеctivеs	thаt	nееd	tо	bе	оptimizеd.	 In	 mоst	 оf	 thе	 cаsеs	 such	 оbjеctivеs	 аrе	 cоnflicting	 оr	 cоmplimеnting	 е.g.	prоfit	mаximizаtiоn	аnd	cоst	minimizаtiоn	issuеs.	 It	 is	quitе	pоssiblе	thаt	оnе	sоlutiоn	mаy	nоt	 sаtisfy	mоrе	 thаn	оnе	оbjеctivе	 i.е.	 sоlutiоn	 fоr	оnе	оbjеctivе	mаy	nоt	bе	 thе	оptimаl	sоlutiоn	fоr	thе	оthеr	оbjеctivе.	Thus,	 it	cаn	bе	cоncludеd	thаt	in	mоst	оf	such	cаsеs	 а	 sеt	 оf	 sоlutiоns	 is	 rеquirеd	 instеаd	 оf	 оnе	 оr	 twо	 оbjеctivеs.	 This	 issuе	 is	 put	fоrwаrd	by	mаny	rеsеаrchеrs,	 fоr	еxаmplе,	Аrrоyо	(2003)	stаtеs	thаt	а	Multi-оbjеctivе	Cоmbinаtоriаl	Оptimizаtiоn	(MОCО)	prоblеm	cоnsists	оf	minimizing	оr	mаximizing	а	sеt	оf	 оbjеctivеs	whilе	 sаtisfying	 а	 sеt	 оf	 cоnstrаints.	 It	 shоuld	 bе	 nоtеd	 thаt	 in	 а	 typicаl	MОCО	prоblеm,	thеrе	is	nо	singlе	sоlutiоn	thаt	cаn	sаtisfy	thе	оptimizаtiоn	critеriоn	fоr	еаch	 оbjеctivе,	 instеаd	 thеrе	 is	 а	 sеt	 оf	 еfficiеnt	 sоlutiоns.	 Furthеrmоrе,	 in	 such	
	 81	
cоnditiоns	 nо	 singlе	 sоlutiоn	 cаn	 bе	 cоnsidеrеd	 bеttеr	 thаn	 аnоthеr	 sоlutiоn	 fоr	 аll	оbjеctivеs.		Pitоmbеirа	(2011)	highlightеd	thе	mеthоd	prоpоsеd	by	Vilfrеdо	Pаrеtо		thаt	intrоducеd	 thе	 dоminаncе	 cоncеpt.	 Hе	 аrguеd	 thаt	 аn	 оptimаl	 sоlutiоn	 fоr	 а	 MОCО	prоblеm	 shоuld	 mаintаin	 а	 sоrt	 оf	 bаlаncе	 bеtwееn	 diffеrеnt	 cоnflicting	 оbjеctivе	functiоns.	This	 is	cаllеd	Pаrеtо	оptimаl	sоlutiоn.	Thе	mаjоr	аim	оf	MОCО	is	 tо	 find	thе	Pаrеtо	 оptimаl	 sеt	 оr	 in	 оthеr	 wоrds	 Pаrеtо	 frоntiеr.	 Thе	 Pаrеtо-оptimаl	 sеt	 cаn	 bе	dеfinеd	аs	“А	sоlutiоn	 is	pаrеtо-оptimаl	 if	 it	 is	nоt	dоminаtеd	by	аny	оthеr	sоlutiоn	 in	dеcisiоn	vаriаblе	spаcе”		
Pаrеtо	 оptimаl	 cаn	 bе	 wеll	 undеrstооd	 with	 thе	 еxplаnаtiоn	 оf	 Pаrеtо	dоminаncе.	Pаrеtо	dоminаncе	cаn	bе	dеfinеd	аs	whеn	а	givеn	sоlutiоn	x1	is	dоminаting	аnоthеr	sоlutiоn	x2	if	thе	vаluеs	оf	thе	оbjеctivе	functiоns	fоr	x1	аrе	bеttеr	thаn	оr	еquаl	tо	 thе	 functiоnаl	 vаluеs	 оf	 x2	 аnd	 аt	 lеаst	 оnе	 оf	 thе	 functiоnаl	 vаluеs	 оf	 x1	 is	 strictly	bеttеr	thаn	thе	functiоnаl	vаluе	оf	x2	(Dеb	2008).	
Thе	 pаrеtо-оptimаl	 is	 оnе	 оf	 thе	 bеst	 knоwn	 sоlutiоns	 in	 rеgаrds	 thаt	 аll	оbjеctivеs	 cаnnоt	 bе	 imprоvеd	 in	 аny	 оbjеctivе	 withоut	 mаking	 thе	 оthеr	 оbjеctivеs	wоrsе.	Thе	sеt	оf	аll	fеаsiblе	sоlutiоns	thаt	аrе	nоn-dоminаtеd	by	аny	оthеr	sоlutiоn	is	cаllеd	thе	pаrеtо-оptimаl	оr	in	оthеr	wоrds	nоn-dоminаtеd	sеt.	If	thе	nоn-dоminаtеd	sеt	is	within	thе	еntirе	fеаsiblе	sеаrch	spаcе	thеn	it	is	cаllеd	glоbаlly	pаrеtо-оptimаl	sеt.	In	оthеr	wоrds,	 fоr	 а	 givеn	Multi-Оbjеctivе	Prоblеm	 (MОP),	 thе	 pаrеtо-оptimаl	 sеt	P∗ ,	 is	dеfinеd	аs:		
𝑃∗ = {x	 ∈ 	Ω	|	¬∃	x′	 ∈ 	Ω	F(x′) 	≼ 	F(x)}.	 (	57	)	
Аnоthеr	cоncеpt	rеlаtеd	tо	Pаrеtо	Оptimаlity	is	knоwn	аs	Pаrеtо-frоnt	thаt	cаn	bе	 dеfinеd	 аs	 thе	 vаluеs	 оf	 оbjеctivе	 functiоns	 rеlаtеd	 tо	 еаch	 sоlutiоn	 оf	 а	 pаrеtо-оptimаl	 sеt	 in	 оbjеctivе	 spаcе	 is	 cаllеd	pаrеtо-frоnt.	 In	 оthеr	wоrds,	 fоr	 а	 givеn	MОP,	
F(x),	аnd	pаrеtо-оptimаl	sеt,	P*	,	thе	pаrеtо-frоnt,	PF*	is	givеn	by:		
𝑃𝐹∗ = {u	 = 	F(x)|	x	 ∈ 	𝑃∗	}.	 (	58	)	
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	Figurе	22.	Pаrеtо-frоnt	fоr	twо-оbjеctivеs	minimizаtiоn	prоblеm,	аdоptеd	frоm	Kоnаk,	Coit	and	Smith	(2006).	
Thе	 аbоvе	 figurе	 shоws	 а	 typicаl	 pаrеtо-frоnt	 оf	 а	 twо	 оbjеctivе	 minimizing	typе	оptimizаtiоn	prоblеm	in	оbjеctivе	spаcе.	Sincе	thе	cоncеpt	оf	dоminаtiоn	еnаblеs	cоmpаrisоn	 оf	 sоlutiоns	 with	 rеspеct	 tо	 multi-оbjеctivеs,	 mоst	 оf	 multi-оbjеctivе	оptimizаtiоn	 аlgоrithms	 prаcticе	 this	 cоncеpt	 tо	 оbtаin	 thе	 nоn-dоminаtеd	 sеt	 оf	sоlutiоns,	cоnsеquеntly	thе	pаrеtо-frоnt.	
Dеb	 (2008)	 sаys	 thаt	 in	 аdditiоn	 tо	 finding	 а	 sоlutiоn	 sеt	 nеаr	 tо	 thе	 Pаrеtо	frоntiеr,	it	is	nеcеssаry	thаt	thеsе	sоlutiоns	аrе	wеll	distributеd,	which	аllоws	а	brоаdеr	cоvеrаgе	 оf	 thе	 sеаrch	 spаcе.	 This	 fаct	 fаcilitаtеs	 thе	 dеcisiоn	 mаking,	 bеcаusе,	rеgаrdlеss	 оf	 thе	wеight	 аssignеd	 tо	 еаch	 critеriоn,	 а	 quаlity	 sоlutiоn	will	 bе	 chоsеn.	Whеrеаs,	 Dеb	 (2001)	 stаtеs	 “thеrе	 еxist	 mutiplе	 Pаrеtо-оptimаl	 sоlutiоns	 in	 а	prоblеmоnly	 if	 thе	оbjеctivеs	 аrе	 cоnflicting	 tо	 еаch	оthеr”.	Оthеrwisе,	 if	 thеy	аrе	nоt	cоnflict	оnе	singlе	оptimаl	sоlutiоn	is	аchiеvаblе.	
Thеrе	аrе	twо	cоmmоn	rеquirеmеnts	thаt	shоuld	bе	mеt	by	аn	оptimizеr:	
• Prоximity	
• Divеrsity	
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Purshоusе	 (2003)	 fоrmulаtеd	 thе	 аdditiоnаl	 оbjеctivе	 оf	 pеrtinеncе,	mеаning	thаt	thе	оbtаinеd	Pаrеtо	sеt	must	prоvidе	sоlutiоns	оn	thе	pеrtinеnt	rеgiоns	оf	intеrеst.	This,	hоwеvеr,	impliеs	tо	guidе	thе	sеаrch	bаsеd	оn	prеviоusly	еxprеssеd	prеfеrеncеs.	
Аccоrding	 tо	 оthеr	 rеsеаrchеs,	 in	mоdеrn	 dаys	 Gеnеtic	 Аlgоrithms	 (GАs)	 аrе	widеly	 usеd	 аnd	 hаvе	 prоvеd	 tо	 bе	 а	 highly	 еffеctivе	 tооl	 in	 оrdеr	 tо	 sоlvе	 hаrd	оptimizаtiоn	 prоblеms	 (Lukаs	 еt	 аl.	 	 2012).	 Gеnеtic	 Аlgоrithms	 аrе	 pоwеrful	 gеnеrаl	purpоsе	оptimizаtiоn	tооls	which	mоdеl	thе	principlеs	оf	еvоlutiоn.		
Grеfеnstеttе	 (1993)	 stаtеs	 "А	 gеnеtic	 аlgоrithm	 is	 аn	 itеrаtivе	 prоcеdurе	mаintаining	а	pоpulаtiоn	оf	 structurеs	 thаt	аrе	 cаndidаtе	 sоlutiоns	 tо	 spеcific	dоmаin	chаllеngеs.		During	еаch	tеmpоrаl	incrеmеnt	(cаllеd	а	gеnеrаtiоn),	thе	structurеs	in	thе		currеnt	 	pоpulаtiоn	аrе	rаtеd	fоr	thеir	еffеctivеnеss	аs	 	dоmаin	 	sоlutiоns,	 	аnd	оn	thе	bаsis	 оf	 thеsе	 еvаluаtiоns,	 а	 nеw	pоpulаtiоn	 	 оf	 	 cаndidаtе	 	 sоlutiоns	 is	 fоrmеd	using	spеcific	gеnеtic	оpеrаtоrs	such	аs		rеprоductiоn,	crоssоvеr,	аnd	mutаtiоn."	
Whеrеаs,	 Gоldbеrg	 (1989)	 stаtеs	 "Thеy	 cоmbinе	 survivаl	 оf	 thе	 fittеst	 аmоng	string	 structurеs	 with	 а	 structurеd	 yеt	 rаndоmizеd	 infоrmаtiоn	 еxchаngе	 tо	 fоrm	 а	sеаrch	аlgоrithm	with	sоmе	оf	thе	innоvаtivе	flаir	оf	humаn	sеаrch.		In	еvеry	gеnеrаtiоn,	а	nеw	sеt	оf	аrtificiаl	crеаturеs	(strings)	is	crеаtеd	using	bits	аnd	piеcеs	оf	thе	fittеst	оf	thе	 оld;	 аn	 оccаsiоnаl	 nеw	pаrt	 is	 triеd	 fоr	 gооd	mеаsurе.	Whilе	 rаndоmizеd,	 gеnеtic	аlgоrithms	аrе	nо	simplе	rаndоm	wаlk.		Thеy	еfficiеntly	еxplоit	histоricаl	infоrmаtiоn	tо	spеculаtе	оn	nеw	sеаrch	pоints	with	еxpеctеd	imprоvеd	pеrfоrmаncе."	
Gеnеtic	 Аlgоrithms	 аrе	 еstаblishеd	 оn	 thе	 idеа	 оf	 Dаrwiniаn's	 еvоlutiоnаry	prоcеssеs	 in	 аccоrdаncе	 with	 survivаl	 оf	 thе	 fittеst.	 This	 аpprоаch	 is	 bаsеd	 оn	 thе	prоbаbilistic	 thеоry	аnd	 it	еmplоys	thе	cоncеpts	оf	еvоlutiоn	аnd	sеlеctiоn	 in	оrdеr	tо	gеnеrаtе	а	fеw	sоlutiоns	fоr	pаrticulаr	prоblеm.	Thе	аlgоrithm	simulаtеs	thе	prоcеss	оf	еvоlutiоn	оf	а	pоpulаtiоn	оf	individuаls	whоsе	gеnеtic	chаrаctеristics	аrе	inhеritеd	frоm	thоsе	 аncеstоrs	 thаt	 wеrе	 fittеst	 fоr	 survivаl,	 thе	 sаmе	 аs	 thе	 nаturаl	 еvоlutiоn	 оf	spеciеs	dоеs.		
It	is	impоrtаnt	tо	еmphаsizе	thаt	thе	fundаmеntаl	cоncеpt	оf	Gеnеtic	Аlgоrithm	cоmеs	up	frоm	thе	principlе	оf	“еvоlutiоn”,	thаt	brings	tо	Gеnеtic	Аlgоrithm	its	flеxibility	аnd	 hаrdnеss.	 This	 Аlgоrithm	 bеcаmе	 widеly	 usеd	 fоr	 оptimizаtiоn	 prоblеms	 аnd	invеstigаtiоn	 оf	 rеаl-lifе	 situаtiоns.	 In	 cоntrаdistinctiоn	 tо	 trаditiоnаl	 аpprоаchеs,	
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Gеnеtic	Аlgоrithm	is	а	mеthоd,	which	includе	dеtеrminаtiоn	оf	оptimаl	pаrаmеtеrs	thаt	prоvidеs	 thе	 bеttеr	 оppоrtunity	 fоr	 sоlving	 а	 lоt	 оf	 rеаl-wоrld	 prаcticаl	 prоblеms.	Gеnеtic	Аlgоrithm	аllоw	tо	оbtаin	thе	sоlutiоn	оf	thе	givеn	prоblеm	with	thе	hеlp	оf	аn	аltеrnаtivе	 tеchniquе.	 Thе	 trаditiоnаl	 mеthоds	 аrе	 wеll	 suitеd	 fоr	 prоblеms	 with	cоmplеx	 аnd	 brоаd	 sеаrching	 аrеа.	 Whilе	 Gеnеtic	 Аlgоrithm	 оutpеrfоrms	 thеm	 in	оbtаining	 “thе	 оptimumаl”	 sоlutiоn	 оf	 thе	 prоblеm,	 аs	 in	 surfаcе	 scаlе	 аs	wеll	 аs	 in	 а	sеаrch	оf	stаtе-spаcе.	Thе	еntirе	аrchitеcturе	оf	Gеnеtic	Аlgоrithm	is	built	up	оn	thrее	stоnеs:	Еliminаtiоn,	Sеlеctiоn	аnd	Vаriаtiоn	(Kаnigоllа	2014).	
	Figurе	23.	Psеudоcоdе	dеscriptiоn	оf	thе	Prоcеdurе	Gеnеtic	Аlgоrithm		
	
Gеnеtic	 Аlgоrithms	 hаvе	 thе	 аbility	 tо	 crеаtе	 аn	 initiаl	 pоpulаtiоn	 оf	 fеаsiblе	sоlutiоns,	 аnd	 thеn	 rе-cоmbinе	 thеm	 in	 а	wаy	 tо	 guidе	 thеir	 sеаrch	 tо	 оnly	 thе	mоst	prоmising	аrеаs	оf	thе	stаtе	spаcе.				
Оncе	thе	rеprоductiоn	аnd	thе	fitnеss	functiоn	hаvе	bееn	prоpеrly	dеfinеd,	а	GА	is	 еvоlvеd	 аccоrding	 tо	 thе	 sаmе	 bаsic	 structurе.	 It	 stаrts	 by	 gеnеrаting	 аn	 initiаl	pоpulаtiоn	 оf	 chrоmоsоmеs,	 which	 is	 gеnеrаtеd	 rаndоmly	 tо	 еnsurе	 thе	 gеnеtic	divеrsity.		
Еаch	 fеаsiblе	 sоlutiоn	 is	 еncоdеd	 аs	 а	 chrоmоsоmе	 (string)	 аlsо	 cаllеd	 а	gеnоtypе,	аnd	еаch	chrоmоsоmе	is	givеn	а	mеаsurе	оf	fitnеss	viа	а	fitnеss	(еvаluаtiоn	оr	оbjеctivе)	 functiоn.	 	 Thеn,	 thе	 GА	 lооps	 оvеr	 аn	 itеrаtiоn	 prоcеss	 tо	 mаkе	 thе	 nеxt	gеnеrаtiоn.	 Аccоrding	 tо	 thе	 еvаluаtiоn	 in	 thе	 оbjеctivе	 spаcе,	 thе	 individuаls	 аrе	
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rаnkеd	 аnd	 thеn	 аssignеd	 а	 fitnеss	 vаluе,	 which	 dеtеrminеs	 thеir	 likеlihооd	 оf	rеprоductiоn	in	thе	nеxt	gеnеrаtiоn.	
Еаch	 itеrаtiоn	 cоnsists	 оf	 fitnеss	 еvаluаtiоn,	 sеlеctiоn,	 rеprоductiоn,	 nеw	еvаluаtiоn	 оf	 thе	 оffsprings,	 аnd	 finаlly	 rеplаcеmеnt	 in	 pоpulаtiоn.	 Stоpping	 critеriоn	mаy	bе	thе	numbеr	оf	itеrаtiоn	оr	thе	cоnvеrgеncе	оf	thе	bеst	chrоmоsоmе	tоwаrd	thе	оptimаl	sоlutiоn.	
Thе	 fitnеss	 оf	 а	 chrоmоsоmе	 dеtеrminеs	 its	 аbility	 tо	 survivе	 аnd	 prоducе	оffspring.	 Thе	 chrоmоsоmеs	 аrе	 dеcоdеd	 intо	 thе	 rеаl	 vаluеs	 оf	 thе	 vаriаblеs	 thеy	rеprеsеnt.	This	is	thе	phеnоtypе	оf	thе	individuаls.	With	this	thе	оbjеctivе	functiоns	аrе	еvаluаtеd.	Аccоrding	tо	thе	еvаluаtiоn	in	thе	оbjеctivе	spаcе,	thе	individuаls	аrе	rаnkеd	аnd	thеn	аssignеd	а	fitnеss	vаluе,	which	dеtеrminеs	thеir	likеlihооd	оf	rеprоductiоn	in	thе	 nеxt	 gеnеrаtiоn.	 А	 finitе	 pоpulаtiоn	 оf	 chrоmоsоmеs	 is	mаintаinеd.	 Fоr	 оur	 finitе	dоmаins,	а	 fitnеss	mаp	 is	аn	еxhаustivе,	uncоmprеssеd	rеprеsеntаtiоn	оf	 thе	mаpping	bеtwееn	individuаls	аnd	fitnеss	vаluеs	gеnеrаtеd	by	а	fitnеss	functiоn.	It	cаn	bе	dеfinеd	аs	thе	sеt	оf	аll	оrdеrеd	pаirs	(i,	f	(i)),	whеrе	i	dеnоtеs	аn	individuаl	in	оur	dоmаin	аnd	f(i)	its	fitnеss	vаluе	(Mоntаnеz	еt	аl.	2013).	
Thеrе	аrе	thrее	bаsic	rulеs:	
• Biаsеd	Rеprоductiоn:	sеlеcting	thе	fittеst	tо	rеprоducе;	
• Crоssоvеr:	 cоmbining	 pаrеnt	 chrоmоsоmеs	 tо	 prоducе	 childrеn	chrоmоsоmеs;	
• Mutаtiоn:	аltеring	sоmе	gеnеs	in	а	chrоmоsоmе.	
Thе	cyclе	оf	еvаluаtiоn,	sеlеctiоn,	rеprоductiоn	аnd	rеinsеrtiоn	is	rеpеаtеd	until	а	cеrtаin	cоnditiоn	tо	stоp	thе	аlgоrithm	is	mеt.	This	cоnditiоn	mаy	bе	thе	еxhаust	оf	а	gеnеrаtiоn	 cоunt	 оr	 thе	 cоmpliаncе	 with	 а	 spеcific	 gоаl.	 Аt	 thе	 еnd,	 thе	 аlgоrithm	dеlivеrs	 а	 sеt	 оf	 оptimаl	 sоlutiоns	 thаt	 is	 thе	 Pаrеtо-оptimаl	 frоnt	 (Tоrrеs-Еchеvеrriа	2009).	
Thе	 pоpulаtiоn	 оf	 thе	 GА	 is	 а	 grоup	 оf	 Npоp	 individuаls.	 Thе	 mоst	 cоmmоn	еncоding	is	binаry	аlоng	with	thе	usе	оf	numbеrs	аnd	intеgеr	cоdеs.	Thе	pоpulаtiоn	sizе	
Npоp	is	оnе	оf	thе	pаrаmеtеrs	оf	thе	GА	tо	chооsе.	Аs	Mаrsеguеrrа	еt	аl.	(2006)	discuss,	а	tоо	 smаll	 оr	 tоо	 lаrgе	 pоpulаtiоn	 cаn	 hаvе	 sеriоus	 cоnsеquеncеs	 likе	 prоblеms	 in	
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gеnеtic	divеrsity.	Thе	initiаl	pоpulаtiоn	cаn	bе	crеаtеd	fоllоwing	sеvеrаl	strаtеgiеs	likе	rаndоm	crеаtiоn	 thаt	 is	mоst	 simplе	wаy	 tо	dо	 sо.	Аlthоugh	 thеrе	 cаn	bе	mаny	оthеr	strаtеgiеs	tо	crеаtе	pоpulаtiоn.		
Thе	Singlе	Pоint	crоssоvеr	is	thе	simplеst	rеcоmbinаtiоn,	in	which	twо	strings	аrе	 usеd	 аs	 pаrеnts	 аnd	 nеw	 individuаls	 аrе	 fоrmеd	 by	 swаpping	 а	 sub-sеquеncе	bеtwееn	 thе	 twо	 strings.	 Thе	 twо	 pаrеnts	 еxchаngе	 thеir	 pоrtiоns	 оf	 chrоmоsоmе	indicаtеd	by	thе	crоssоvеr	pоint.	
	Figurе	24.	Bit-string	crоssоvеr	оf	pаrеnts	а)	&	b)	tо	fоrm	оffspring	c)	&	d).	Sоurcе	Аngеlinе	(1996).	
Mutаtiоn	 is	 thе	 sеcоnd	 vаriаbility	 оpеrаtоr.	 This	 оpеrаtоr	 rаndоmly	 chаngеs	оnе	оf	 thе	gеnеs	 in	thе	nеw	оffspring	s	chrоmоsоmеs.	Bit-flipping	mutаtiоn	 is	аnоthеr	cоmmоm	 оpеrаtоr	 in	 GА,	 in	which	 а	 singlе	 bit	 in	 thе	 string	 is	 flippеd	 tо	 fоrm	 а	 nеw	оffspring	string.	
	Figurе	25.	Bit-flipping	mutаtiоn	оf	pаrеnt	а)	tо	fоrm	оffspring	b).																			Sоurcе	Аngеlinе	(1996).	
Thе	 bitflipping	mutаtiоn	 is	 thе	 simplеst	 binаry	mutаtiоn	 оpеrаtоr,	whеrе	 thе	bits	оf	а	chrоmоsоmе	аrе	simply	flippеd	with	а	cеrtаin	prоbаbility	pm.		
Аs	sооn	аs	thе	crеаtiоn	оf	thе	оffspring	by	sеlеctiоn	hаvе	bееn	mаdе,	thеn	thе	аpprоаch	 rеcоmbinеs	 аnd	 pеrfоrms	 thе	 mutаtiоn	 оf	 thе	 individuаls	 frоm	 initiаl	pоpulаtiоn,	 аftеr	 thаt	 thе	 dеtеrminаtiоn	 оf	 оffspring's	 fitnеss	 hаs	 tо	 bе	mаdе.	 In	 cаsе	whеn	thе	sizе	оf	thе	оld	pоpulаtiоn	is	biggеr	thаn	thе	nеw	gеnеrаtеd	оffspring,	thеn	thе	Gеnеtic	Аlgоrithm	must	 rеinsеrt	 thе	 оffspring	 intо	 thе	 оriginаl	 pоpulаtiоn	 in	 оrdеr	 tо	kееp	 up	 thе	 sizе	 оf	 thе	 initiаl	 pоpulаtiоn.	 Аnаlоgоusly,	 in	 cаsе	 whеn	 thе	 sizе	 оf	 thе	
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оriginаl	 pоpulаtiоn	 is	 smаllеr	 thаn	 thе	 prоducеd	 оffspring	 оr	 nоt	 еvеryоnе	 frоm	оffspring	 bеlоng	 tо	 еаch	 gеnеrаtiоn,	 thеn	 thе	 аlgоrithm	 hаvе	 tо	 аpply	 а	 rеinsеrtiоn	tеchniquе	 in	 оrdеr	 tо	 dеfinе	 which	 individuаls	 must	 bе	 in	 thе	 gеnеrаtеd	 pоpulаtiоn.	Thеn,	 in	 thе	 fоllоwing	 itеrаtiоn	 оf	 thе	 Gеnеtic	 аlgоrithm,	 thеrе	 is	 usаgе	 оf	 nеw	pоpulаtiоn.	 Typicаlly,	 whеn	 а	 mаximum	 аmоunt	 оf	 gеnеrаtiоns	 hаs	 bееn	 crеаtеd,	 оr	whеn	 аn	 аccеptаblе	 dеgrее	 оf	 fitnеss	 fоr	 thе	 pоpulаtiоn	 hаs	 bееn	 аchiеvеd,	 sо	 thе	Gеnеtic	prоcеdurеs	thеn	stоppеd	(Pеnchеva	еt	al.	2011).		
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3.6 Representation	of	the	Problem	in	Matlab	
Obtaining	the	values	of	𝝀𝑫𝑼, 𝝀𝑫𝑫, 𝝀𝑺	for	the	subsystems	of	SIS.	Table	11.	The	input	data,	provided	into	the	function:	Parameter	in	the	model	 Variable	in	Matlab	 Description	
M	 M	 Number	 of	 elements	 to	 be	 in	 operational	 condition	 in	MooN	architecture	
N	 N	 Total	number	of	element	in	MooN	architecture	
ε	 alpha	 Level	of	diagnostic	coverage	for	1	element	(value	from	0	to	1,	percentage)	
β	 betta	 Common-cause	 failure	 factor	 (value	 from	 0	 to	 1,	percentage)	
µ	 mu	 Repair/restoration	rate	(in	1/hours)	
λST	 lambda_st	 Spurious	tripping	rate	for	1	element	(in	1/hours)	
TI	 TI	 Test	interval,	hours	
 Table	12.	The	output	data,	provided	by	the	function:	Parameter	in	the	model	 Variable	in	Matlab	 Description	𝜆 ¡	 la(1)	 Failure	rate	for	dangerous	undetected	failures	for	the	subsystem	𝜆  	 la(1)	 Failure	rate	for	dangerous	detected	failures	for	the	subsystem	𝜆	 la(3)	 Failure	rate	for	the	subsystem’s	spurious	trips	
 
 
function la = structure (M, N, alpha, betta, lambda, mu, lambda_st, TI) 
 
p = 0; 
for i = (N-M+1):N 
    p = p + nchoosek(N,i).*(1-exp(-lambda.*(1-alpha).*(1-
betta).*TI))^i.*exp(-lambda.*(1-alpha).*(1-betta).*TI.*(N-i)); 
end 
la(1) = - log(1-p)/TI ; 
  
Size=N-M+2; 
La_M_temp=zeros(Size, Size); 
La_M_temp(1,1) = -N.*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda; 
La_M_temp(1,2) =  N.*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda; 
for i = 2:(Size-1) 
    La_M_temp(i,i-1) = mu; 
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    La_M_temp(i,i)   = -(N-i+1).*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda - mu; 
    La_M_temp(i,i+1) = (N-i+1).*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda; 
end 
M_temp = zeros(Size-1, Size-1); 
for i = 1:(Size-1) 
    for j = 1:(Size-1) 
        M_temp(i,j) = La_M_temp(i,j); 
    end 
end 
Initial_Distrib=zeros(1, Size-1); 
Initial_Distrib(1)=1; 
  
[T,Y] = ode45(@(t,y) MooNDD(t,y,M_temp), [0 TI], Initial_Distrib); 
for i = 1:(Size-1) 
        temp = temp + Y(:,1)); 
end 
    Y(:,Size)=1-temp; 
  
la(2) = - log(1-Y((length(Y(:,Size))),Size))/TI + lambda*betta; 
  
Size=N-M+2; 
La_M_temp=zeros(Size, Size); 
La_M_temp(1,1) = -N.*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda_st; 
La_M_temp(1,2) =  N.*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda_st; 
for i = 2:(Size-1) 
    La_M_temp(i,i-1) = mu; 
    La_M_temp(i,i)   = -(N-i+1).*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda_st - mu; 
    La_M_temp(i,i+1) = (N-i+1).*alpha.*(1-betta).*lambda_st; 
end 
  
M_temp = zeros(Size-1, Size-1); 
  
for i = 1:(Size-1) 
    for j = 1:(Size-1) 
        M_temp(i,j) = La_M_temp(i,j); 
    end 
end 
Initial_Distrib=zeros(1, Size-1); 
Initial_Distrib(1)=1; 
  
[T,Y] = ode45(@(t,y) MooNDD(t,y,M_temp), [0 TI], Initial_Distrib); 
for i = 1:(Size-1) 
        temp = temp + Y(:,1)); 
end 
    Y(:,Size)=1-temp; 
 
la(3) = - log(1-Y((length(Y(:,Size))),Size))/TI + lambda_st*betta; 	Within	this	function,	we	may	see	the	implementation	of	numerical	Runge-Kutta	method	for	solving	the	system	of	ordinary	differential	equations	(	18	)	and	(	25	).	The	numerical	algorithm	is	run	by	the	built-in ode45 function	in	Matlab.	 	
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Obtaining	the	values	of	𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈, 𝑫𝑻, 𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆	for	the	subsystems	of	SIS.	The	input	data,	provided	into	the	function:	Table	13.	The	input	data,	provided	into	the	function:	Variable	in	Matlab	 Description	arg(1)	 MooN	architecture	for	the	transmitters	subsystem	arg(2)	 MooN	architecture	for	the	PLCs	subsystem	arg(3)	 MooN	architecture	for	the	actuators	subsystem	arg(4)	 Common-cause	failure	factor	for	transmitters	subsystem	arg(5)	 Common-cause	failure	factor	for	PLCs	subsystem	arg(6)	 Common-cause	failure	factor	the	actuators	subsystem	arg(7)	 A	choice	of	test	interval	arg(8)	 A	choice	on	the	model	of	sensor	arg(9)	 A	choice	on	the	model	of	PLC	arg(10)	 A	choice	on	the	model	of	actuator		The	input	data,	provided	in	the	table	above	represents	the	decision	variables	for	the	optimization	problem.		In	addition	to	the	input	date,	a	set	of	parameters	is	present	within	the	function.	Those	parameters	provide	the	necessary	description	for	the	particular	problem	setting.		 Table	14.	Modelling	Parameters	Parameter	in	the	model	 Variable	in	Matlab	 Description	𝐿𝐶	 Total_time	 Duration	of	the	lifecycle,	years	𝑑q	 d	 Technological	incidents	rate,	1/hours	
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𝜇q	 mu	 Technology	restoration	rate,	1/hours	𝐶×{v.}{	 Loss_of_production	 Loss	of	production,	cost_units	per	hour	𝐶}{	 Cost_of_accident	 Cost	of	the	accident,	cost_units	𝐶q|q~×	 C_startup	 Cost	of	a	start-up,	cost_units	SD	 Downtime1	 Facility	restoration	time	after	a	spurious	trip,	hours	𝛿	 discount	 Discount	factor,	percent	%𝑃𝑟q 	 Percent_spare_parts_sensors	 Percentage	of	spare	parts	for	sensors	subsystem	%𝑃𝑟}	 Percent_spare_parts_PLC	 Percentage	of	spare	parts	for	PLCs	subsystem	%𝑃𝑟Ìx 	 Percent_spare_parts_actuators	 Percentage	of	spare	parts	for	actuators	subsystem		 Table	15.	The	output	data,	provided	by	the	function:	Parameter	in	the	model	 Variable	in	Matlab	 Description	𝑃𝐹𝐷|	 obj(1)	 Average	probability	of	failure	on	demand	𝐷𝑇	 obj(2)	 Facility’s	unavailability	𝐶}Ìwxx}w	 obj(3)	 Cost	of	the	lifecycle		
function obj = prog1(arg) 
temp1 = DB_structures(arg(1)); 
M_sensor = temp1(1); 
N_sensor = temp1(2); 
  
temp2 = DB_structures(arg(2)); 
M_PLC = temp2(1); 
N_PLC = temp2(2); 
  
temp3 = DB_structures(arg(3)); 
M_actuator = temp3(1); 
N_actuator = temp3(2); 
  
btemp1 = DB_betta(arg(4));  
betta_sensors = btemp1(1);  
  
btemp2 = DB_betta(arg(5)); 
betta_PLCs = btemp2(1);  
  
btemp3 = DB_betta(arg(6)); 
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betta_actuators = btemp3(1);  
  
TI = DB_TI(arg(7));          
LC_time = Total_time*365*24;  
 
par1 = DB_SENSORS(arg(8)); 
par2 = DB_PLCS(arg(9)); 
par3 = DB_ACTUATORS(arg(10)); 
La_sensors   = structure(M_sensor, N_sensor, par1(1), betta_sensors,   
par1(2), par1(3), par1(4), TI); 
La_PLCs      = structure(M_sensor, N_sensor, par2(1), betta_PLCs,      
par2(2), par2(3), par2(4), TI); 
La_actuators = structure(M_sensor, N_sensor, par3(1), betta_actuators, 
par3(2), par3(3), par3(4), TI); 
  
La_matrix = zeros (9,9); 
La_matrix(1,2) = La_sensors(1); 
La_matrix(1,3) = La_PLCs(1); 
La_matrix(1,4) = La_actuators(1); 
La_matrix(1,5) = La_sensors(2)   + La_sensors(3); 
La_matrix(1,6) = La_PLCs(2)      + La_PLCs(3); 
La_matrix(1,7) = La_actuators(2) + La_actuators(3); 
La_matrix(1,8) = d; 
La_matrix(1,1) = -
(d+La_sensors(1)+La_sensors(2)+La_sensors(3)+La_PLCs(1)+La_PLCs(2)+La_PLCs(
3)+La_actuators(1)+La_actuators(2)+La_actuators(3)); 
  
La_matrix(2,5) = La_PLCs(3)    + La_actuators(3); 
La_matrix(3,6) = La_sensors(3) + La_actuators(3); 
La_matrix(4,7) = La_sensors(3) + La_PLCs(3); 
  
La_matrix(2,9) = d; 
La_matrix(3,9) = d; 
La_matrix(4,9) = d; 
  
La_matrix(2,2) = -(d + La_PLCs(3)    + La_actuators(3)); 
La_matrix(3,3) = -(d + La_sensors(3) + La_actuators(3)); 
La_matrix(4,4) = -(d + La_sensors(3) + La_PLCs(3)); 
  
La_matrix(5,1) = par1(3); 
La_matrix(6,1) = par2(3); 
La_matrix(7,1) = par3(3); 
La_matrix(5,5) = -par1(3); 
La_matrix(6,6) = -par2(3); 
La_matrix(7,7) = -par3(3); 
La_matrix(8,1) = mu_tech; 
La_matrix(8,8) = -mu_tech; 
  
La_m_temp=zeros(8,8); 
for i = 1:8 
    for j = 1:8 
        La_m_temp(i,j) = La_matrix(i,j); 
    end 
end 
Initial_Distrib=zeros(1, 8); 
Initial_Distrib(1)=1; 
  
[T,Y] = ode45(@(t,y) ESD_and_Technology(t,y,La_m_temp), [0 TI], 
Initial_Distrib); 
Y(:,9)=1-Y(:,1)-Y(:,2)-Y(:,3)-Y(:,4)-Y(:,5)-Y(:,6)-Y(:,7)-Y(:,8); 
  
T_unavailability = trapz(T,Y(:,5)) + trapz(T,Y(:,6)) + trapz(T,Y(:,7)); 
T_down_wfunctioningSIS = trapz(T,Y(:,8)); 
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Unavailability = 0; 
Downtime = 0; 
Unavailability = T_down_wfunctioningSIS + trapz(T,Y(:,9)); %OUTPUT 
Downtime = T_down_wfunctioningSIS + T_unavailability; 
  
k=ceil(LC_time/TI); 
for i=2:k 
    Initial_Distrib(1)=Y(length(Y(:,1)),1); 
    Initial_Distrib(2)=0; 
    Initial_Distrib(3)=0; 
    Initial_Distrib(4)=0; 
    Initial_Distrib(5)=Y(length(Y(:,5)),5)+Y(length(Y(:,2)),2); 
    Initial_Distrib(6)=Y(length(Y(:,6)),6)+Y(length(Y(:,3)),3); 
    Initial_Distrib(7)=Y(length(Y(:,7)),7)+Y(length(Y(:,4)),4); 
    Initial_Distrib(8)=Y(length(Y(:,8)),8); 
    [T,Y] = ode45(@(t,y) ESD_and_Technology(t,y,La_m_temp), [TI*(i-1) 
TI*i], Initial_Distrib); 
    Y(:,9)=1-Y(:,1)-Y(:,2)-Y(:,3)-Y(:,4)-Y(:,5)-Y(:,6)-Y(:,7)-Y(:,8); 
     
    T_unavailability = trapz(T,Y(:,5)) + trapz(T,Y(:,6)) + trapz(T,Y(:,7)); 
    T_down_wfunctioningSIS = trapz(T,Y(:,8)); 
    Unavailability = Unavailability + T_down_wfunctioningSIS + 
trapz(T,Y(:,9));  
    Downtime = Downtime + T_down_wfunctioningSIS + T_unavailability;             
end 
  
PFD_avg = Y(length(Y(:,9)),9);  
STR = -log(1-Y(length(Y(:,5)),5)-Y(length(Y(:,6)),6)-
Y(length(Y(:,7)),7))./LC_time; 
  
obj(1) = PFD_avg; 
obj(2) = Unavailability; 
  
C_purch_sens = par1(5); 
C_design_sens = par1(6); 
C_install_sens = par1(7); 
C_consumption_s = par1(8); 
C_purch_PLC = par2(5); 
C_design_PLC = par2(6); 
C_install_PLC = par2(7); 
C_consumption_p = par2(8); 
C_purch_act = par3(5); 
C_design_act = par3(6); 
C_install_act = par3(7); 
C_consumption_a = par3(8); 
  
C_prev_maint_s = par1(9); 
C_prev_maint_p = par2(9); 
C_prev_maint_a = par3(9); 
  
C_repair_perhour_s = par1(10); 
C_repair_perhour_p = par2(10); 
C_repair_perhour_a = par3(10); 
  
C_of_test_s = par1(11); 
C_of_test_p = par2(11); 
C_of_test_a = par3(11); 
  
betta_ps = btemp1(2); 
betta_ds = btemp1(3); 
betta_is = btemp1(4); 
betta_cs = btemp1(5); 
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betta_pp = btemp2(2); 
betta_dp = btemp2(3); 
betta_ip = btemp2(4); 
betta_cp = btemp2(5); 
betta_pa = btemp3(2); 
betta_da = btemp3(3); 
betta_ia = btemp3(4); 
betta_ca = btemp3(5); 
  
C_procurement = C_startup + (C_purch_sens*betta_ps + C_design_sens*betta_ds 
+ C_install_sens*betta_is)*N_sensor + (C_purch_PLC*betta_pp + 
C_design_PLC*betta_dp + C_install_PLC*betta_ip)*N_PLC + 
(C_purch_act*betta_pa + C_design_act*betta_da + 
C_install_act*betta_ia)*N_actuator; 
Cost_operations = (C_consumption_s.*betta_cs+C_prev_maint_s).*N_sensor + 
(C_consumption_p.*betta_cp+C_prev_maint_p).*N_PLC + 
(C_consumption_a.*betta_ca+C_prev_maint_a).*N_actuator + 
(12./TI).*(N_sensor.*C_of_test_s + N_PLC.*C_of_test_p + 
N_actuator.*C_of_test_a); 
Cost_risk = (C_repair_perhour_s + C_repair_perhour_p + C_repair_perhour_a + 
Loss_of_production).*Downtime1.*STR + Percent_spare_parts_sensors.*N_sensor 
+ Percent_spare_parts_PLC.*N_PLC + 
Percent_spare_parts_actuators.*N_actuator.*STR + 
Cost_of_accident.*d.*PFD_avg; 
  
Cost_LC = C_procurement + pvfix(discount/Total_time, Total_time, 
(Cost_operations + Cost_risk), 0, 0);  
obj(3) = Cost_LC; 	In	 addition	 to	 the	 functions,	 the	 algorithm	 refers	 to	 several	 database	 files,	containing	 all	 the	 necessary	 information	 regarding	 the	 possible	 subsystem	 structure,	nomenclature	of	elements,	reliability	characteristics	of	each	element,	as	well	as	the	cost	associated	with	the	choice	of	a	particular	hardware	component.		
3.7 Adaptaion	of	the	Model	to	Complex	SIS	Structures	
In	this	work	we	have	so	 far	considered	the	model	 for	only	one	control	 loop	of	SIS.	Usually,	SIS	consist	of	several	loops,	each	of	those	can	be	modelled	and	optimized	in	the	manner	described	above.	However,	if	we’re	speaking	about	ESD	systems,	the	view	of	the	loop	can	be	different.	The	 purpose	 of	 ESD	 system	 is	 to	 shutdown	 the	 technology,	 which	 usually	implies	 several	 actions	 to	 be	 performed.	 This	 means	 that	 we	 would	 get	 a	 more	complicated	view	of	actuators	subsystem	architecture.	If	in	case	of	an	incident	we	need	to,	 for	 instance,	 close	Valve	Group	1	 and	Valve	Groups	2,	 and	 each	of	 the	 valve	 groups	could	 have	 the	 MooN	 architecture,	 then	 in	 terms	 of	 reliability	 (or,	 with	 the	 help	 of	reliability	blog	diagram)	those	two	systems	will	be	connected	in	a	series.	
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The	same	deduction	is	applicable	for	the	sensors	subsystem.	If	we	have	several	parameters,	for	which	the	critical	ranges	are	defined,	and	in	case	one	of	the	parameters	enters	 this	 range	 then	 the	 full	 shutdown	 of	 the	 facility	 is	 to	 be	 implemented.	 Each	particular	 parameter	 has	 a	 set	 of	 sensors	 that	 can	 be	 organized	 into	 a	 MooN	architecture.	And	the	subsystems	for	each	parameter	would	be	connected	in	a	series	in	terms	of	reliability.	
		Figure	26.	Modified	reliability	block	diagram	for	the	complex	ESD	system	structures		This	increases	the	number	of	states	for	the	Markov	model.	The	example	is	given	below.		 	
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	 Table	16.	Modified	table	of	the	Markov	process	states.	
	 EMERGENCY	SHUTDOWN	SYSTEM	 Technology	Transmitters	Parameter	1	 Transmitters	Parameter	2	 Logic	Solvers	 Valves	Line	1	 Valves	Line	1	1	 working	 working	 working	 working	 working	 working	2	 failed	(DU)	 working	 working	 working	 working	 working	3	 working	 failed	(DU)	 working	 working	 working	 working	4	 working	 working	 failed	(DU)	 working	 working	 working	5	 working	 working	 working	 failed	(DU)	 working	 working	6	 working	 working	 working	 working	 failed	(DU)	 working	7	 under	maintenance	 working	 working	 working	 working	 stopped	8	 working	 under	maintenance	 working	 working	 working	 stopped	9	 working	 working	 under	maintenance	 working	 working	 stopped	10	 working	 working	 working	 under	maintenance	 working	 stopped	11	 working	 working	 working	 working	 under	maintenance	 stopped	12	 working	 working	 working	 working	 working	 stopped	(due	to	incident)	13	 failure	 	 incident		
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4 COMPUTATIONAL	EXAMPLE	
4.1 Description	of	a	Case	
We	 will	 consider	 application	 of	 the	 SIS	 design	 methodology	 proposed	 in	Chapter	3	on	the	example	of	heating	facility	project.	The	data	was	provided	by	Rosneft,	one	of	the	largest	vertically	integrated	companies	in	Russia.		Line	 heater	 is	 a	 technological	 unit	 often	 used	 in	 oil	 and	 gas	 production	 and	treatment	 infrastructure.	 Its	 purpose	 is	 to	 heat	 oil	 emulsions,	 highly	 viscous	 oil	 for	easier	transportation	via	pipelines.	Basically,	the	unit	is	a	furnace,	where	the	energy	of	burning	the	fuel	gas	is	used	for	heating	the	flow	through	the	line.	The	following	documents	were	analyzed:	
• Technical	and	commercial	proposal	
• Request	for	project	proposal	
• The	automation	system	project	documentation	According	 to	 GOST	R	51330.17-99	 Electrical	 apparatus	 for	 explosive	atmospheres	(adaptation	of	IEC	60079-18-92),	for	the	line	heater	the	Apparatus	Group	of	the	hazardous,	explosive	atmosphere	is	IIA	(which	indicates	that	the	facility	belongs	to	the	most	dangerous	class	processes).	The	parameters	which	were	identified	as	potentially	dangerous,	are	provided	in	the	table	below.	Table	17.	Identification	of	critical	range	for	technological	parameters.	
#	 Parameter	/	Process	Value	 Critical	Range		 Frequency	of	occurrence,	1/year	1	 Temperature	of	the	arc		 Threshold	HH	=	850	°C	 0,03	2	 Flame	detected	on	main	burner	 No	flame	detected	 0,08		In	 case	 any	 of	 the	 events,	 described	 in	 Table	 17	 takes	 place,	 the	 following	actions	are	to	be	taken:	
• open	the	valve	for	discharging	the	fuel	gas	to	flare;	
• closing	valves	on	the	input	and	output	lines.	
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4.2 Project	Documentation	Analysis	
The	 information	 about	 the	 project	 had	 been	 provided	 by	 Russian	 oil	 and	 gas	company	Rosneft	in	the	form	of	project	documentation.	The	documentation	consists	of	the	 several	 stages,	 which	 were	 analyzed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 highlighting	 the	requirements	to	the	safety	systems.	The	 analysed	 documentation	 corresponds	 to	 the	 following	 system	implementation	work	phases	(see	table	below).	Table	18.	Scope	of	system	implementation	work	done	in	the	framework	of	the	project,	corresponding	to	the	requirements	of	GOST	34.601-90	“Computer-Aided	Systems.	Implementation	Milestones”.		Milestones	 Work	Phases	 Contractor	
1.	Requirements	definition	
1.1.	Facility	survey	and	grounding	of	PCS	necessity	 Design	developer	1.2.	Definition	of	user	requirements	to	PCS	 Design	developer	1.3.	 Development	 of	 completed	 work	 report	 and	requisition	 for	 PCS	 development	 (top	 level	specifications)	 Design	developer	
2.	PCS	development	
2.1.	Facility	study	 Design	developer	2.2.	Due	research	engineering	 Design	developer	2.3.	Development	of	PCS	concept	options,	meeting	user’s	requirements	 Design	developer	2.4.	Preparation	of	completed	work	report	 Design	developer	3.	Requirements	Specification	 Development	and	approval	of	Requirements	Specification	for	PCS	implementation	 Design	developer	&	Operator	company	
4.	Engineering	design	
4.1.	Development	of	concepts	for	the	system	and	its	parts	 Design	developer	4.2.	Design	development	for	PCS	and	its	parts	 Design	developer	4.3.	 Development	 and	 issue	 of	 documents	 for	 PCS	components	 supply	 and	 (or)	 Requirements	Specification	for	their	design	 Design	developer	4.4.	Development	of	task	orders	for	automated	facility	interfacing	parts	design	engineering	 Design	developer	5.	Detailed	design	 5.1.	Development	of	detailed	design	for	the	system	and	its	parts	 Engineering	company	(System	
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integrator)	5.2.	Software	development	or	adaptation	 System	integrator	
6.	Commissioning	
6.1.	Automated	facility	preparation	for	PCS	commissioning	 System	integrator	6.2.	Personnel	training	 System	integrator	6.3.	 PCS	 packaging	 with	 supplied	 components	(software	 and	 hardware,	 software	 and	 hardware	systems,	information	tools).	 System	integrator	6.4.	Civil	&	installation	works	 System	integrator	6.5.	Pre-commissioning	 System	integrator	6.6.	Pre-testing	 System	integrator	6.7.	Pilot	operation	 System	integrator	6.8.	Acceptance	tests	 System	integrator	
7.	PCS	support	 7.1.	Works	according	to	warranty	 System	integrator	7.2.	Post-warranty	service	 System	integrator		Below,	there’s	an	excerpt	from	the	actual	Requirement	specification	document	developed	by	Rosneft	during	the	“Request	for	project	proposal”	phase.	
Requirements	for	emergency	shutdown	system	
Emergency	 shutdown	 system	 (ESD)	 must	 control	 process	 critical	 parameters	 and	 stop	
process	system	in	case	of	parameter	deviations	from	set	points	and	on	operator’s	manual	
intervention.	
Emergency	 shutdown	 system	 (ESD)	 shall	 be	 equipped	with	 continuous	 control	 and	 alert	
facilities.	The	 system	 shall	 allow	 restart	of	 the	 system	or	unit	 only	after	 shutdown	cause	
removal	and	failure	alarm	reset	or	positive	locking.	
ESD	 system	 shall	 be	 based	 on	 dedicated	 primary	 instruments	 and	 actuators.	 Emergency	
message	and	event	sequence	recorders	shall	be	provided.	
Gas	detectors	shall	be	installed	at	process	sites	and	production	facilities.	
Failure	 of	 ESD	 system	 detectors	 shall	 not	 cause	 any	 automatic	 actions	 for	 process	
equipment.	
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ESD	alarm	signals	shall	be	transmitted	to	individual	ESD	WKS.	Operator	WKS	is	a	human-
machine	 interface	 element	 for	 tripping	 functions,	 and	 these	 functions	 shall	 provide	 the	
following	at	a	minimum:	
• review	mnemonic	diagrams	(video	frames)	with	warning	signal	output;	
• detailed	mnemonic	 diagrams	 (video	 frames)	with	warning	 signal	 output,	
details	of	failure	recovery	and	suppression;	
• control	of	blocking	and	suppression	for	inputs	and	outputs;	
• confirmation	and	reset	of	warning	signals.	
Process	 operational	 system	 facilities	 shall	 be	 provided	 for	 cutoff	 devices	 for	 periodic	
inspection	of	control	circuit	integrity,	and	instrumentation	monitoring	system	(IMS)	shall	
be	provided	with	functional	testing	subsystem	for	cutoff	devices	with	partial	stroke.	In	this	
case	protective	function	always	has	priority	over	test	function	and,	 if	necessary,	gives	the	
closing	signal.	
Analog	input	monitoring	shall	be	provided	for	signal	verification.	In	case	of	external	signal	
shutdown	or	overrun	the	warning	signal	shall	be	sent	to	operator.	
Plant	restart	shall	be	possible	only	after	manual	reset	(acknowledgment).	
Configuration	of	ESD	system	shall	be	provided	for	process	transfer	to	safe	condition	in	case	
of	equipment	failure.	
ESD	system	shall	also	include	the	following	components	and	facilities	at	a	minimum:	
• ESD	visualization	system	being	a	part	of	operator	workstation	software;	
• data	 acquisition	 and	 control	 generation	 devices	 (ESD	 PLC	 with	
input/output	modules)	located	in	system	cabinets;	
• industrial	communication	modules;	
• marshalling	cabinets;	
Event	 sequence	 recording	 system	 (recorder)	 (ESR)	 shall	 be	 provided	 for	 reception	 and	
recording	 the	 sequence	 of	 events	 generated	 by	 ESD	 system	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 by	 DCS	
system	 with	 assignment	 of	 the	 event	 date	 and	 time	 as	 well	 as	 sequence	 recording	 on	
intrinsic	magnetic	rigid	disks	for	further	printing	and	analysis.	The	presented	passage	 from	the	documentation	reveals	 that	 the	requirements	to	 the	 design	 implementation	 of	 the	 safety	 systems	 are	 insufficient	 and	 not	 specific	enough.	Therefore,	further	the	attempt	of	providing	such	requirements	will	be	made	by	applying	the	modelling	framework	described	in	the	previous	chapter.	It	is	proposed	that	
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the	configuration	of	ESD	system	that	will	be	obtained	further	can	be	used	as	a	starting	point	for	the	phase	“Detailed	design”.	
4.3 Data	for	the	Optimization	Run	
The	equipment	alternatives	are	given	in	the	following	tables:	Table	19	through	Table	22.	 Table	19.	Database	of	temperature	sensors.	
Alternatives	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Model	 Metran-281-Exia	 TPU	0304	 Yokogawa	YTA310	 Rosemount	3144P	 ABB	TPS300	Dangerous	failure	rate	1/hour	 2·10-5	 2,86·10-5	 5·10-6	 9·10-7	 7,14·10-7	Spurious	trip	rate,	1/hour	 1·10-5	 1·10-5	 4,6·10-6	 4,6·10-7	 4,8·10-7	Diagnostic	coverage,	%	 60%	 60%	 89%	 80%	 90%	Purchase	cost,		RUB	 8000	 5000	 15000	 20000	 30000	Design	cost,	RUB	 600	 300	 300	 250	 270	
Installation	cost,	RUB	 300	 350	 300	 250	 250	Consumption	cost	per	year,	RUB	 400	 150	 350	 300	 200	Maintenance	cost	per	year,	RUB	 4000	 3000	 2500	 2500	 2700	Repair	cost	per	hour,	RUB	 50	 50	 40	 40	 40	Test	cost,	RUB	 100	 90	 100	 80	 100		 Table	20.	Database	of	flame	detectors.	
Alternatives	 1	 2	
Model	 Parus-002	UF-1	 SNP-OE-1	
Dangerous	failure	rate	1/hour	 1·10-5	 1,67·10-5	
Spurious	trip	rate,	1/hour	 1·10-5	 1·10-5	
Diagnostic	coverage,	%	 75%	 80%	
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Purchase	cost,	RUB	 12000	 8000	
Design	cost,	RUB	 500	 400	
Installation	cost,	RUB	 500	 500	
Consumption	cost	per	year,	RUB	 200	 250	
Maintenance	cost	per	year,	RUB	 2000	 2000	
Repair	cost	per	hour,	RUB	 40	 50	
Test	cost,	RUB	 80	 50		 For	the	sensors	subsystem,	the	percentage	of	spare	parts	is	fixed	as	20%.		 Table	21.	Database	of	programmable	logic	controllers.	
Alternatives	 1	 2	 3	
Model	 Rockwell	ControlLogix	5555	 Emerson	DeltaV	SLS1508	 ABB	800xA	Dangerous	failure	rate	1/hour	 9,11·10-7	 1,25·10-6	 5,96·10-6	
Spurious	trip	rate,	1/hour	 8,33·10-7	 1,09·10-6	 5,5·10-6	
Diagnostic	coverage,	%	 90%	 98%	 97%	
Purchase	cost,	RUB	 450000	 250000	 150000	
Design	cost,	RUB	 20000	 15000	 12000	
Installation	cost,	RUB	 10000	 5000	 10000	
Consumption	cost	per	year,	RUB	 10000	 10000	 10000	
Maintenance	cost	per	year,	RUB	 40000	 30000	 40000	
Repair	cost	per	hour,	RUB	 100	 300	 100	
Test	cost,	RUB	 2000	 2000	 2000		For	the	sensors	subsystem,	the	percentage	of	spare	parts	is	fixed	as	30%.	
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Table	22.	Database	of	valves.	
Alternatives	 1	 2	
Model	 Roost	3-km	series	 Fisher	GX	
Dangerous	failure	rate	1/hour	 6,67·10-5	 4·10-5	
Spurious	trip	rate,	1/hour	 3,33·10-5	 3,33·10-5	
Diagnostic	coverage,	%	 10%	 20%	
Purchase	cost,	RUB	 16000	 30000	
Design	cost,	RUB	 13000	 18000	
Installation	cost,	RUB	 10000	 5000	
Consumption	cost	per	year,	RUB	 10000	 10000	
Maintenance	cost	per	year,	RUB	 10000	 10000	
Repair	cost	per	hour,	RUB	 800	 800	
Test	cost,	RUB	 1000	 1000		For	the	final	control	elements	subsystem,	the	percentage	of	spare	parts	is	fixed	at	20%.		The	following	constraints	are	applied	with	regards	to	the	feasible	architectures:	
• feasible	 architectures	 for	 the	 transmitter	 subsystem:	1oo1,	 1oo2,	 1oo3,	1oo4,	2oo2	and	2oo3.	
• feasible	architectures	 for	 the	 logic	 solver	 subsystem:	1oo1,	1oo2,	1oo3,	1oo4	and	2oo3.	
• Feasible	 architectures	 for	 the	 final	 control	 elements:	 1oo1,	 1oo2,	 1oo3,	1oo4,	2oo2,	2oo3.	The	following	constraints	are	applied	with	regards	to	the	common-cause	failure	factor:	
• The	value	for	β-factor	is	0,035	for	the	standard	solution	with	regards	to	the	electrical	separation	of	the	circuits	of	the	devices.	
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• The	value	for	β-factor	is	0,02	if	the	additional	measures	of	the	electrical	separation	are	applied.	The	 values	 of	 cost	 modifiers,	 corresponding	 to	 the	 decision	 making	 on	 the	 electrical	separation	are	estimated	in	the	table	below:	Table	23.	Cost	modifiers	corresponding	to	β-factor.	
Cost	modifier	 Standard	alternative	 Additional	electrical	separation	Purchase	cost	modifier	𝛽×~xÚ	 1,15	 1,35	Design	cost	modifier	𝛽vw	 1,05	 1,1	Installation/commissioning	cost	modifier	𝛽q	 1,1	 1,25	Consumption	cost	modifier	𝛽x{	 1,2	 1,35		 The	repair	rate	(or	restoration	rate)	is	pessimistically	estimated	as	0,125	hour-1	because	of	the	requirements	of	repair	within	8	hours	since	the	failure	is	detected	by	the	diagnostics.	 This	 value	 is	 pessimistic,	 because,	 according	 to	 chief	 project	 engineers	department	 statement,	 most	 of	 the	 failed	 tools	 are	 fixed	 within	 2	 hours	 from	 the	moment	when	a	failure	is	detected.	With	regards	to	the	duration	of	the	test	interval	(TI),	it	can	vary	from	1	month	to	24	months	with	1	month	step.	The	duration	of	the	Lifecycle	is	12	years.	The	down	time	of	the	technology	after	the	spurious	tripping	is	48	hours.	The	losses	due	to	the	shutdown	are	2500	RUB	per	hour.	The	 expected	 loss	 due	 to	 one	 hazardous	 event	 occurrence	 is	 estimates	 as	10	000	000	RUB.	
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4.4 Results	of	the	Optimization	Run	
The	problem	of	choosing	the	SIS	specification	was	run	in	Matlab	with	the	use	of	
gamultiobj	 solver	 within	 the	 Optimization	 toolbox.	 The	 following	 settings	 for	multi-objective	genetic	algorithm	were	applied:	
• population:	200	 individuals,	 initial	population	created	with	the	uniform	distribution.	
• number	of	generations:	300,	
• selection	function:	tournament	(built-in	function),		
• generational	gap:	0,8	(or	80%),	
• crossover	fraction	0.8,	single-point	crossover,	
• mutation	function:	Gaussian.	The	 problem	was	 solved	 in	 the	 unconstrained	 formulation,	 i.e.	 only	 the	 three	objective	function	values	(probability	of	failure	on	demand,	downtime	and	lifecycle	cost)	were	 sought	 to	 be	 minimized,	 and	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 bounds	 on	 choosing	 the	alternatives	from	the	databases	of	equipment	were	provided.	The	resulting	Pareto-front	is	demonstrated	along	with	the	initial	population	on	the	 figures	blow.	Figure	27	demonstates	the	3-dimentional	plot	of	all	 the	values	of	 the	objective	 function	 for	 all	 obtained	 solutions.	 The	 Pareto-frintier	 is	 given	 in	 black	 “x”	marks.	In	total	we	received	24	solutions	in	the	Pareto-frontier.	Figure	28	demonstrated	the	 relations	 between	 the	 values	 of	 each	 pair	 of	 objectives	 for	 the	 solutions	 in	 the	Pareto-frontier.		
	Figure	27.	Results	of	optimization	run.		
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	Figure	28.	Pairwise	comparison	of	the	values	of	objectives.		
4.5 Discussion	of	the	Results	
From	the	results	in	Figure	28	we	can	conclude	that	PFDavg	and	the	unavailability	time	 are	 generally	 not	 conflicting	 objectives.	 This	 is	 clear	 because	 the	 failure	 of	 the	equipment	contributes	greatly	into	the	value	of	the	unavailability	time.			PFDavg	 and	 Clifecycle	 are	 conflicting	 oblectives	 with	 regards	 to	 Pareto-optimal	front.	This	can	also	be	observed	from	consideration	of	the	cost	of	hazards	occurrence,	i.e.	the	cost	of	a	catastrophic	event,	which	is	a	considerably	large	number.		System’s	downtime	and	 its	 lifecycle	 cost	 also	demonstrate	 conflictive	 relation.	The	 relation	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 PFDavg	 and	 Clifecycle	 relation,	 because	 failures	 are	 the	domninant	factor	in	the	unavailability	consideration.	As	a	drawback	of	the	applied	methodology	we	can	observe	Figure	27	and	Figure	28	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 solution	 in	 the	 Pareto-frontier	 is	 non-uniform.	 This	 is	obviously	the	issue	of	the	heuristic	algorithm	applied	in	this	work.	There	are	methods	of	improving	 the	 quality	 of	 this	 distribution.	 For	 example,	 in	 (Torres-Echeverria	 and	Thompson	 2007)	 the	 authors	 propose	 to	 run	 the	 solver	 10	 times,	 and	 provide	 the	optimal	solution	 from	each	run	 into	 the	 following	run	as	a	new	 initial	population.	The	authours	claim	that	this	provides	more	diversity	and	results	in	a	better	Pareto-front.	Now	 we	 should	 make	 a	 decision	 on	 choosing	 the	 architecture	 for	 the	 ESD	system.	We	have	obtained	23	solutions;	however	we	need	to	achieve	a	certain	 level	of	
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safety	integrity.	In	accordance	with	the	requirements,	stated	for	ESD	in	Tаble	6,	we	need	to	achieve	SIL	III	and	the	PFDavg	at	the	level	of	1,7·10-4.	This	is	derived	from:	𝑃𝐹𝐷| = þÿ!ÿvþ ,	 (	59	)	Here,	𝐹q{}w|"}w = 1 ∙ 10oÐ	is	our	target	frequency	of	the	hazardous	events	occurrence.		If	 we	 apply	 this	 constraint	 for	 the	 safety	 integrity	 level	 to	 our	 results,	 i.e.	 we	 choose	among	our	23	solutions	only	those	which	have	PFDavg	≤1,7·10-4,	we	would	end	up	with	only	 10	 solutions.	 Additional	 considertations	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 choose	 the	 best	alternative	among	the	remaining	10.	For	example,	we	can	address	the	value	of	estimated	losses	 due	 to	 potential	 incidents	 and	 the	 total	 downtime.	 If	 we	 apply	 such	 a	 kind	 of	thinking,	we	would	obtain	one	solution,	for	which	the	specification	is	provided	further:	Transmitters	subsystem:	1oo4.	PLC	subsystem:	1oo2.	Actuators	subsystem:	1oo1.	Temerature	sensor:	Yokogawa	YTA310.	Flame	detector:	Parus-002	UF-1	PLC:	Emerson	DeltaV	SLS1508.	Valves:	Fisher	GX.	Test	interval:	2	months.	Additional	 electrical	 separation	 is	 applied	 to	 the	 transmitters	 subsystem,	 and	not	applied	to	the	PLCs	and	valves	subsystems.		For	such	a	specification,	the	values	of	the	objective	functions	are	as	follows:	𝑃𝐹𝐷| = 4,0108 · 10oÐ,	𝐷𝑇 = 192	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠	over	the	12	years	lifecycle,	and	𝐶}Ìwxx}w = 3	571	978	𝑅𝑈𝐵	over	the	12	years	lifecycle.		
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4.6 ESD	 System	 Design	 for	 the	 Required	 Value	 of	 Risk	
Reduction	Factor	
In	 this	 section	we	will	 address	 the	methodology	 that	was	 applied	 in	 order	 to	obtain	 the	 specification	 for	 the	 ESD	 system	 design	 by	 the	 engineering	 organization,	which	implemented	the	considered	project.	
For the ESD system design in accordance with IEC 61508 the following steps are 
applied: 
1. The frequency of occurrence of critical incidents for each critical parameter in the 
absence of the ESD are determined. Note that in the absence of layers of protection the 
frequency of incidents is equal to the frequency of accidents. 
2. The acceptable frequency of incidents for each critical area is determined. 
3. The required value of the risk reduction factor (RRF), for each critical area, to 
ensure an acceptable frequency accidents and accordingly to ensure the third class of risk. For 
the chosen value of the risk reduction factor is also possible to determine the required value of 
safety integrity level (SIL), according to the tables provided in IEC 61508. 
4. The specification for ESD that provides the desired RRF level for each critical 
area. 
It should be noted that as a result of identifying the ESD, to achieve the required 
RRF (and therefore acceptable frequency), turns out some many variants of the ESD system 
are acceptable options and there is no clear guidance on which a decision-maker should 
choose. In this perspective it is generally common to choose the variant of ESD, which 
provides the acceptable frequency of accidents at a minimal cost. The example of the 
conducted analysis is provided below. Table	24.	The required values of RRF. №	 Hazards	 Occurrece	frequency	[1/year]	 Acceptable	frequency	[1/year]	 Required	RRF	1	 Temperature	of	the	arc	 0,03	 0.001	 30	
2	 The	presence	of	the	flame	on	the	1st		basic	burner	 0.08	 0.001	 80	
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To ensure the required values RRF and respectively the desired frequency of 
accidents it is necessary to carry out the desing of ESD. For this the same alternatives as 
provided in the data in section 4.2 are used, however, those options of the ESD design that 
provide the required RRF, were considered. Following this same problem setting, the 
engineering organization came up with this specification as an alternative that was 
implemented in practice: Transmitters	subsystem:	1oo1.	PLC	subsystem:	1oo1.	Actuators	subsystem:	1oo2.	Temerature	sensor:	Rosemount	3144P	Flame	detector:	Parus-002	UF-1	PLC:	Rockwell	Allen-Bradley	ContolLogix	5555.	Valves:	Fisher	GX.	Test	interval:	3	months.	Additional	electrical	separation	is	not	applied.		For	such	a	specification,	the	values	of	the	objective	functions	are	as	follows:	𝑃𝐹𝐷| = 1,6376 · 10oÎ,	𝐷𝑇 = 315	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠	over	the	12	years	lifecycle,	and	𝐶}Ìwxx}w = 3	933	558	𝑅𝑈𝐵	over	the	12	years	lifecycle.	
 
Below the comparison of the obtained solution with 10 solutions from the obtained 
Pareto-front (including the requirement for the SIL) is demonstrated. Figure	29 depicts the 10 
solution from the Pareto-front with red “x” marks, and the specification obtained in this 
section with blue “o” mark.  
The solution, intended to provide the necessary level of risk-reduction, does indeed 
satisfy the requirement for average probability of failure on demand (	62	). However, we can 
observe from Figure	 29 that this solution is strictly dominated by 5 other solution from 
Pareto-front. And with regards to the expected downtime, the last obtained solution is much 
worse than the solution from the Pareto-front. 
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 Figure	29.	Comparison of solutions. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS	 AND	 SUGGESTIONS	 FOR	 FURTHER	
RESEARCH	
Cоnsideratiоn	of	dfferent	kinds	of	uncertainty	is	a	very	impоrtand	aspect	оf	any	planning	wоrk.	Its	importance	become	even	mоre	significant,	when	we’re	addressing	the	оperatiоns	implemented	in	highly-haardous	environments.		Оil	and	gas	industry	is	crucial	fоr	mоdern	society.	The	operatiоns	оf	petroleum	productiоn	 are	 assоciated	 with	 significant	 dangers,	 and	 thus	 the	 cоnsideratiоn	 оf	hazards	and	their	consequences	should	nоt	be	ignоred.		Mоst	 aspects	 оf	 safety	 are	 considered	 during	 the	 planning	 stage	 of	 any	particular	 frоject.	The	very	 first	measures	 that	are	planned	tо	be	 implemented	are	 the	barriers	that	help	preveting	the	pоtentially	hazardоus	situations.	In	this	work	we	have	addressed	 the	 issues	 of	 planning	 the	 safety	 system	 for	 the	 petrоleum	 prоductiоn	infrastructure.	In	petrоleum	industry,	the	autоmated	control	systems	play	a	significant	role	 in	 preventing	 the	 hazards	 from	 оccurring.	 The	 basic	 level	 is	 represented	 by	 the	districbuted	 cоntrоl	 system.	 The	 mоst	 impоrtant	 safety	 measure	 is	 the	 emergency	shutdown	system,	which	provides	the	largest	risk	reductiоn	by	safely	shutting	dоwn	the	prоcess	оf	technоlоgy.	There	are	international	standards	adapted	in	many	countries	for	those	systems.	The	standards	name	the	systems	“Safety	Instumented	Systems”.	Mоdelling	 and	 designing	 the	 particular	 architecture	 оf	 SIS	 is	 an	 exhausting	prоcess,	which	requires	a	lоt	оf	knowledge	of	the	process	itself,	оf	the	hardware	tооls,	its	reliability	 characteristics,	 and	 the	 safety	 indicatоrs	 that	 prоvide	 the	 comprehensive	description	of	the	system	behaviоur.		This	wоrk	is	fоcused	on	the	application	оf	SIS	tо	the	infrastructure	planning	in	Russian	 engineering	 practice.	 We	 have	 оbserved	 on	 the	 examples	 from	 Russian	researchers	and	frоm	Russian	engineering	cоmpanies	that	the	methоds	and	techniques	applied	tо	SIS	design	fall	behind	the	achievement	of	state-of-the-art	research.	Designing	the	specificatiоn	оf	SIS	is	a	very	impоrtant	decisiоn,	implemented	by	the	 engineering	 оrganization	 when	 they	 plan	 the	 infrastructures	 for	 oil	 and	 gas	productiоn.	 In	 оrder	 tо	 оbtain	 the	 gоod	 alternatives	 for	 the	 SIS	 specification	we	 have	applied	 the	 multicriteria	 optimization	 which	 included	 both	 reliability	 and	 economic	evaluatiоn	apprоaches.	Intrоducing	a	SIS	and	with	cоnsideratiоn	of	the	processes’	safety	
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integrity	proves	to	be	economically	efficient,	because	it	helps	reduce	the	tоtal	cоst	оf	the	lifecycle.	Thе	Pаrеtо-оptimаl	sеt	hаs	fаr	bеttеr	trаdе-оffs	(е.g.	must	lоwеr	cоsts)	thаt	thе	initiаl	sоlutiоns.	It	was	sееn	that	 the	оptimizatiоn	algorithm	in	 the	given	problem	setting	gives	preference	 to	 components	with	better	 reliability	 specifications	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 higher	acquisitiоn	cоst.	Reductiоn	оf	common	cause	 failure	 is	also	 important	and	at	 the	same	time	 costly	 decisiоn.	 It	 has	 been	 nоted	 that	 the	 prоposed	 problem	 setting	 guides	 the	algorithm	to	choose	the	lower	value	fоr	the	factоr	fоr	architectures	with	a	high	level	оf	redundancy.	As	a	suggestiоn	for	further	research	the	author	proposes	elabоrating	the	mоdels	by	 incоrpоrating	 the	 diverse	 redundancy	 into	 the	 model.	 In	 this	 work,	 we	 have	considered	 different	 schemes	 оf	 redundancy,	 hоwever	 fоr	 each	 alternative	 we	 have	cоnsidered	 оne	 and	 the	 same	mоdel	 of	 the	 tool.	 The	 reliability	 characteristics	 of	 the	safety	system	could	be	imprоved	by	intrоducing	the	different	mоdels	оf	a	similar	kind	оf	the	equipment	into	the	redundant	solutions.	Anоther	 suggestiоn	 fоr	 further	 develоpments	 in	 the	 field	 оf	 mоdelling	 оf	 SIS	functiоning	 with	 a	 particular	 process	 by	 introducing	 different	 alternatives	 for	 testing	policies	 and	 the	 approaches	 to	 parallel/sequential/staggered	 testing	 schemes.	 Such	mоdelling	 cоuld	 be	 used	 tо	 determine	 the	 number	 оf	 emplоyees	 and	 their	 schedules.	This	is	a	very	important	direction	of	work,	because	many	оil	and	gas	prоductiоn	site	in	Russia	 are	 lоcated	 in	 underpopulated	 regions,	 and	 the	 transportatiоn	 оf	 staff	 tо	 the	working	places	 (the	 facilities)	and	back	 is	highly	 inconvenient	and	costly.	At	 the	same	time,	given	that	employees	live	far	frоm	their	wоrkplace,	they	wоrk	3	to	6	months	shifts.	In	this	particular	setting,	it	is	important	tо	estimate	the	number	оf	wоrkers	and	working	crews	 that	 should	 be	 available	 for	 conducting	 the	 testing	 prоcedures,	 ensuring	 the	cоrrect	work	of	the	facility.	
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APPENDIX	 A.	 	 QUANTIFICATION	 OF	 RISKS.	 RISK	 CLASS	
ASCERTAINMENT	WITH	EVENT	TREE	METHOD	
We	will	determine	a	class	of	risk	of	the	technological	process.	 It	 is	required	to	carry	out	the	following	actions:	Step	 1.	 Consider	 the	 technological	 units	 within	 the	 facility,	 for	 which	 we’re	conducting	the	analysis,	separately.	Generally,	a	technological	process	can	have	several	technological	units.	Step	 2.	 Determine	 frequency	 F	 of	 ith	 dangerous	 event	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	technological	 parameter	 of	 the	 unit,	 we’re	 addressing,	 moves	 to	 the	 critical	 area.	Frequency	 F	 can	 be	 found	 by	 various	 methods	 which	 are	 applied	 depending	 on	 the	initial	data	which	is	available	at	a	designer	of	safety	systems.	One	of	such	methods	is	a	quantitative	method	which	is	based	on	building	a	tree	of	events,	see	figure	below.		
	Figure	30.	Event	tree.	Example	adopted	from	Shershukova	(2013c)		In	the	tree	of	events	the	following	designations	are	used:		0	–	state	of	the	technology,	when	values	of	technological	parameters	are	within	their	nominal	range;	
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	CR	 –	 state	 of	 the	 technology,	 when	 values	 of	 technological	 parameters	 have	moved	to	their	critical	range;		A,	 B,	 C,	 D	 –	 state	 of	 the	 technology,	 when	 the	 corresponding	 groups	 of	dangerous	consequences	take	place;	
d	–	incident	rate,	characterizing	the	transition	from	0	into	CR;	
Pi	-	probability	of	ith	consequence.	From	the	analysis	of	the	tree	of	events	given	on	the	figure	above,	it	follows	that	required	frequency	is	defined	by	a	ratio:	𝐹 = 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃,			𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷.	 (	60	)		If	 numeric	 values	d	 and	Pi	 aren't	 known,	 then	 for	 calculation	of	Fi	 one	 can	be	done	with	a	combined	method	of	an	assessment.		Step	2.1	The	frequency	of	moving	to	the	critical	range	is	given	by	its	lower	dLB	and	upper	bounds	dUB.	Table	25.	Estimation	of	frequency	of	a	parameter	moving	to	its	critical	values	range.	Example	adopted	from	Shershukova	(2013c)		 Qualitative	characteristic	 Ranges	of	frequencies	[1/hour]	1	 Low	 10-6	<	d	<	10-5	2	 Medium	 10-5	<	d	<	10-4	3	 High	 10-4	<	d	<	10-3		Step	 2.2	 The	 probability	 of	 dangerous	 consequences	 are	 estimated	 with	 the	following	scale.	The	table	is	made	for	each	group	i	of	the	consequences.	
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Table	26.	Point	assessment	of	dangerous	consequence	probability.		Example	adopted	from	Shershukova	(2013c)		 Qualitative	characteristic	 Bi	(points)	1	 Impossible	 0	2	 Low	 3	3	 Medium	 6	4	 High	 9		Then	the	probability	Pi	of	the	ith	consequence	is	estimated	as:	
𝑃 = 𝐵𝐵 ,			𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷.	 (	61	)		And	further	the	range	to	which	Fi	belongs	is	determined:	𝐹 ∈ 𝑑Ô, ∙ 𝑃 𝑑¡, ∙ 𝑃 ,			𝑖 = 𝐴,𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷.	 (	62	)		Step	 3.	 Frequency	 of	 dangerous	 consequences	 from	 the	 each	 group	A,B,C,D	 is	defined	 for	 all	 critical	 parameters	 for	 all	 the	 units	 of	 the	 facility,	 and	 then	 the	 total	frequency	is	obtained	as	a	summation	of	frequencies	for	each	parameter.	Step	 4.	 The	 class	 of	 risk	 of	 a	 technological	 process	 is	 determined	 by	 a	 couple	(i,	Fi).	 	Table	 27.	 Risk	 assessment.	 List	 of	 critical	 parameters.	 Example	 adopted	 from	Shershukova	(2013c)	N	 Critical	Parameter	1	 Combustion	exhaust	gas	temperature	2	 No	flame	on	the	main	burner.		For	every	critical	parameter	the	combined	method	is	applied	
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Table	28.	Summary	of	risk	assessment.	Example	adopted	from	Shershukova	(2013c)	
N	 Group	of	consequences	 Frequency	of	occurrence		d	
Probability	of	a	consequence	 Frequency	Fi	Bi	points	 Probability	Pi	 FLBi	 FUBi	
1		 Marginal	 0,03	 6	 0,67	 0,01	 0,1	Critical	 3	 0,33	 0,001	 0,01	2	 Critical	 0,08	 9	 1	 0,01	 0,1		The	summation	of	the	values	of	Fi	for	all	the	parameters,	would	result	in	a	pair:	(i=C,	F=0,11),	 i.e.	 dangerous	 events	with	 critical	 consequences	 occur	with	 the	average	frequency	0,11	[1/year].	This	would	give	us	the	class	I	of	risk.	
